Ivar, Stephen, Gary R., List: My sincere thanks to Ivar, for restating his questions that I still needed to address, which I have attempted to do below; to Stephen, for sharing his paper on downward causation, which might warrant its own thread for further discussion; and to Gary R., for his very stimulating post earlier this evening, to which I will hold off on responding for at least a day or two because I want to give it due consideration, although I hope that others will go ahead and comment on it (and perhaps also this one) in the meantime.
1. By advocating a top-down rather than bottom-up understanding of the entire universe as one immense sign, I am suggesting that it conforms to Peirce's late topical conception of continuity as spelled out in my paper on that subject (https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHPTC-2.pdf). It is a true continuum (3ns), an *undivided *whole whose parts are indefinite *material *parts (possibilities/1ns), unless and until they are deliberately marked off as *actual *parts (individuals/2ns); it is not an assemblage of the latter as *discrete *parts from which it is built up. That is what I mean when I say that the whole is *ontologically *prior to its parts--as a loose analogy, the parts are "precipitated out" of the whole, not joined together to "construct" it. I am not sure exactly what is meant by asking whether the parts are logically *prior *to the whole, but prescinding them is "supposing a state of things in which one element is present without the other, the one being logically *possible* without the other" (EP 2:270, 1903; emphasis mine). That is what we are doing with a *specific *sign when we analyze it *as if* it were separate from all other signs; this is *logically* possible, even though *within* the universe, "there can be no isolated sign" (CP 4.551, 1906). 2. As hinted above, signs can indeed be actual and thus individuals--sign *tokens* (sinsigns in Peirce's early taxonomies) as distinguished from sign *types* (legisigns) and, in my view, signs in themselves--but again, only upon being deliberately marked off for a purpose, such that their "boundaries" are arbitrary, at least to some extent. For example, this entire e-mail message, written in English with certain formatting, is a sign type such that a different token--an *instance *(replica) of the type--appears on the screen of each List member who reads it, with the same tones. Each paragraph of it is also a sign type with different tokens on different screens, and so is each sentence, and so is each word, and so is each letter. As I see it, a translation of any of these into another language or alphabet--including its binary encoding within a computer--is another token of the same sign, but an instance of a different type. In the List archive (https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/), all posts are converted to a standard font with no italicized, bolded, underlined, or colored text, except that indented portions are grey instead of black; so this one as presented there is a different token of the same type with different tones. CSP: In the first place, a sign is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*. Look down a printed page, and every *the* you see is the same word, every *e* the same letter. A real thing does not so exist in replica. ... Giving to the word *sign *the full scope that reasonably belongs to it for logical purposes, a whole book is a sign; and a translation of it is a replica of the same sign. (EP 2:303, 1901) [N.B. In light of the other two quotations below, where Peirce says "real thing" here (twice), I believe that the proper interpretive emphasis is on "thing," not on "real"--a sign is real but does not *exist *in itself, or even as a legisign/type; it only *exists *in its replicas/instances, which are sinsigns/tokens.] CSP: The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of, it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact represented. This repetitory character of the representamen involves as a consequence that it is essential to a representamen that it should contribute to the determination of another representamen distinct from itself. For in what sense would it be true that a representamen was repeated if it were not capable of determining some different representamen? "Evil communications corrupt good manners" and *φθείρουσιν ἢθη χρήσθ' όμιλίαι κακαί* are one and the same representamen. (CP 5.138, EP 2:203, 1903) CSP: A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty *the's* on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word "word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a *Type*. A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a *Token*. An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token. I propose to call such a Sign a *Tone*. In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an *Instance *of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type "the" on a page. (CP 5.437, 1906) 3. I always try to be careful about distinguishing Peirce's views as expressed in his writings from my (and others') interpretations of and elaborations on them. As implied by the title and content of "Peirce's Topical Continuum: A 'Thicker' Theory," I maintain that the topical conception of continuity is *his *final theory--most clearly presented by him in the previously unpublished manuscripts R 144 and R S-30 that I quote at length, but consistent with various better-known texts as I go on to demonstrate. On the other hand, as I acknowledge in the subtitle and introduction of my "Semiosic Synechism" paper ( https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHSSA-42.pdf), the argumentation that it presents is recognizably *Peircean* but not Peirce's own; most of its premisses and conclusions are natural consequences of his ideas, not anything that he ever stated explicitly himself. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Jul 23, 2025 at 4:50 AM Ivar <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > Thank you for the clarifications, the latest posts have cleared up many > confusions for me. > > (1) Beginning with my second question above, if every individual, or > perhaps object, is a sign, you, Jon, deny this in the last post, > > Jon: "everything is a sign" does not mean that every *individual *thing > is a sign (bottom-up), but that everything *as a whole* is a sign > (top-down) > > But in the previous post you wrote > > Jon: Again, what I am proposing is that the entire universe is a vast > semiosic continuum, signs all the way down. > > which could be quite easily be misleading! Now I will try to make sense of > your position. Individuals and possibilites can only be signs > contingently, because if an individual or possibility was a sign > necessarily it would not be possible to prescind an individual or > possibility from a sign, but it is possible, thus individuals and > possibilities are not signs necessarily. I guess this is what you mean when > denying a bottom-up perspective of the claim of semiosic synechism. It > makes sense when combining this with the claim that you ascribe to Peirce, > that the whole is ontologically prior (I presume) to its parts. That is, at > least one continuity is prior to all discrete objects. But then I begin to > wonder, if the whole is ontologically prior to its parts, are the parts > logically prior to the whole, in line with his use of prescission? Is this > discrepancy harmless? Granted the statement, can the whole be ontologically > prior if the parts are logically prior? > > (2) Returning to my first question once again, do you Jon, claim that > signs can be actual? And thus individuals? I fail to find an answer in your > posts! Maybe I did not read you correctly. > > (3) Lastly, a new question has popped up concerning the relation to > Peirce. As I see it there are three main directions, first, Peirce is used > in order to construct an independent theory, second, Peirce is claimed to > subscribe to the theory laid out, and third, the theory is a natural > consequence of Peirce's ideas, developing one of his "children". Would you, > Jon, agree to be aligned to one of these? The answer determines if this is > some sort of commentary on Peirce or something else inspired by Peirce, and > to our guesswork of Peirce's interpretations in relation to the claims made. > > To finish, I just want to say that on the whole I am very sympathetic to > your project and I believe that I agree with the general theory! It is an > exciting topic. > > Best regards > Ivar >
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