>using it themselves or retransmitting it. The resulting data one >whitespace availability will be visible to people and or devices which >are not completely controlled by the regulatory agencies. >As such, what is the role of confidentiality with regard to this >information?
All channel availability (at least for the FCC) is openly available. There is no threat of disclosure of this information. It's actually the reverse. For planning purposes to buy and use WS devices - you really would like a good picture of available spectrum. It would be very detremental to market adoption to limit access to the available channels. That said - the current incumbants we discuss are just TV and microphones. In the future, we might be sharing with public saftey or military applications that would not want readily accessable maps of their locations disseminated. "Open" consumer devices might in these scenarios see no spectrum and the approved devices would get allocations. This still should be out-of-scope. These types of devices are not in our use case scenarios. Privacy as you point out alone is a good justification for some form of confidentiality. But protecting a devices identity may not require encryption of the full paws messages. Intgrity and data origin authentication seem more important for the protocol design considerations. Paul >-----Original Message----- >From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of >Joel M. Halpern >Sent: Friday, February 03, 2012 11:51 AM >To: [email protected] >Cc: [email protected] >Subject: Re: [paws] Threat model (Rev 3) > >Can we please include in this document some articulation of the >confidentiality assumption we are making with regard to the whitespace >data itself? I am not trying to object to the threats. (And the >personal information collection issues are enough to jsutify include >confidentiality mechanisms in the solutions.) >But I am still trying to get my head around this. There are going to be >hoards of whitespace devices. They will be getting the data, and either >using it themselves or retransmitting it. The resulting data one >whitespace availability will be visible to people and or devices which >are not completely controlled by the regulatory agencies. >As such, what is the role of confidentiality with regard to this >information? > >Yours, >Joel > >On 2/3/2012 2:34 PM, [email protected] wrote: >> >> Below is Rev 3 of the threat model based on feedback from Stephen, >Nancy >> and Gabor (Thanks). >> >> -Raj >> >> >> Rev 3 (3/2/12) >> >> Threat model for the PAWS protocol >> ---------------------------------- >> >> Assumptions: >> ............ >> >> o It is assumed that an attacker has full access to the network medium >> between the master device and the white space database. The >attacker >> may be able to eavesdrop on any communications between these >> entities. The link between the master device and the white space >> database can be wired or wireless and provides IP connectivity. >> >> o It is assumed that the master device or the white space database >> have NOT been compromised from a security standpoint. >> >> Threat 1: User modifies a device to masquerade as another valid >> certified device >> >> The master device needs to authenticate itself with the white >> space database prior to requesting channel information. The >> attacker may try to get access to the secrets of the master >> device which can be used maliciously. The effect of such an >> attack being successful would result in a malicious client >> replaying the stolen authentication/authorization secrets to a >> white space database. >> >> Threat 2: Spoofed white space database >> >> A master device discovers a white space database(s) thru which >> it can query for channel information. The master device needs >> to ensure that the white space database with which it >> communicates with is an authentic entity. The white space >> database needs to provide its identity to the master device >> which can confirm the validity/authenticty of the database. An >> attacker may attempt to spoof a white space database and >> provide responses to a master device which are malicious and >> result in the master device causing interference to the >primary >> user of the spectrum. >> >> Threat 3: Modifying a query request >> >> An attacker may modify the query request sent by a master >> device to a white space database. The attacker may change the >> location of the device or the capabilities in terms of its >> transmit power or antenna height etc. which could result in >the >> database responding with incorrect information about available >> channels or max transmit power allowed. The result of such an >> attack is that the master device would cause intereference to >> the primary user of the spectrum. It could also result in a >> denial of service to the master device by indicating that no >> channels are available. >> >> Threat 4: Modifying a query response >> >> An attacker could modify the query response sent by the white >> space database to a master device. The channel information or >> transmit power allowed type of parameters carried in the >> response could be modified by the attacker resulting in the >> master device using channels that are not available at a >> location or transmitting at a greater power level than allowed >> resulting in interference to the primary user of that >> spectrum. Alternatively the attacker may indicate no channel >> availability at a location resulting in a denial of service to >> the master device. >> >> Threat 5: Unauthorized use of channels by an uncertified device >> >> An attacker may be a master device which is not certified for >> use by the relevant regulatory body. The attacker may listen >to >> the communication between a valid master device and white >space >> database and utilize the information about available channels >> in the response message by utilizing those channels. The >result >> of such an attack is unauthorized use of channels by a master >> device which is not certified to operate. >> The master device querying the white space database may be >> operated by a law-enforcement agency and the communications >> between the device and the database are intended to be kept >> private. A malicious device should not be able to eavesdrop on >> such communications. >> >> Threat 6: Third party tracking of white space device location and >identity >> >> A white space database may require a master device to provide >> its identity in addition to its location in the query request. >> Such location/identity information can be gleaned by an >> eavesdropper. A master device may prefer to keep the >> location/identity information secret. Hence the protocol >should >> provide a means to protect the location and identity >> information of the master device and prevent tracking of >> locations associated with a white space database. If >> regulations do not require the identity of the master device >to >> be provided to the white space database, the master is not >> required to include its identity in the query. >> >> >> Threat 7: Termination of device service for reasons other than >> incumbent protection >> >> A white space database may include a mechanism by which >service >> and channels allocated to a master device can be revoked. A >> malicious node can send a revoke message to a master >> device. This results in denial of service to the master >> device. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> paws mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/paws >> >_______________________________________________ >paws mailing list >[email protected] >https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/paws _______________________________________________ paws mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/paws
