Helmut, Jack, Jon, List, Helmut, I hope this proves useful. Since some folk have begun using AI here recently (often rather creatively and always ethically, in my opinion), I thought I'd offer an AI structured summary of Jon's recent post for comparison of his and Jack's views. Following the summary is an AI created 'debate map' which I personally found especially helpful.
*Summary of Jon's post today responding to Jack's earlier post.* *Jack: CP 5.525 shows that when predicates describe a subject, the subject remains beyond what is said of it—the subject is not reducible to the proposition.* Jon's response: That is not what CP 5.525 demonstrates. Instead, Peirce affirms that every proposition must have a subject, identified by an index or precept, to which general concepts are attributed through words. If the object conforms to those concepts, the proposition is true. *Jack: The propositions confuse agreement on facts with truth of the subject as it really is.* Jon's response: There is no "truth of the subject," only truth of propositions about it. "Agreement on facts" is the only kind of truth. Examples: grass is green, Peirce died in 1914. These are true propositions representing things as they really are. *Jack: Equating selective, adequate propositions with the subject’s reality is a category error. Propositions tell us about the subject but are never identical with it.* Jon's response: It is not a category error but how cognition functions. Propositions are not identical with their objects, but represent facts prescinded from reality. Full representation would require infinitely many propositions—an infinite community over infinite investigation. *Jack: Propositions may be pragmatically “valid-true” but do not meet the stronger test of representing the subject as it really is. The model-theoretic result shows this limit.* Jon's response: : Any belief whose habits would never be confounded by possible future experience is true—it represents its subject as it really is. The model-theoretic result concerns provability, not truth. *Jack: You did not pass the test—Peirce’s logical conclusion must be overturned for you to succeed.* Jon's response: On the contrary, the test was passed. The JRKC interpretation misrepresents Peirce, attributing contradiction. Peirce’s principle refutes the idea of an incognizable thing-in-itself. *CSP (quoted, CP 2.330, EP 2:286, 1903): Every subject of a proposition, unless an index or subindex, must be a precept or symbol that both guides how to obtain an index of an individual and assigns designation to it.* Jon's response: Complete representation is unnecessary for representing something as it really is; one needs only an index or precept plus accurate descriptive words. Recommendation: carefully read EP 2:168 (1903). ________________________________ *Debate Map on Jack vs. Jon Peirce CP 5.525* *1. What CP 5.525 demonstrates* JRKC: CP 5.525 shows that the subject always exceeds what can be said of it. Jas: CP 5.525 only states a logical point: every proposition requires a subject indicated by an index or precept. ________________________________ *2. Truth and “the subject”* JRKC: You confuse agreement on facts with the truth of the subject as it really is. JAS: There is no “truth of the subject” — only truth of propositions about it. ________________________________ *3. Category error?* JRKC: Equating propositions with the subject’s reality is a category mistake. JAS: No, it’s how cognition works; propositions aren’t identical with objects, but they represent them. ________________________________ *4. Pragmatic vs. “stronger” truth* JRKC: Propositions may be pragmatically true, but they don’t fully represent the subject as it is; model theory shows this gap. JAS: True beliefs are those immune to any future disconfirmation — they do represent reality; model theory is about provability, not truth. ________________________________ *5. Passing the “test”* JRKC: You failed the test; Peirce’s logic must be overturned to succeed. JAS: On the contrary, I upheld Peirce; your interpretation wrongly attributes contradiction and thing-in-itself thinking to him. ________________________________ *6. What Peirce actually said (CP 2.330, EP 2:286, 1903)* CSP: A subject must be identified by indices, subindices, or precepts assigning designations and guiding access to individuals. JAS: Thus, complete representation is unnecessary — indices + accurate words suffice. ________________________________ *Overall Flow:* Jack treats Peirce as affirming a metaphysical gap (subject exceeds propositions). Jon insists Peirce was making a logical/semantic point (truth = accurate propositions, not a thing-in-itself). CSP: Peirce quotations support the Respondent’s interpretation: propositions need subjects indicated by indices/precepts, not metaphysical excess. Note to Helmut: I just noticed your second post in this thread: Please remember to limit your posts to one per thread each day unless someone is responding to *your* thread post, in which case a second response is permissible that same day. As earlier discussed, a single response in a second thread is also allowed. Also, and as I mentioned to Jack off List a week or so ago, I am paying heed to time differences so that that shouldn't be an issue in the future.. Best, Gary R On Wed, Sep 3, 2025 at 3:12 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Jack, List, > > sorry that I write something without having fully understood your > positions. Is what you are talking about the epistemic cut, and whether it > is bridgeable by applying an infinity to one side of its? In this case, I > would say that this way it is not bridgeable. Why should infinity of > inquiry be able to bridge a gap, which exists not due to different > quantity, but due to different quality? > > In chaos theory, a quantity difference can switch to quality difference, > but in a common coordinate system. I think, aboutness is about two > separated-by-nature coordinate systems, one ontological, and one > representative. > > Best, Helmut > 3. September 2025 um 19:20 > "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > Jack, List: > > > JRKC: 5.525 demonstrates that when words migrate to predicates and all > which can be "said" of a subject is said there remains a subject, the truth > of which, cannot be what has been said of it--the subject is not what is > given in the proposition > > > That is not what CP 5.525 (c. 1905) demonstrates at all. Again, Peirce > simply states the logical principle that every proposition has at least one > subject that must be indicated or found, not merely described using words. > An index or precept identifies an individual object, and words attribute > general concepts to it by means of syntax. If that object really conforms > to those concepts accordingly, then the proposition is true--it represents > the object as it really is. > > > JRKC: Accordingly, I find your two propositions confuse *agreement on > facts* with *truth of the subject as it really is*. > > > There is no such thing as "truth of the subject," only truth of > propositions *about *a subject. In other words, what you call "agreement > on facts" is the only kind of truth there is. Remember, "A *fact *is so > highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly > represented in a simple proposition" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). It is a > fact that the grass in my yard is (mostly) green today, i.e., my grass *really > is* green. It is a fact that Peirce died in 1914, i.e., Peirce *really > did* die that year. Hence, these are both true propositions that > represent things as they really are--exactly what you requested. > > > JRKC: Yet equivocation with selective, functionally adequate propositions > with the subject’s reality is a categorical error. They tell us something > about the subject, but they are never identical with what the subject > really is. This is obvious. > > > It is not equivocation nor a category error, it is how cognition works. It > is indeed obvious that propositions are not identical with their objects, > and no one is claiming otherwise--*that *would be a category error. We > *prescind > *facts from the "one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of > things, namely, the all of reality" (ibid.); and we represent them in true > propositions, correctly attributing general concepts (signified by words) > to individual objects (denoted by indices or precepts) in accordance with > logical relations (embodied by syntax). A *complete *representation would > require infinitely many such propositions, i.e., the beliefs of an infinite > community after infinite investigation and thus infinite experience. > > > JRKC: Thus, while such propositions may be “valid-true” in the pragmatic > sense (our habits are not confounded by them), they do not achieve the > stronger claim: representing the subject as it really is (which was the > test one had to pass here). That’s precisely the barrier the > model-theoretic result marks out. > > > Any proposition expressing a belief whose corresponding habits of conduct > *would > *never be confounded by *any possible* future experience is *true *(full > stop), i.e., it represents its subject as it really is. The model-theoretic > result has no bearing whatsoever on whether a given proposition does this; > it only demonstrates that in most cases, it cannot be *proved *true as a > theorem within a formal system. Truth and provability are not synonymous. > > > JRKC: I just wanted to point out that you didn't pass the test > ... Peirce's logical conclusion has to be overturned for you to pass it > > > On the contrary, I passed it with flying colors, and you continue to > exhibit a fundamental misunderstanding of Peirce's logical principle as > stated in CP 5.525. It is patently absurd to ascribe blatant > self-contradiction to him by interpreting it as somehow *confirming *an > incognizable thing-in-itself, when he explicitly employs it for *directly > refuting* that notion. Here is more detailed statement of what he is > actually highlighting there. > > > CSP: Every subject of a proposition, unless it is either an Index (like > the environment of the interlocutors, or something attracting attention in > that environment, as the pointing finger of the speaker) or a Subindex > (like a proper name, personal pronoun, or demonstrative) must be a > *Precept*, or Symbol, not only describing to the Interpreter what is to > be done, by him or others or both, in order to obtain an Index of an > individual (whether a unit or a single set of units) of which the > proposition is represented as meant to be true, but also assigning a > designation to that individual, or, if it is a set, to each single unit of > the set. (CP 2.330, EP 2:286, 1903) > > > Again, we do not need to represent something *completely *in order to > represent it as it really is; we just need an index or precept to denote > it, in addition to words that accurately describe it. I also still > recommend carefully reading EP 2:168 (1903)--the whole page--and this time, > I have attached an image of it, in case you do not have access to it. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > On Wed, Sep 3, 2025 at 6:23 AM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon, Jerry, Mike, list >> >> *JAS*:You requested one example of a true proposition which represents >> things as they really are. That very sentence of mine is one example of a >> true proposition which represents things as they really are--you really >> made that specific request. Other obvious examples include "the grass in my >> yard is (mostly) green today" and "Charles Sanders Peirce died in 1914." >> Again, *every *true proposition represents things as they really >> are--that is the very *definition *of a true proposition. Why did you >> think that complying with your request would be at all difficult, let alone >> "close to impossible"? As I said before, most of our beliefs can be >> expressed as true propositions, because otherwise our corresponding habits >> of conduct would be *constantly *confounded by experience. >> >> I asked because 5.525 demonstrates that when words migrate to predicates >> and all which can be "said" of a subject is said there remains a subject, >> the truth of which, cannot be what has been said of it — the subject is not >> what is given in the proposition (and that's why the structural >> incompleteness is highly relevant, especially if we're discussing 5.525 >> where such is organically derived). >> Accordingly, I find your two propositions confuse* agreement on facts* with >> * truth of the subject as it really is*. Saying “Peirce died in 1914” or >> “the grass is green today” is certainly valid within our practices: these >> statements fit records, habits of use, and expectations. But that is not >> the same as representing the subject *as it really is — you are not >> giving the truth of either subject — and that is what I expect cannot be >> done (in propositions), following Peirce's own logic, carefully explicated, >> in 5.525*. The bar for that claim (this is the truth of the subject: as >> it "really" is) is much higher and thus why I cannot think of a propostion >> which meets that truth-standard. >> Why? Because what is predicated is always partial and conventional. >> “Green” is one, categorically linguistic, aspect of grass, but even >> ignoring the categorical linguistic (I mean categorial >> error/conflation...), such as it is ignores infinitely many other aspects >> of what "grass" is or would be. And, even then, qua 5.525, there would >> remain whatever "grass" is which could not be the finite nor infinite >> descriptions/definitions of such (minimally in propositions). >> Peirce “died in 1914” is likewise: may be said to capture a historical >> record about Peirce, but it is not the truth of Peirce (as subject). Only >> God knows how you could go about that in a written/spoken record. Yet >> equivocation with selective, functionally adequate propositions with the >> subject’s reality is a categorical error. They tell us something *about* the >> subject, but they are never identical with what the subject really is. This >> is obvious. >> Thus, while such propositions may be “valid-true” in the pragmatic sense >> (our habits are not confounded by them), they do not achieve the stronger >> claim: representing the subject as it really is (which was the test one had >> to pass here). That’s precisely the barrier the model-theoretic result >> marks out. >> Anyway, you have your own distinct framework, Mike has another >> interesting way of demonstrating how Peirce would respond to the result >> Peirce himself anticipates, and then Jerry has made an interesting set of >> remarks which I have to read more closely as I think it's highly >> interesting in the most technical respect of what "interesting" conveys. So >> I'll spend most of the day reading through other people's comments as I >> think there's lots there to consider. I just wanted to point out that you >> didn't pass the test (but that I do not understand how you could pass it, >> so it's not a dig or anything personal {Peirce's logical conclusion has to >> be overturned for you to pass it — and it won't be}). >> >> Best, >> Jack >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or > "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. 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