Hello Jon, Gary F., Gary R., and all, How should we interpret Peirce’s claims about the topological distinction between three types of cosmologies? Jon has assembled an extensive set of textual references spanning roughly twenty years of Peirce’s work (1886–1906). My general approach is to read Peirce as engaged in a cycle of inquiry, with his initial focus on the abductive phase—framing questions and developing competing hypotheses. He claims that all such hypotheses can be grouped into one of three types:
* Hyperbolic or evolutionist cosmology (CP 1.409, EP 1:277, 1887–8; CP 6.581, 1890; CP 8.317, 1891) * Parabolic or pessimistic cosmology * Elliptical or Epicurean cosmology (CP 1.362, EP 1:251, 1887–8; CP 6.582–5, 1890; R 953, c. 1897) My assumption is that Peirce is asking: What kinds of models can be applied to these competing hypotheses? It is striking that as early as 1886, he is applying the mathematics of topology to classify possible cosmological models. From his study of mathematical inquiry, he concludes that topology provides the fundamental set of hypotheses for the study of continuous systems. This raises a question: to what extent did this tripartite division of explanatory models shape his later work, particularly the development of the existential graphs—especially the gamma system? My own inclination is to think that Peirce devised the existential graphs, at least in part, to clarify such philosophical and cosmological hypotheses. If so, we might explore how the gamma system could be used to make these competing hypotheses more precise and to frame them in a way that allows for empirical or logical testing. We can also ask, to what extent is he guided by hypotheses that lay at the bases of topology to the development of the existential graphs. Great cosmologists, such as Einstein and Penrose look to various geometries for guidance in their physical--and philosophical-- inquiries. Peirce is suggesting that we should look, first, to topology before turning to the metrical questions of geometry. Yours, Jeff ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, August 9, 2025 1:38 PM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Ontology and Evolution (was If not Cognitive/Experiential, then what is Semiosis?) Gary R., List: We seem to be almost entirely on the same page with respect to the previous topic, so I changed the subject line to reflect what you brought up in your last few paragraphs below. I also see this as a continuation of where I left off Thursday in the "Semiosic Ontology" thread and would still welcome any responses to that post (https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-08/msg00023.html). I need to acknowledge and clarify something up-front--Peirce himself never explicitly says that the universe is a semiosic continuum, nor "that every entity is a token of a type," nor "that every interaction is a degenerate form of a continuous triadic semiosis." However, I view these as legitimate implications of his relevant writings, and I provide many supporting excerpts from them in my "Semiosic Synechism" paper (https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHSSA-42.pdf), some of which I have quoted or cited in recent posts (as well as below). That is why my subtitle for that paper is "A Peircean Argumentation," not "Peirce's Argumentation," as I explain in its introduction. Your most significant misgiving about my hypothesis still seems to be the question of whether and how evolution fits into the resulting picture. I hope that I have made it clear by now that, just like the knowledge of all reality that would be possessed by an infinite community after infinite investigation and thus infinite experience, the "one individual, or completely determinate, state of things" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906)--i.e., "the fact that is not abstracted but complete, [which] is the ultimate interpretant of every sign" (EP 2:304, NEM 4:239-40, 1901)--is an asymptotic limit in the infinite future. Likewise, a completely indeterminate state of things--i.e., "nothing, pure zero" (CP 6.217, 1898), "Utter indetermination" (EP 2:322, NEM 4:260, 1901), "utter nothingness ... nility ... tohu bohu" (CP 6.490, 1908)--is an asymptotic limit in the infinite past. In between, at any assignable date, the entire universe is constantly evolving by becoming more determinate. This is Peirce's self-described hyperbolic or evolutionist cosmology (CP 1.409, EP 1:277, 1887-8; CP 6.581, 1890; CP 8.317, 1891), which he contrasts with the alternative parabolic or pessimistic and elliptical or Epicurean cosmologies (CP 1.362, EP 1:251, 1887-8; CP 6.582-5, 1890; R 953, c. 1897). In my view, these correspond respectively to genuine, degenerate, and doubly degenerate continua. Because the state of the universe is always proceeding between initial and final states that are different from each other, it is isomorphic with time (NEM 2:249-50, 1895; NEM 2:611, 1908) and with the inferential process of reasoning (CP 1.491, c. 1896; NEM 4:127&134, 1897-8), thus suggesting my own conception of it as a semiosic continuum. The universe as a perfect sign is constantly evolving by becoming more determinate (EP 2:545n25, 1906), "working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903), because all the signs within it are constantly determining their interpretants. Simply put, "Symbols grow" (CP 2.302, EP 2:10, 1894). "Reality, therefore, can only be regarded as the limit of the endless series of symbols. A symbol is essentially a purpose, that is to say, is a representation that seeks to make itself definite, or seeks to produce an interpretant more definite than itself" (EP 2:323, NEM 4:261, 1901). "Synechism is founded on the notion that the coalescence, the becoming continuous, the becoming governed by laws, the becoming instinct with general ideas, are but phases of one and the same process of the growth of reasonableness" (CP 5.4, 1902). "Accordingly, the pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable" (CP 5.433, EP 2:343, 1905; see also CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903). I am not sure what else still needs to be addressed at this point, so I will pause again to see what comments and questions you and others might have. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Aug 8, 2025 at 8:18 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon, List, Referencing your post yesterday, you and I agree that, as Peirce argues, Kant's Ding an sich is conceptually incoherent, that when we perceive something that we are directly perceiving it even as our conceptual hold is -- as it must be -- incomplete and imperfect, sometimes confused or distorted. Further, that "anything that exists can be denoted in a proposition" and if it can’t be indicated, it can’t be denoted; so, the Ding an sich can’t be indicated; therefore it doesn’t exist. Continuing that line of argumentation in your post today, I found it helpful for you to have included multiple short Peirce passages demonstrating that Peirce rejected the incoherent idea of an 'absolutely unknowable reality' which, again, is incoherent . I also certainly agree that Peirce’s ideal of infinite inquiry (truth as the eventual hypothetical consensus of all investigation) is not, as was suggested, subject to falsification, because, as you remarked, it is merely a regulative ideal which 'plays out' in an asymptotic manner, not at all a prediction of an actual end state that will ever be reached. Truth is what an ideal community of investigators would ultimately agree upon if research could proceed indefinitely under improving conditions of reasoning, evidence, and freedom from bias. Meanwhile our knowledge remains fallible and provisional and is always subject to correction and revision. It follows that progress toward truth is a communal effort, the “community of inquirers” over many, many generations, pushing knowledge forward. I thought this had been hashed out in the literature so that there was consensus on what Peirce meant by infinite inquiry. I liked your simple and concise explanation that experience is strictly cognitive while semiosis is not, that is as you put it, that while all cognition is semiosis, not all semiosis is cognition (again, that being exactly Peirce's 'broader conception') and why Peirce argues that something like thought appears in natural processes, not just our human brains. I fail to see why some find that difficult to comprehend; but, of course, even Peirce despaired of making his broader conception understood as you noted. But we are in the 21st century after over a century of Peirce scholarship. . . In my view, any contemporary attempt to limit semiosis to human cognition would be a step backward in semiotic. And as I noted in an earlier post, even some contemporary professional linguists, like Michael Shaprio, have embraced Peirce's semeiotic, including his 'broader conception', into their work. As I see it, the matters summarized above are all clearly Peirce's views, well established principles that, whether they are expressed as direct quotes or paraphrases, are recognized by many Peirce scholars as expressing his considered and weighed views on those matters (whatever questions there may be about other aspects of his philosophy). Now whether one agrees with them or not is another matter. But to suggest that everything I wrote in the first half of this message is just an individual, personal 'interpretation' of Peirce is, in my opinion, pure nonsense. Yet it would appear that, for some, one is damned whether they include direct quotes in a post or paraphrase Peirce. Heavens, there'd be few -- I mean no -- books rooted in what Peirce thought if both weren't included as standard operating procedure in scientific and philosophical literature. But your post today contains ideas that I have expressed reservations regarding at least some of the implications of Peirce's claim that “the universe is a vast representamen” (<-> your "single immense sign") and that all signs are interconnected in a vast continuum. You state that Peirce argues that every entity is a token of a type (so not only the word 'rose' but any particular actual🌹that one might single out, say point to in a garden) and, further, that every interaction is a degenerate form of a continuous triadic semiosis (where does Peirce argue that, may I ask?) That would seem to follow from semeiotic principles applicable to language and through--but to every interaction? Of course I'm eager to read you next post, as your argument that semiosis pervades the "single immense sign" which is the cosmos, that everything and every event participates in a continuous, unbroken web of semiosis, and I assume, semiotic meaning (or, perhaps, potential meaning) would seem to sum up the matter. But evidently there is more. . . While you've written about it here before, I still don't quite understand how that 'vast representamen' and much 'within' it (continuous with it?) evolves so I hope you're planning to discuss that further. (For the nonce I won't touch the theosemiotic conclusions you've drawn in other posts, although, as I recall, they are quintessential in your argument concerning the 'how' of evolution.) I very much appreciate the clarity of your last posts. Thanks, Gary R
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