Helmut, Jack, List With regard to Helmut’s reference to ‘a sign is not real’, I think that the terms of ‘sign’ and ‘real’ have to be defined.
In my understanding of Peirce, a ‘sign’ is a spatiotemporal triadic entity – and is existentially real in spatial and temporal perimeters in the Phaneron. Peirce wrote: “I propose to use the word Phaneron as a proper name to denote the total content of any one consciousness’. EP 2: 363. If there is a phaneron ,the idea of combination is an indecomposable element of it. This idea is a triad;.[ EP2 362-3. And CP: 8.305” I shall define a Sign and show its triadic form. “ My understanding is that this triadic entity, the Sign, in its triadic form, is an existential spatiotemporal entity, an organized form of energy, whether it be in the form of an atom, molecule, insect, animal, human being, word, thought. As Peirce noted, 5.449f. ‘the universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs”. Therefore, my conclusion is that these Signs are the very ‘stuff of our reality, aka, the Phaneron. And – there is nothing else in our universe other than these constantly forming, dissolving, and reforming triads, aka Signs. This would also mean, of course, that there is no such thing as the ‘noumena’, that aspatial, atemporal ‘thing-in-itself. All we have is the Phaneron. And, as Peirce noted, its spatiotemporal entities, those Signs, are created within three categorical modes, which provide their formation with the predictive continuity of habits [ Thirdness], indexical interaction [Secondness] and innovative and adaptive freedom[ Firstness]. Edwina > On Aug 4, 2025, at 2:49 PM, Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > > Helmut, Jon, List. > > "A sign is not real. But a sign contains something real: There is always > something, that is discernable from its environment, without which the sign > would not function." — Helmut R. > > I tend to agree with Helmut here. I do not think it contains something — > although you could argue on a signifer/signifed basis that the signifer > points to the signified and that in abstract linguistic usage that which most > signs (banal language use) "contain" is that connection: the relation, > Pavlovain in its arbitrariness, between signifier and signified. Saussure > would call this the "social product" which is deposited in the brain in what > Peirce might call the "commens" or community (of speakers). > > Real, insofar as that term is used here, surely must be that which is (true) > regardless of whatever anyone may experience/think (this is properly > apriori). In that respect, I have to, and this is more metaphysical (though > necessary) conclude with Helmut that it's unlikely "signs" are "real" in that > apriori (beyond experience) sense. Not entirely sure of where Peirce stood > upon the issue beyond two or three quotations that as I've noted before, > though I am a ways from producing my own work here, I do not find consistent. > That is, the "apriori" in Kant (whom we know Peirce "more than admires" but > whose "noumenal" Peirce cannot accept) — that apriori is that which is > "beyond experience" but necessarily exists. It is remarkably close to what > Peirce would call that "real" insofar as I have ever understood Peirce here > (though Peirce doesn't want to pay what is often cited as the "noumenal > price"). > > Just some thoughts. > > Best > > Jack > From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf > of Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > Sent: Monday, August 4, 2025 5:40 PM > To: [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] > <[email protected]> > Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Ontology (was Spencer-Brown's concept of > 'reentry') > > Jon, List, > > A sign is not real. But a sign contains something real: There is always > something, that is discernable from its environment, without which the sign > would not function. With "discernable" I mean that a thought-experimental > alien, who is maximally different from us, would see that there is something > special, without knowing its meaning. Like us seeing the "Wow"- signal in > extraterrestrial waves- which might be just due to random chance though, as i > donot say, that everything discernable is a sign, but only the other way > around. > > An object does not have to be discernable, it might be a probe of the ocean > or a coordinate in empty space. > > The universe is discernable from its environment, although in this case the > environment is an inner environment: Something particular. It is easy to > discern an universal law from a cultural rule, or a human right based on the > castegorical imperative from a dancehall dress code. > > So the universe is a sign. > > Best regards, helmut > 3. August 2025 um 19:14 > "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> > wrote: > Gary R., List: > > I suppose that I should take a step back and clarify what my semiosic > ontological hypothesis purportedly explains. The surprising fact, the > universe is intelligible, is observed; but if the One root of all being--the > identical being of which all the different subjects within the universe > partake--were the being of a sign, then the intelligibility of the universe > would be a matter of course; hence, there is reason to suspect that the root > of all being is the being of sign. This formulation summarizes the > abductive/retroductive stage of my inquiry, and now I am in the deductive > stage of explicating my hypothesis, initially by exploring an obvious > question that arises--what exactly is the being of a sign? > > Peirce offers more clues to his own answer in three quotations that I > included in my reply to Ivar last week > (https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-07/msg00072.html), which I will > not reiterate here. He elaborates on the first of them later in the same > text, as well as in a contemporaneous manuscript. "It is of the nature of a > sign to be an individual replica and to be in that replica a living general" > (EP 2:324, 1901). "Now it is very true that a word is not a thing, and there > is a sense in which a sign is not a reality; although in another sense the > very entelechy of reality is of the nature of a sign" (NEM 4:297, 1901). In > summary, what Peirce says about propositions and symbols in the following > remarks is true of all signs. > > CSP: I have not fully defined a proposition, because I have not discriminated > the proposition from the individual sign which is the embodiment of the > proposition. By a proposition, as something which can be repeated over and > over again, translated into another language, embodied in a logical graph or > algebraical formula, and still be one and the same proposition, we do not > mean any existing individual object but a type, a general, which does not > exist but governs existents, to which individuals conform. (CP 8.313, 1905 > Jan 22) > > CSP: We have to distinguish Symbols, which are not themselves existent things > from Instances of them, which are Icons of them. Just as if the word 'the' > occurs 20 times on my copy of a certain page of a certain book, those are 20 > 'lnstances' of a single Symbol. (NEM 3:887, 1908 Dec 5) > > These distinctions inform Peirce’s late trichotomy for classifying a sign > according to its own mode of being, apprehension, or presentation. As I > hinted at the end of my previous post > (https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-07/msg00100.html), I advocate > reconceiving it as designating different aspects of the same sign, not > different signs, consistent with these definitions. > > CSP: Such a definitely significant Form [as the one English word 'the'], I > propose to term a Type. A Single event which happens once and whose identity > is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some > single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being > significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or > that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I > will venture to call a Token. An indefinite significant character such as a > tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token. I propose to call > such a Sign a Tone. In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied > in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the > Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance of the > Type. (CP 4.537, 1906) > > Type, token, tone, and instance respectively replace legisign, sinsign, > qualisign, and replica in Peirce’s earlier writings. While conceding that in > one sense, a sign is not real, he nevertheless describes its nature as the > very entelechy (perfection) of reality, presumably because "there can be no > reality which has not the life of a symbol" (EP 2:324, 1901). Moreover, his > main point in all these passages is that a sign does not exist in > itself--"react with the other like things in the environment" (CP 6.495, c. > 1906)--nor as a general type within a language or other system of signs, > because it is "capable of repetition." Instead, a sign only exists in its > instances, which are individual tokens, each of which is "a unique > embodiment" that can possess different tones while always representing the > type (iconically) in addition to the latter’s dynamical object. > > Again, more to come, but that seems like enough for now. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Fri, Aug 1, 2025 at 8:47 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Jon, List, > I cannot yet support your hypothesis that the universe’s variety is unified > through the notion that the fundamental root of all Being is the being of a > sign. Yet I fully agree (with you and Peirce) that a sign cannot be conceived > in isolation, that it must always be connected with its object and > interpretant. This is simply to say that the nature of a sign is essentially > triadic, mediating between its object and its interpretant -- no news there! > The excellent Peirce’s example you offered (close to my heart as I, on > occasion, take the ferry boat from Lower Manhattan over to Governor's Island) > does indeed show that a sign always embodies relations beyond itself. So, > prescinding any sign requires also prescinding not only its object and > interpretant, but also their relations, both triadic and dyadic. That > logically makes sense. Extrapolating that to argue that it follows that the > 'fundamental root of all Being is the being of a sign', is not yet > convincing: prescision is a logical move, not necessarily a metaphysical one. > I do, however, most certainly agree that this analysis explains why Peirce’s > classification of signs uses multiple trichotomies as they are all needed for > a full analysis of what a sign is. > Beyond that, I've nothing further to offer for now. Perhaps others do. > Best, > Gary R > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com > <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com > <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY > ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More athttps://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► > PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with > UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the > body. 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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
