On Jun 13, 2011, at 8:38 PM, Jan Brittenson <b...@rockgarden.net> wrote:
> > On Jun 12, 2011, at 5:26 PM, David Barrett wrote: > >> >> For example, assuming we already had some sort of mesh network >> capability (via wifi or bluetooth or whatever), perhaps have nodes >> synchronize their clocks such that they only agree to send/receive >> according to some psuedorandom intervals? Even more interesting if it >> combined GPS such that the broadcast periods could be derived from >> actual physical location. So two nodes that have never communicated but >> know some shared secret (eg, a password) could check their positions and >> figure out "I don't know if anybody is around me, but if there *is*, >> they'll be online for 60s at 5:23pm." >> > > I think all you need is something that can be turned on at specific times, to > get a message > out. Then shut it off. People will have their phones on, then all of a > sudden they get service, a > text message or two, after which the service promptly drops again. A station > only needs to be > on long enough to get the message out. ... and to receive the acknowledgement regarding said message. > A small portable unit could be in a car or on a roof, > or it could sit next to your table in a bag as you sit and drink or eat. Or > while you walk down the > street. I don't think broadcasts need to be scheduled; simply turn it on > when you have > something to forward. > > So it's about creating a simple, cheap, lightweight station that can look > like a 'real' mobile > network, allowing phones to connect and that can send text messages. To > distribute a message > to a large number of people you'd have a topology where operators receive > messages like > anyone else and propagate it. It doesn't seem anything terribly complicated > is needed, or > even desirable. > > I think the main challenge is how to prevent a regime from hijacking the > network. This will > probably require an organized structure with isolation, redundancy, a > revocation protocol, > and careful safeguarding at the top. The number of dissident operated devices need only outweigh a "regime" in order to protect the network. The same rules apply to most overlay networks. > For instance, if operator A propagates messages from > B or C, then B or C might be redundant. If C0 is compromised C1 is > activates, and starts by > notifying A of the compromise. (C2 is then activated if C1 is compromised.) > Some sort of > cryptographic protection is probably necessary to prevent regimes from simply > creating their > own stations. > > But I think security is a pretty minor point - just getting messages out > while making everyone > aware of the possibility of compromise is probably good enough. > > _______________________________________________ > p2p-hackers mailing list > p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com > http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
