List, Edwina, Jon, Jack, Edwina wrote: As for the one-post-per-day- I’m against it, because I think it transforms an interactive discussion into a site of polemical sermons. GR: As I wrote on List and to you, Edwina, off List, so far you are the only List member who appears to see it this way; on and off List, participants have tended to find this approach reasonable. This is not to say that you are the only one who is 'against it'. But, at least for now, I see no reason to change that rule.
ET: . . . I really don’t applaud the use of such phrases as ‘Peirce and I’ or 'Kant and I’… The ‘best buddies' analogy only works, I suggest, for existential reality and since neither gentleman is around..then.... GR: I would tend to agree except when someone posts something which is a paraphrase of Peirce's own words, especially when that is supported by a Peirce quotation demonstrating that the paraphrase does indeed accurately express Peirce's idea. There is nothing 'novel' about that in scholarly scientific discussion. ET: I think that both Jack and Jon should define what each one means by the term of ‘ding an sich’. I suspect that for each, the meanings are quite different - and therefore, we have a situation of tails chasing tails. I concur with Jon's current and earlier explanation of the reasons for Peirce's (and his and my) rejection of Kant's 'ding an sich'. In a word, Peirce considers Kant's notion of a thing-in-itself as incoherent since it posits something completely incognizable. For Peirce *Reality* -- that is, the reality of physical and mental 'things' -- *is* accessible within the limits of fallible thought and ongoing inquiry. while the thing-in-itself is 'something' we cannot discuss meaningfully or use productively in inquiry. Perhaps the following passage will help clarify both just how strongly Peirce felt himself influenced by Kant as well as his total rejection of the idea of the 'ding an sich'. I've added the numbers 1 and 2 for clarity within the passage. This List discussion principally concerns itself with 2. Critical Common-sensism may fairly lay claim to this title for two sorts of reasons; namely, 1. that on the one hand it subjects four opinions to rigid criticism: its own; that of the Scotch school; that of those who would base logic or metaphysics on psychology or any other special science, the least tenable of all the philosophical opinions that have any vogue; and 2. that of Kant; while on the other hand it has besides some claim to be called Critical from the fact that it is but a modification of Kantism. The present writer was a pure Kantist until he was forced by successive steps into Pragmaticism. The Kantist has only* to abjure from the bottom of his heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be conceived*; and then correct the details of Kant's doctrine accordingly, and he will find himself to have become a Critical Common-sensist. CP 5.452 (*“Issues of Pragmaticism”* *The Monist*, *Volume 15, Number 4*, *October 1905, emphasis added)*. Best, Gary R On Wed, Aug 6, 2025 at 2:33 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > List > > I think that both Jack and Jon should define what each one means by the > term of ‘ding an sich’. I suspect that for each, the meanings are quite > different - and therefore, we have a situation of tails chasing tails. > > As for the one-post-per-day- I’m against it, because I think it transforms > an interactive discussion into a site of polemical sermons. > > And as an addition to this - I also suggest that posters should be careful > to differentiate themselves from their ‘mentors’, so to speak. That is - I > really don’t applaud the use of such phrases as ‘Peirce and I’ or 'Kant and > I’… The ‘best buddies' analogy only works, I suggest, for existential > reality and since neither gentleman is around..then.... > > With regard to the Peircean outline of the 'ding an sich’….it’s not the > same, as I understand his outline, as the* external object *which is > ‘anything that is not affected by any cognition, whether about it of not, > of the man to whom it is external’ [5.525]. This simply means, to me, an > object which is not being interacted with *at the moment by this human.*ie, > until such time as it becomes a Dynamic Object rather than an ‘external > object’..[EP2.478]. Though I will note that this external object, let’s > call it a tree, is most certainly in the semiosic process of Dynamic > Object interaction with other entities such as a caterpillar, an ant, a > bird, .. > > Peirce continues in this section ….but, if you ‘exaggerate this …”you > have the conception of what is not affected by any cognitions at all…and.. > the notion of what does not affect cognition"…. That is - an entity which > does not affect cognition and which is itself not affected by cognition. > > This means, as I understand it, an entity which is outside of the > processes of Thirdness, because Thridness is the mode of being of > Cognition or Mind, I would just add that for Peirce, cognition does not > require a brain [4.551]…but is operative in > all existentially..ie..existence requires continuity of organization or > habits-of-form, and these habits can be understood as the operation of > Mind/cognition - whether within the formation and operation of a chemical > molecule, a bacterium or an insect. . > > And note further, that Thirdness is communal; ie, Forms or habits don't > exist ‘per se’ [Aristotle vs Plato] but only within existing entities and > operative as a general, as a commonality - operative within a collective > and thus requires interaction…which is to say, semiosis. Can the *ding an > sich* exist per se, outside of semiosis? > In other words - is there such an entity operative without Mind? > Doesn’t a chemical molecule exist only within its common general > formulation? And if it does, then, doesn’t this put us more into the > analysis offered by Peirce? > > So- the definition of ‘ding an sich’,in my view, requires clarification. > > Edwina > > . > > > > > > > > On Aug 6, 2025, at 12:35 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jack, List: > > In addition to the List post to which I am replying, you sent me three > off-List messages within 30 minutes last night, followed by a fourth one > this morning. Why not just wait a few hours to get some sleep, collect your > thoughts, and send a single on-List post--the one per thread per day that > is currently allowed--with everything that you wanted to say? I have come > to appreciate the wisdom of that restriction, so that is exactly what I am > doing here, quoting your off-List messages where I address them. I have > tried to limit the resulting length of this post by linking or citing some > relevant passages instead of quoting them. > > Your first statement below is inscrutable to me, but for "the tree > example," you initially said the following off-List. > > JRKC: Humans may use representational sign-systems but there is zero proof > (and none possible) that trees and so forth do. The tree's reality may have > no "representation" at all. And, insofar as it could, it would always be > beyond us to ever know. > > > Not surprisingly for someone who has apparently embraced not only Kantian > epistemology and metaphysics, but also Saussurean linguistics, this > reflects a fundamental misunderstanding on your part--experience is a > strictly *cognitive *phenomenon, but semiosis is not. "It appears in the > work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and > one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the > shapes, etc., of objects are really there" (CP 4.551, 1906). At this point, > I join Peirce in despairing of making this "broader conception" understood, > at least in your case. As you said later, "we probably diverge and that's > fine." > > I previously quoted Kant's own epistemological definition of *a priori* > as "*knowledge *that is absolutely independent of all experience" > (emphasis mine). Best I can tell, you are still misapplying that term to > the ontological concept of a thing-in-itself as *that which* is > (supposedly) "beyond all possible experience" and therefore unknowable. > However, you have yet to address Peirce's simple refutation of this, which > I summarized a couple of days ago ( > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-08/msg00008.html) as > presented in the very same paragraph where he refers to Kant as someone > "whom I *more *than admire" (CP 5.525, c. 1905; see also CP 6.95, 1903). > Needless to say, I continue to agree with him, and thus disagree with you > and Kant; again, "we probably diverge and that's fine." > > JRKC: Not to be a pain, but the Gödel part is also wrong. When you > demonstrate complete inequivalence it has a bearing on all possible > systems. That includes all possible meaning making systems--including this > one and any possible system Peirce uses. > > > I still disagree--Gödel's incompleteness theorems strictly pertain to > sufficiently powerful *formal *systems as mathematical proofs that draw > necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of things. Applying them in > epistemology and ontology requires showing that both our knowledge and > reality itself conform to every single premiss, including a *specific *formal > system that meets the stipulated criteria. In other words, complete > inequivalence is a controversial hypothesis, not another established > theorem. > > JRKC: Any definition of an object through a symbolic system is a function > of the system, not the object. > > > Objects do not have definitions, words do; and those definitions are > indeed functions of the sign system being employed, not the objects that > they purport to describe. In Peircean terms, the definition of a word is > its immediate interpretant, and whatever conforms to that definition is its > (potential) immediate object when it is incorporated into a proposition. > Any description of something using words is inevitably incomplete because > the words themselves and the concepts that they denote are *general *and > therefore indeterminate. As a result, "[T]he subject of discourse ... can, > in fact, not be described in general terms; it can only be indicated. The > actual world cannot be distinguished from a world of imagination by any > description. Hence the need of pronoun and indices, and the more > complicated the subject the greater the need of them" (CP 3.363, 1885; see > also CP 2.337, c. 1895, and CP 2.536, 1902). > > Peirce's Existential Graphs iconically illustrate this. In the Beta part, > names (words) denote general concepts and heavy lines of identity denote > indefinite individuals (objects) to which those concepts are attributed by > attaching their names. The effect of such combinations in various > propositions is making the concepts *more *determinate and the > individuals *more *definite--ascribing the same concept to multiple > individuals, increasing that concept's logical *breadth*; and ascribing > different concepts to the same individual, increasing each concept's > logical *depth *(see the last two CSP quotations in my post at > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-07/msg00068.html). The > product of these for any particular concept is its *information *(CP > 2.419, 1867), which increases in both ways. > > This finally gets us back to my semiosic ontological hypothesis, which I > will discuss further in a separate post in that thread. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Aug 5, 2025 at 11:13 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > >> I can prove that to/through (mediation) the human being, the thing cannot >> be what it is in asbentia of that relation nor need it even be similar or >> remotely equivalent. I assert it rhetorically here. >> >> Now the tree example below, qua "impossible to know how a tree >> experiences anything as the tree does for a human" - this has an obvious >> bearing on realities that cannot possibly be represented (unless we mean >> represented as in "made-up conceptual stuff which is not true"). >> >> As to ontology — and sorry for the double post — Kant's claim is >> absolutely ontological for the noumenal is an ontological distinction and >> use of "apriori" as beyond experience is catogircally demarcated from his >> use of it in other contexts. He means, by the first a priori, that the >> meaning of the "thing" as it is is beyond all possible experience and that >> is what the thing in itself, generally, refers/corresponds to. That is an >> ontological distinction (you cannot merely call it epistemological wheter >> you accept the ontological distinction or not). >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Jack >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
