Ulysses, Ben, Jon, List, Thanks for your comments, Ulysses, which have the additional virtue of putting the matter into a Peircean perspective:
Ulysses: AI output might appear like Peirce's own words, but it is a mere likeness. The Peirce quote you offered supporting your assertion seems quite apt: ". . .an Icon cannot, of itself, convey information, since its Object is *whatever there may be which is like the Icon*. . ." (shortened, with emphasis added). I should note that yesterday both Ben and Jon counselled me to expeditiously post my experience as being "in the interest of scholarship to do so," as Ben phrased it. Your response confirms their good counsel. Thanks to them both! In closing, I'd like to say that those of us who yet envision a potential value in AI ought nevertheless see, as in the recent experiences of Jack and me, that there are clear dangers in employing LLMs, like Chat GPT, for formal or even informal research. Best, Gary (writing as Peirce-L moderator and co-manager of the forum with Ben Udell) On Tue, Jul 29, 2025 at 6:20 PM Ulysses <[email protected]> wrote: > Thank you Gary, this is an important warning to AI users. Large Language > Models are after all only *models* capable of producing possible > facsimiles/replicas of language (icons). Unless you provide them directly > with sufficient context which they can index (as in your news summaries) > they can't be trusted to give you information (even then they can't be > fully trusted). > > After all: > "We find that, in fact, icons may be of the greatest service in obtaining > information,—in geometry, for example;—but still, it true that an Icon > cannot, of itself, convey information, since its Object is whatever there > may be which is like the Icon, and is its Object in the measure in which it > is like the Icon." (EP 2. p. 277) > > AI output might appear like Peirce's own words, but it is a mere likeness. > > Best, > Ulysses > > On Tue, Jul 29, 2025 at 10:55 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> List, Ben, Jon, >> >> Ben Udell's recently posting that Jack's AI generated quotes had either >> the CP number wrong (one quote) or hadn't a CP number representing an >> actual Peirce quotation (several quotes) got me thinking about how I may >> have inadvertently used AI generated files compiled a couple of years ago >> to quickly -- that is, without having to pull up the online CP -- locate >> Peirce quotes for a couple of responses to some recent posts by Jon. >> >> Off-list I wrote both Ben and Jon asking whether I should immediately >> inform the List of what I consider to be a major blunder (Ben informs me >> that he double-checked that the error was made only in a couple of my >> posts, thank goodness), especially given my position as a Peirce scholar >> and moderator of Peirce-L. Still, I consider it an inexcusable lapse of >> judgment on my behalf to believe -- when it was first released to the >> public -- that Chat GPT offered accurate sources. Recently we've learned of >> its 'hallucinating' and other problematic issues related to the accuracy of >> the material it pulls up. >> >> Below I've pasted passages (with only a few mainly grammatical and >> punctuational modifications) from the note I sent Ben and Jon as >> explanation of how those errors might have occurred. >> >> >> Several weeks ago Jon noted that I had references -- quotations linked to >> CP numbers -- that were ostensibly of Peirce but which contained quotes not >> attributable to him and CP numbers that didn't jive with the quote given. I >> now recall that in early 2023, I believe, I began exploring Chat GPT rather >> intensely for several weeks, perhaps a month or so, using Peirce >> scholarship as my test case. Among other materials, I compiled several long >> Lists of quotations under various headings, including CP numbers, topics, >> famous and favorite quotations, etc. and put them in a rather large folder >> titled "Peirce sources" containing many other files. Foolishly, then not >> knowing how error prone AI can be, I didn't check the accuracy of any of >> that material against the online CP or my hardcopy. >> >> It now seems to me likely -- if not certain -- that rather than pull up >> the online CP in responding to Jon that, in the first instance, I went to >> that folder and grabbed things which I assumed were exact Peirce >> quotations. And recently, again in a response to Jon, I now think I pulled >> the CP number of a quotation he'd given in his post from that file which >> gave me an entirely different quotation -- actually a pseudo-quotation (Jon >> noted he couldn't find it in any of the published Peirce source material). >> So after sampling quite a few of the items in those AI generated files and >> finding that virtually none of them is correct, I have today removed those >> files -- of which there were several -- from that folder. >> >> >> I apologize to Jon and to the List for what I consider to be a terrible >> error of judgment in not originally checking even one of those AI generated >> quotations, and a really inexcusable blunder in forgetting the AI source of >> those files, which blunder could have been avoided had I simply labeled >> those files as AI generated. With what I now know about AI, I would >> certainly have not used items from those files. >> >> There is no doubt an important lesson to be learned here about employing >> AI in even informal research. Still, the fault is principally mine as I >> continue to find value in AI (I mainly use it to summarize on-line magazine >> and newspaper articles as I subscribe to many of these online). >> >> So, once again, *mea maxima culpa*, and my sincerest apologies to the >> Peirce-L community and, especially, Jon. And, again, my thanks to Ben for >> stirring up my thoughts about exactly what might have occurred in those >> replies to Jon. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> >> On Sun, Jul 27, 2025 at 2:16 PM Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Jack, allo, >>> >>> The first AI-supplied quote ascribed to Peirce is accurate except for >>> its volume number and paragraph number. It is from CP 8.328, not CP 1.337. >>> >>> QUOTE: Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, >>> positively and without reference to anything else. It is the realm of >>> possibility, quality, feeling. END QUOTE. >>> >>> The other two AI-supplied quotes ascribed to Peirce seemed not quite >>> right to me. I'll try to address the questions of substance a little (but >>> that's more work!) and not just questions of textual and citational >>> accuracy. >>> >>> Now, the quote labeled as from CP 2.303 seems like it's a translation >>> from another language into which somebody translated Peirce. >>> >>> QUOTE: “The sign depends upon its interpretant for its >>> interpretation, and this interpretant again is a sign, which has an >>> interpretant of its own; so that the process of semiosis is unlimited.” >>> — CP 2.303 (1903 - by AI-Source) >>> END QUOTE. >>> >>> I can't find that wording anywhere. It's true, I think, that, for >>> Peirce, semiosis is structured to perpetuate itself, at least potentially. >>> I remember decades ago we discuissed on peirce-l whether semiosis always >>> goes on forever; it's a pretty strong claim to make in cenoscopy. Anyway >>> here is what I found in* CP 2.303*: >>> >>> QUOTE: >>> §4. SIGN †2 >>> >>> 2.303. Anything which determines something else (its _*interpretant_*) >>> to refer to an object to which itself refers (its *_object*_) in the >>> same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on _*ad >>> infinitum*_. >>> >>> No doubt, intelligent consciousness must enter into the series. If the >>> series of successive interpretants comes to an end, the sign is thereby >>> rendered imperfect, at least. If, an interpretant idea having been >>> determined in an individual consciousness, it determines no outward sign, >>> but that consciousness becomes annihilated, or otherwise loses all memory >>> or other significant effect of the sign, it becomes absolutely >>> undiscoverable that there ever was such an idea in that consciousness; and >>> in that case it is difficult to see how it could have any meaning to say >>> that that consciousness ever had the idea, since the saying so would be an >>> interpretant of that idea. >>> END QUOTE. >>> >>> Next quote, labeled as being from CP 2.92 >>> >>> QUOTE: “There is no final, or absolute, interpretant. The process of >>> interpretation never ceases. The semiosis is infinite.” >>> — CP 2.92 (1903 - by AI-Source) >>> END QUOTE. >>> >>> I can't find that wording anywhere. It doesn't sound like Peirce to my >>> ear. Peirce often enough wrote of final opinion, final interpretant, and >>> he didn't flatly deny its reality. It's more like a regulatory ideal, but I >>> don't want to get technical for the time being, because I don't want to get >>> into whether there are 3 interpretants or 9. Anyway, I don't find the >>> AI-supplied quote word-for-word or approximated in CP 2.92. Here is what >>> does appear in *CP 2.92*: >>> >>> QUOTE: >>> Peirce: CP 2.92 >>> 92. Transuasion in its obsistent aspect, or Mediation, will be shown to >>> be subject to two degrees of degeneracy. Genuine mediation is the character >>> of a _*Sign*_. A _*Sign*_ is anything which is related to a Second >>> thing, its _*Object*_, in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to >>> bring a Third thing, its Interpretant, _*into relation to the same >>> Object, and that in such a way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that >>> Object in the same form*_, If the series is broken off, the Sign, in so >>> far, falls short of the perfect significant character. It is not necessary >>> that the Interpretant should actually exist. A being _in futuro_ will >>> suffice. Signs have two degrees of Degeneracy. A Sign degenerate in the >>> lesser degree, is an Obsistent Sign, or _Index_, which is a Sign whose >>> significance of its Object is due to its having a genuine Relation to that >>> Object, irrespective of the Interpretant. Such, for example, is the >>> exclamation "Hi!" as _indicative_ of present danger, or a rap at the door >>> as indicative of a visitor. A Sign degenerate in the greater degree is an >>> Originalian Sign, or _*Icon*_, which is a Sign whose significant virtue >>> is due simply to its Quality. Such, for example, are imaginations of how I >>> would act under certain circumstances, as showing me how another man would >>> be likely to act. We say that the portrait of a person we have not seen is _ >>> *convincing*_. So far as, on the ground merely of what I see in it, I >>> am led to form an idea of the person it represents, it is an Icon. But, in >>> fact, it is not a pure Icon, because I am greatly influenced by knowing >>> that it is an _*effect*_, through the artist, caused by the original's >>> appearance, and is thus in a genuine Obsistent relation to that original. >>> Besides, I know that portraits have but the slightest resemblance to their >>> originals, except in certain conventional respects, and after a >>> conventional scale of values, etc. A Genuine Sign is a Transuasional Sign, >>> or _*Symbol*_, which is a sign which owes its significant virtue to a >>> character which can only be realized by the aid of its Interpretant. Any >>> utterance of speech is an example. If the sounds were originally in part >>> iconic, in part indexical, those characters have long since lost their >>> importance. The words only stand for the objects they do, and signify the >>> qualities they do, because they will determine, in the mind of the auditor, >>> corresponding signs. The importance of the above divisions, although they >>> are new, has been acknowledged by all logicians who have seriously >>> considered them. . . >>> END QUOTE. >>> >>> The ellipsis is as it appears at the end of CP 2.92. >>> >>> Best, Ben >>> >>> On 7/27/2025 9:57 AM, Jack Cody wrote: >>> >>> Speaking of the past—and here I may depart from orthodoxy among Peirce >>> scholars—I do not consider Peirce’s system to be a literal description of >>> the world as it is, but rather a model for understanding consciousness. I >>> realize this may be rejected outright, but I cannot help but interpret it >>> in this way. >>> >>> When it comes to time—past, present, future—I read Peirce’s categories not >>> as fixed ontological boundaries, but as phenomenological modalities of >>> temporal consciousness. That is, I see time in Peirce much like I see it in >>> quantum theory: not as a clean succession of fixed states, but as an >>> ongoing process of semiotic determination. Peirce’s account of the >>> categories—Firstness (quality of feeling), Secondness (reaction or brute >>> fact), and Thirdness (law or mediation)—already admits a model of >>> continuity that resists closure: >>> >>> “Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, >>> positively and without reference to anything else. It is the realm of >>> possibility, quality, feeling.” >>> — CP 1.337 (1885 - by AI-Source). >>> >>> In Peirce’s semiosis, the sign is not static: it unfolds through a process >>> of interpretation, where the Interpretant alters and extends the meaning of >>> a given sign. In this way, the sign is not an object, but a relational >>> function across time. Similarly, in quantum terms, the act of >>> measurement—or interpretation—collapses a possibility space into a >>> particular state, but never exhausts it. This is why, for example, a sign >>> that emerges twenty years later may retroactively restructure the >>> significance of a prior event. The past is made newly legible through >>> present interpretation. >>> >>> This is consistent with Peirce’s claim that semiosis is infinite and that >>> interpretants are themselves signs, capable of being interpreted again: >>> >>> “The sign depends upon its interpretant for its interpretation, and >>> this interpretant again is a sign, which has an interpretant of its own; so >>> that the process of semiosis is unlimited.” >>> — CP 2.303 (1903 - by AI-Source) >>> >>> As such, what we call "the past" is not determined once and for all, >>> because it remains open to revision by future interpretants. If the past >>> were fully determinate, then the most basic acts of reinterpretation, >>> revision, or understanding would be impossible. >>> >>> This same structure is evident in the quantum method I use. In my deductive >>> framework, I describe recursive systems (S₁, S₂, …) as semiotic phases: >>> each invocation of S₁ alters it, such that S₁ becomes S₁′, and then S₁″, >>> and so on. It is never the same state again. This is not merely >>> metaphorical—each call alters the relational state space, just as each >>> interpretive act in semiosis transforms the “meaning” of the sign. >>> >>> Only when S₁/S₁′ (S₁″… S₁ⁿ) is no longer invoked at all can we say that the >>> past configuration has truly ceased to be—no longer semeiotically active. >>> In network or systems theory, that point can be modeled through thresholds >>> of signal collapse or feedback saturation. But in consciousness or human >>> reality, it is far less clear: the "end" of a sign’s activity is not >>> determined ontologically, but functionally—whether or not it continues to >>> be invoked. >>> >>> This is in line with Peirce’s theory that semiosis is never complete. There >>> is no final interpretant “in this life”—and perhaps not even “in the next”: >>> >>> “There is no final, or absolute, interpretant. The process of >>> interpretation never ceases. The semiosis is infinite.” >>> — CP 2.92 (1903 - by AI-Source) >>> >>> A sign, like a quantum state, may lie dormant, but not concluded. >>> >>> In that light, semiosis is akin to the quantum structure I devised (states >>> and call-backs) in that each is recursive, reinterpreting, historically >>> contingent, and indeterminate until it isn’t. What we take to be “the past” >>> is, surely, that which may be called upon within the present at any given >>> moment (or otherwise we cannot even cite said "past"). >>> >>> I must add, here, that owing to my relative "novice" status within this >>> list I have had to program an AI to grab Peirce quotations where I think >>> they may or may not fit but the message: I think it important to clarfy >>> such things these days. As many of you may or may not know, my own work is >>> moving in divergent areas so I am trying much more, these days, to find >>> some common ground within the Peircean corpus. It's something that must be >>> addresssed, by me, personally, at any rate, for me to advance my other work >>> and thus this community is very helpful (in its agreements and >>> disagreements). >>> >>> (I add, think Marcel Proust and the cake — for those literary inclined >>> among us). >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Jack >>> >>> ________________________________ >>> From: [email protected] <[email protected]> >>> <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt >>> <[email protected]> <[email protected]> >>> Sent: Saturday, July 26, 2025 10:28 PM >>> To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> <[email protected]> >>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Time and Semiosis (was Semiosic Ontology) >>> >>> Gary F., List: >>> >>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >>> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >>> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all >>> the links! >>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . >>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] >>> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in >>> the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all >> the links! >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] >> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in >> the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
