Jack, List: I changed the subject line because you and Kant are still talking about epistemology, not ontology--how metaphysical *cognition *is derived, not the nature of reality *itself*. Moreover, Peirce and I think that you and Kant are wrong about the difference between metaphysics and the special sciences, both physical and psychical. It is not that the latter are empirical while the former is entirely *a priori*; on the contrary ...
CSP: The only essential difference between metaphysics and meteorology, linguistics, or chemistry, is that it does not avail itself of microscopes, telescopes, voyages, or other means of acquiring recondite experiences, but contents itself with ascertaining all that can be ascertained from such experience as every man undergoes every day and hour of his life. All other differences between philosophy and the special sciences are mere consequences of this one. (CP 8.110, 1900) It is true but irrelevant that you and I and every other human will never experience the world as an ant or a tree does. That has no bearing on whether there are any realities that cannot possibly be *represented*--on the contrary, every reality *would *be represented by an infinite community after infinite inquiry, although that ideal state will never *actually *come about. Clarifying my previous statement, the debate is not over whether there are any realities beyond all *humanly *possible experience, it is over whether there are any realities beyond all possible experience *whatsoever*. I am not going to get into theology here, but suffice it to say that when Jesus talks about signs, he is not addressing exactly the same topic as when Peirce talks about signs. You might have intended your second message to be off-List, but you sent it to the entire List. Again, Peirce and I disagree with you and Kant about whether we directly experience things as they really are, and there is no "anthropocentric omnipotence claim" associated with saying that we do. Our experiences *are not *those things (obviously), but our experiences *are of *those things. Our resulting cognitions--beginning with perceptual judgments--are by no means *complete *representations of those things, but they are nevertheless representations *of those things*. Finally, Gödel's incompleteness theorems have nothing to do with the limitations of human experience. They are purely logical demonstrations that certain kinds of sentences are undecidable within any sufficiently powerful *formal *system. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Aug 5, 2025 at 8:53 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Jon - > > Off-list > > To be simpler about it. Our experience of things is not what thigns are > and nor can it be such. Otherwise there would be an absurd anthropocentric > omnipotence claim being made. > > Things exist. > We experience them (as humans). > That, human experience of things, is not equivalent to "things" and need > not even be similar (Hume's point entirely so far qua habit rather than > necessity). However, ala Descartes ad absurdum (methodology) that things > exist beyond human experience (altogether) regardless of what humans do > experience is necessary and this is Kant's basic thesis (and he's right). > It basically explains the starting position of Godel's incompleteness > theorems as well certain other mathematical (or pure mathematical) claims. > > I don't want it to be too dense or unorthodox. So best to give a simple > version and see where you disagree and why (qua Peirce of course). > > Best wishes, > Jack > On Tue, Aug 5, 2025 at 8:22 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, > > I have to say that I thonk you're wrong — "apriori" is very much > ontological in Kant as it goes hand in hand with his noumenal distinction. > Indeed, Kant’s response to Hume centers on a critical distinction: that > metaphysical cognition, by its very concept, cannot be derived from > experience. As Kant writes: > > “First, concerning the sources of metaphysical cognition, it already lies > in the concept of metaphysics that they cannot be empirical. The principles > of such cognition (which include not only its fundamental propositions or > basic principles, but also its fundamental concepts) must therefore never > be taken from experience; for the cognition is supposed to be not physical > but metaphysical, i.e., lying beyond experience. Therefore it will be based > upon neither outer experience, which constitutes the source of physics > proper, nor inner, which provides the foundation of empirical psychology. > It is therefore cognition a priori, or from pure understanding and pure > reason.” (Prolegomena, 15). > > Kant’s point is this: if a claim is metaphysical, it cannot rely on > empirical input, for then it would no longer be metaphysics, but natural > science or psychology. Therefore, all metaphysical knowledge must be a > priori, and this is not merely a logical or epistemic label. It reflects a > deeper ontological condition: that which is a priori stands beyond and > before experience as such, and serves as the ground for the possibility of > experience itself. > > Moreover, I don't doubt that an ant exerpiences the world. I also do not > doubt that with or without infinity I will never experience the world as an > ant does. I don't see how that blocks inquiry. It's common sense. You > cannot possibly hold the position that on the one hand the ant's experience > is real enough (it exists and I doubt anyone doubts this) but that on the > other a human can have experiences that an ant has? It's so radically > different as to be absurd and so there are basically infinitely many > experiences of the world (assume a large number of species on this planet, > in this time period alone, that it verges on infinite) which humans will > never have. > > That is not blocking inquiry. It is to state that however a tree > experiences the world it is not possible that a human should ever have that > experience. This is basic to me. Infinite inquiry, by axiom, is such that > you would merely repeat the same logical mistake an infinite period of > times if you were to disagree with the basic claims here and so it really > doesn't do any good to cite it (in this context). That there is a truth, > transcendental as far as I can tell, I do not doubt. That that truth is > "positivistic" (in any respect qua knowledge) I doubt entirely. I think > understanding has almost nothing to do with knowledge. But that's a larger > reply. > > To ask you one final question: if you believe in God, and I mean this > within the context of ontology and this thread as you've alluded to it > before, surely you would find this at least interesting. Jesus cannot be a > sign, surely. for he says that "it is a wicked generation that seeketh > after a sign" and he knows the messiah is sought for. If the universe were > a sign, Jesus seems to contradict this. I too believe in God, as it goes, > but I do not believe the universe is a sign at all. > > Best wishes, > Jack >
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