Cheers Ben, as Gary said, too, I take each of your points on board. I'm not 
going to use it again — I assumed it would be wrong which is why I flagged it 
in the original post.

I'll use the PDF of the CP.

Cheers for the reply, though, I cannot the limit for the day.

Best wishes

Jack
________________________________
From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of 
Benjamin Udell <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, July 27, 2025 7:16 PM
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Time and Semiosis (was Semiosic Ontology)


Jack, allo,

The first AI-supplied quote ascribed to Peirce is accurate except for its 
volume number and paragraph number.  It is from CP 8.328, not CP 1.337.

QUOTE: Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
positively and without reference to anything else. It is the realm of 
possibility, quality, feeling. END QUOTE.

The other two AI-supplied quotes ascribed to Peirce seemed not quite right to 
me. I'll try to address the questions of substance a little (but that's more 
work!) and not just questions of textual and citational accuracy.

Now, the quote labeled as from CP 2.303 seems like it's a translation from 
another language into which somebody translated Peirce.

QUOTE:    “The sign depends upon its interpretant for its interpretation, and 
this interpretant again is a sign, which has an interpretant of its own; so 
that the process of semiosis is unlimited.”
    — CP 2.303 (1903 - by AI-Source)
END QUOTE.

I can't find that wording anywhere.  It's true, I think, that, for Peirce, 
semiosis is structured to perpetuate itself, at least potentially. I remember 
decades ago we discuissed on peirce-l whether semiosis always goes on forever; 
it's a pretty strong claim to make in cenoscopy.  Anyway here is what I found 
in CP 2.303:

QUOTE:
§4. SIGN †2

2.303. Anything which determines something else (its _interpretant_) to refer 
to an object to which itself refers (its _object_) in the same way, the 
interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on _ad infinitum_.

No doubt, intelligent consciousness must enter into the series. If the series 
of successive interpretants comes to an end, the sign is thereby rendered 
imperfect, at least. If, an interpretant idea having been determined in an 
individual consciousness, it determines no outward sign, but that consciousness 
becomes annihilated, or otherwise loses all memory or other significant effect 
of the sign, it becomes absolutely undiscoverable that there ever was such an 
idea in that consciousness; and in that case it is difficult to see how it 
could have any meaning to say that that consciousness ever had the idea, since 
the saying so would be an interpretant of that idea.
END QUOTE.

Next quote, labeled as being from CP 2.92
 QUOTE:   “There is no final, or absolute, interpretant. The process of 
interpretation never ceases. The semiosis is infinite.”
— CP 2.92 (1903 - by AI-Source)
END QUOTE.

I can't find that wording anywhere. It doesn't sound like Peirce to my ear.  
Peirce often enough wrote of final opinion, final interpretant, and he didn't 
flatly deny its reality. It's more like a regulatory ideal, but I don't want to 
get technical for the time being, because I don't want to get into whether 
there are 3 interpretants or 9.  Anyway, I don't find the AI-supplied quote 
word-for-word or approximated in CP 2.92. Here is what does appear in CP 2.92:

QUOTE:
Peirce: CP 2.92
92. Transuasion in its obsistent aspect, or Mediation, will be shown to be 
subject to two degrees of degeneracy. Genuine mediation is the character of a 
_Sign_. A _Sign_ is anything which is related to a Second thing, its _Object_, 
in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to bring a Third thing, its 
Interpretant, _into relation to the same Object, and that in such a way as to 
bring a Fourth into relation to that Object in the same form_, If the series is 
broken off, the Sign, in so far, falls short of the perfect significant 
character. It is not necessary that the Interpretant should actually exist. A 
being _in futuro_ will suffice. Signs have two degrees of Degeneracy. A Sign 
degenerate in the lesser degree, is an Obsistent Sign, or _Index_, which is a 
Sign whose significance of its Object is due to its having a genuine Relation 
to that Object, irrespective of the Interpretant. Such, for example, is the 
exclamation "Hi!" as _indicative_ of present danger, or a rap at the door as 
indicative of a visitor. A Sign degenerate in the greater degree is an 
Originalian Sign, or _Icon_, which is a Sign whose significant virtue is due 
simply to its Quality. Such, for example, are imaginations of how I would act 
under certain circumstances, as showing me how another man would be likely to 
act. We say that the portrait of a person we have not seen is _convincing_. So 
far as, on the ground merely of what I see in it, I am led to form an idea of 
the person it represents, it is an Icon. But, in fact, it is not a pure Icon, 
because I am greatly influenced by knowing that it is an _effect_, through the 
artist, caused by the original's appearance, and is thus in a genuine Obsistent 
relation to that original. Besides, I know that portraits have but the 
slightest resemblance to their originals, except in certain conventional 
respects, and after a conventional scale of values, etc. A Genuine Sign is a 
Transuasional Sign, or _Symbol_, which is a sign which owes its significant 
virtue to a character which can only be realized by the aid of its 
Interpretant. Any utterance of speech is an example. If the sounds were 
originally in part iconic, in part indexical, those characters have long since 
lost their importance. The words only stand for the objects they do, and 
signify the qualities they do, because they will determine, in the mind of the 
auditor, corresponding signs. The importance of the above divisions, although 
they are new, has been acknowledged by all logicians who have seriously 
considered them. . .
END QUOTE.

The ellipsis is as it appears at the end of CP 2.92.

Best, Ben

On 7/27/2025 9:57 AM, Jack Cody wrote:

Speaking of the past—and here I may depart from orthodoxy among Peirce 
scholars—I do not consider Peirce’s system to be a literal description of the 
world as it is, but rather a model for understanding consciousness. I realize 
this may be rejected outright, but I cannot help but interpret it in this way.

When it comes to time—past, present, future—I read Peirce’s categories not as 
fixed ontological boundaries, but as phenomenological modalities of temporal 
consciousness. That is, I see time in Peirce much like I see it in quantum 
theory: not as a clean succession of fixed states, but as an ongoing process of 
semiotic determination. Peirce’s account of the categories—Firstness (quality 
of feeling), Secondness (reaction or brute fact), and Thirdness (law or 
mediation)—already admits a model of continuity that resists closure:

    “Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively 
and without reference to anything else. It is the realm of possibility, 
quality, feeling.”
    — CP 1.337 (1885 - by AI-Source).

In Peirce’s semiosis, the sign is not static: it unfolds through a process of 
interpretation, where the Interpretant alters and extends the meaning of a 
given sign. In this way, the sign is not an object, but a relational function 
across time. Similarly, in quantum terms, the act of measurement—or 
interpretation—collapses a possibility space into a particular state, but never 
exhausts it. This is why, for example, a sign that emerges twenty years later 
may retroactively restructure the significance of a prior event. The past is 
made newly legible through present interpretation.

This is consistent with Peirce’s claim that semiosis is infinite and that 
interpretants are themselves signs, capable of being interpreted again:

    “The sign depends upon its interpretant for its interpretation, and this 
interpretant again is a sign, which has an interpretant of its own; so that the 
process of semiosis is unlimited.”
    — CP 2.303 (1903 - by AI-Source)

As such, what we call "the past" is not determined once and for all, because it 
remains open to revision by future interpretants. If the past were fully 
determinate, then the most basic acts of reinterpretation, revision, or 
understanding would be impossible.

This same structure is evident in the quantum method I use. In my deductive 
framework, I describe recursive systems (S₁, S₂, …) as semiotic phases: each 
invocation of S₁ alters it, such that S₁ becomes S₁′, and then S₁″, and so on. 
It is never the same state again. This is not merely metaphorical—each call 
alters the relational state space, just as each interpretive act in semiosis 
transforms the “meaning” of the sign.

Only when S₁/S₁′ (S₁″… S₁ⁿ) is no longer invoked at all can we say that the 
past configuration has truly ceased to be—no longer semeiotically active. In 
network or systems theory, that point can be modeled through thresholds of 
signal collapse or feedback saturation. But in consciousness or human reality, 
it is far less clear: the "end" of a sign’s activity is not determined 
ontologically, but functionally—whether or not it continues to be invoked.

This is in line with Peirce’s theory that semiosis is never complete. There is 
no final interpretant “in this life”—and perhaps not even “in the next”:

    “There is no final, or absolute, interpretant. The process of 
interpretation never ceases. The semiosis is infinite.”
    — CP 2.92 (1903 - by AI-Source)

A sign, like a quantum state, may lie dormant, but not concluded.

In that light, semiosis is akin to the quantum structure I devised (states and 
call-backs) in that each is recursive, reinterpreting, historically contingent, 
and indeterminate until it isn’t. What we take to be “the past” is, surely, 
that which may be called upon within the present at any given moment (or 
otherwise we cannot even cite said "past").

I must add, here, that owing to my relative "novice" status within this list I 
have had to program an AI to grab Peirce quotations where I think they may or 
may not fit but the message: I think it important to clarfy such things these 
days. As many of you may or may not know, my own work is moving in divergent 
areas so I am trying much more, these days, to find some common ground within 
the Peircean corpus. It's something that must be addresssed, by me, personally, 
at any rate, for me to advance my other work and thus this community is very 
helpful (in its agreements and disagreements).

(I add, think Marcel Proust and the cake — for those literary inclined among 
us).

Best,

Jack

________________________________
From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> 
<[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]> on behalf 
of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]>
Sent: Saturday, July 26, 2025 10:28 PM
To: Peirce-L <[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Time and Semiosis (was Semiosic Ontology)

Gary F., List:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with 
UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Reply via email to