Gary, Frederik, Well stated. I’m going to catch up on Frederick’s work. Many thanks for your input!
Atila On Mon, Sep 22, 2025 at 5:57 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Frederik, List, > > Thank you for including these excerpts from your book, quite pertinent to > this discussion. > > One thought of yours which I keep reflecting on is that a fact is not > simply an object of reference, but is the structured state of things which > makes a Dicisign true. As you note, this distinction allows Peirce to > explain false and even meaningless propositions, the first attributing the > *wrong > predicate* to a real entity, the second one not offering an object > reference in the universe of discourse *at all*. > > The distinction you make between 'occurrences' and 'facts' is also > important: occurrences being but segments of reality happening within a > given time frame, while facts are extracted by thought from reality following > the trichotomic structure of the dicisign. And since scientific reasoning > depends on representing such structured aspects of reality, it is > possible for Dicisigns to represent ideas across widely different > ontological levels, some of which you noted. > > Your providing such significant insights is part of the reason why > I've always considered *Natural Propositions* to be a most excellent > contribution of Peirce's semeiotics, and of course not only to > biosemiotics, but to semiotics more generally. > > Best, > > Gary Richmond > > > On Sat, Sep 20, 2025 at 11:04 AM Frederik Stjernfelt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Dear Peircers – >> >> In my 2014 book *Natural Propositions* on ”Dicisigns” I investigate >> Peirce’s idea from around 1903 that Dicisigns may represent Facts. Below, a >> section of the discussion. >> >> Best >> >> Frederik >> >> >> >> 3.8 Facts as Truth-makers of Dicisigns >> >> >> >> ”What we call a 'fact' is something having the structure of a >> proposition, but >> >> supposed to be an element of the very universe itself” ( *Kaina >> Stoicheia,* 1904, >> >> EPII 304), Peirce claims, and this fact theory is what explains the >> ability of >> >> propositions to depict facts. Facts are the truth-makers of Dicisigns: if >> a >> >> Dicisign is true, the corresponding fact is the case. >> >> >> >> Thus, the fact depicted by the Dicisign is different from the object >> reference >> >> of the Dicisign. This distinction allows for an obvious way of >> explaining the >> >> existence of false Dicisigns – something which may sometimes be a >> challenge >> >> for picture-oriented theories of the expression of propositions (cf. G.E. >> Moore; >> >> the early Russell). The syntax keeping together the Dicisign in itself >> functions >> >> as an index of the two aspects of the fact corresponding to the two >> aspects >> >> of the Dicisign: ”Every informational sign thus involves a Fact, which is >> its >> >> Syntax” (*Syllabus*, 1903, EP II 282; 2.321). Peirce thus maintains a >> theory of >> >> facts or state-of-things to account for what was later called the >> truth-makers >> >> of propositions. Thus, he distinguishes the object or referent of the >> Dicisign >> >> given by its indexical subject part, on the one hand, and the truth-maker >> >> making true the Dicisign as a truth-bearer given by the fact structured in >> >> the same way as the syntax of the proposition. This plastic theory permits >> >> Peirce's account to escape problems encountered by proposition theories >> taking >> >> states-of-affairs or facts to be not only the truth-makers of >> propositions but >> >> also their referents. Such simpler doctrines immediately, of course, run >> into >> >> trouble because of their diffculty in accounting for false propositions. >> >> But even theories admitting false propositions may encounter problems. >> >> False propositions refer to non-existing facts, but the same thing is >> achieved by >> >> meaningless propositions. The difference between propositions such as >> ”Barack >> >> Obama is the president of China” and ”The present king of France is bald” >> tends >> >> to evaporate in such a theory. Russell, as is well known, concluded that >> the >> >> latter just like the former must be counted as false. In Peirce's >> account, we >> >> should rather take the former proposition as a false claim about an >> existing >> >> person and the latter as a meaningless claim about a non-existing person >> because >> >> it fails to make an object reference for the proposition in the Universe >> of >> >> Discourse even if both have non-existing truth-makers. (In the framework >> of >> >> bivalent logic, Peirce tended to count meaningless propositions as true, >> reserving >> >> ”false” to refer to ascriptions of erroneous predicates to potentially >> existing >> >> entities only.) >> >> >> >> Facts, in Peirce's doctrine, are certain simple states of things: >> >> >> >> A state of things is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such >> >> a nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but >> >> one individual, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, >> >> the all of reality. A fact is so highly a prescissively abstract state of >> >> things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, >> >> and the term ”simple”, here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely >> >> a comparative expression. ( *The Basis of Pragmaticism in the* >> >> *Normative Sciences* , EPII, 378, 5.549 50) >> >> >> >> Thus, simplicity here pertains to the relevant level of observation, not >> to any >> >> supposedly basic level of reality, such as was the case in Wittgenstein's >> in some >> >> respects similar picture theory of language in the *Tractatus* which >> famously led >> >> him to found his whole theory upon logical atoms without being able to >> point >> >> out a single example of one. Even if Peirce's theory of Dicisigns may, >> even in a >> >> very strong sense, be called a picture theory of propositions, it does >> not follow >> >> that the objects and properties singled out by a proposition be simple in >> any >> >> absolute sense. This is because states-of-things or facts in Peirce's >> account are >> >> *structures* of reality, distinct from simple subsets of reality: >> >> >> >> . . . I must first point out the distinction between a Fact and what in >> >> other connexions, is often called an Event* [Foot note* Or at least >> >> the temporal element of it is not the whole of it since [the] thing to >> >> which the event happens [is] an element of the event.], but which, >> >> owing to that word being used in the Doctrine of Chances in its >> >> stricter sense of the way in which a doubt about what will happen >> >> is ultimately resolved, must be here called an Occurrence. If from >> >> the Universe of the Actual we cut out in thought all that, between >> >> two instances of time, in uences or involves in any considerable >> >> degree certain Existent Persons and Things, this Actual fragment >> >> of what exists and actually happens, so cut out, I call an Actual >> >> Occurrence which Thought analizes into Things and Happenings. >> >> It is necessarily Real; but it can never be known or even imagined >> >> in all its infinite detail. A Fact, on the other hand is so much of the >> >> Real Universe as can be represented in a Proposition, and instead >> >> of being, like an Occurrence, a slice of the Universe, it is rather >> >> to be compared to a chemical principle extracted therefrom by the >> >> power of Thought; and though it is, or may be, Real, yet, in its >> >> Real Existence, it is inseparably combined with an infinite swarm >> >> of circumstances, which make no part of the Fact itself. (Ms. 647 >> >> *Definition* , 5th draught 16-18 Feb. 1910, p. 8-11, discussing >> >> Laplace) >> >> >> >> Thus, facts or states-of-things are ”principles”, structures extracted >> from >> >> reality explaining their Janus-headed doubleness, consisting at the same >> time >> >> of particular objects (secondnesses, referred to by the indices of the >> proposition) >> >> and general properties (firstnesses, described by the icons of the >> proposition). >> >> Scientifically traceable causal relations hold between facts, not between >> >> occurrences. Thus, Peirce's version of scientific realism (and >> scholastic realism, >> >> assuming the reality of some predicates) is dependent upon this ability of >> >> Dicisigns to depict extracted, structured aspects of reality. Here, the >> ability >> >> of Dicisigns to involve the large array of iconic predicate possibilities >> of maps, >> >> diagrams, graphs, etc., becomes central to his notion of diagrammatical >> reasoning >> >> in the sciences. The important claim above, that the simplicity of facts >> >> is relative only, gives an easy way of understanding why simple Dicisigns >> may >> >> express facts stemming from very different levels of ontology (from ”2+2 >> = 4” >> >> to ”There are two classes of elementary particles”, ”This chair is white” >> to ”The >> >> Movement of Enlightenment took place in the 17th and 18th centuries”) >> where >> >> the objects involved have highly different ontology and complexity, cf. >> on diagrams >> >> and language in ch. 7. This simplicity pertains to fact structure only, >> >> not to the objects and events co-constituting those facts. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *Fra: *[email protected] <[email protected]> på >> vegne af Atila Bayat <[email protected]> >> *Dato: *lørdag, 20. september 2025 kl. 17.17 >> *Til: *[email protected] <[email protected]>, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> [email protected]> >> *Emne: *Re: [PEIRCE-L] Facts, Opinion, Perspective, and Inquiry, was, >> Truth, Ethics, and Esthetics >> >> Jon, Mary, Ben, List: >> >> >> >> Thank you for these excellent citations and corrections. Mary supplied a >> brilliant passage from Collected paper Volume 1 (*§ *22-26), and >> reflects my sentiment. Let me add to this some other passages from CSP >> around the 2nd category; >> >> CP Vol. 1, p.183 >> >> Cf. Buchler’s edition Philosophical Writings Chapter 6 complete, >> specifically ‘’What is fact’ excerpt is from 1896…excerpts in that chapter >> are not in chronological order. >> >> CP Vo. 7, 7.659; see the whole excerpt. Notice in the Century Dictionary >> definition, there is only a reference to a “simple” fact. CSP will describe >> “Hard facts” in his papers. Cf. Collected Papers (CP) 7.659; see the whole >> excerpt. >> >> MS.283, he introduced formal distinctions of facts again; these ideas >> lead me back to the section in CP 1.183; (in a well-stated paraphrase by E. >> Freeman, *Categories of Peirce* (1934)) pp. 17-19. I'd like to direct >> you there and include an excerpt later. >> >> Invariably, CSP will tie these definitions into his discussion and >> demonstration of his ontological constructs - in his papers - of how his >> categories are derived as mental processes, and of course, how these >> correspond to the three kinds of signs. Freeman writes, “These three kinds >> of relations and signs…are the clues to the three essentially different >> kinds of mental processes.” p.14 >> >> Jon, that’s a good correction, and I see it. While I incorrectly wrote >> “representation,” I will opt for the expression from J. Esposito: “From >> Schiller Peirce took over the idea that reality was a synthesizing >> interplay of opposing tendencies—*a concretizing tendency* *and a >> generalizing tendency*.” (Peirce Studies Symposium #1 1979, ‘On the >> Origins and Foundations of Peirce’s Semiotic.’ Peirce lays out these >> definitions, anticipating his systematic leaning toward developing both a >> theory of categories and a theory of semiotic process. >> >> Perhaps the best treatment of ‘fact and Secondness’ I found is in J. >> Feibleman’s *Introduction to Peirce* (1946), pp. 160-61. Important. It >> seems some of these matters could lead to an exhaustive dissertation. Does >> anyone recall the talk T. Sebeok delivered in 1989 at the Harvard >> Sesquicentennial for CSP? I remember taking notes on Indexicality. >> >> Sorry for the late reply. Ben, please send me an email. I need to get >> updated to share digital content. Regards, >> >> Atila >> >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Sep 18, 2025 at 1:38 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >> Mary, List: >> >> >> >> Thank you for bringing that additional passage by Peirce into the >> discussion. It is from the 1903 Lowell Lectures and comes a few paragraphs >> after his definition of "the question of nominalism and [scholastic] >> realism" as "whether *laws *and general *types *are figments of the mind >> or are real" (1.16), as well as his assertion that "all modern philosophy >> of every sect has been nominalistic" such that Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, >> Hartley, Hume, Reid, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel were all nominalists (1.19). >> What he says about Aristotle (1.22) echoes his earlier remarks that I >> quoted in another thread a few days ago--"he may, I think, be described as >> a nominalist with vague intimations of realism" because he "endeavors to >> express the universe in terms of Matter [2ns] and Form [1ns] alone," >> exhibiting only "an obscure conception of what he calls *entelechy* [3ns]" >> (NEM 4:294-5, 1901). Since we are focusing here on the definition of >> "fact," the immediately previous paragraph is also relevant. >> >> >> >> CSP: The heart of the dispute [between nominalism and scholastic realism] >> lies in this. The modern philosophers--one and all, unless Schelling be an >> exception--recognize but one mode of being, the being of an individual >> thing or fact, the being which consists in the object's crowding out a >> place for itself in the universe, so to speak, and reacting by brute force >> of fact, against all other things. I call that existence. (1.21) >> >> >> >> Nominalists view facts as discrete individuals, not real abstractions >> prescinded from the continuous whole that is "the all of reality." >> Similarly, Peirce later identifies "three Universes, which are >> distinguished by three Modalities of Being" that correspond to his three >> categories, the second of which "is that of, 1st, Objects whose Being >> consists in their Brute reactions, and of, 2nd, the facts (reactions, >> events, qualities, etc.) concerning those Objects, all of which facts, in >> the last analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, Things, >> or more unambiguously, *Existents*, and the facts about them I call >> *Facts*. Every member of this Universe is either a Single Object, >> subject alike to the Principles of Contradiction and to that of Excluded >> Middle, or it is expressible by a proposition having such a singular >> subject" (SS 81-2, EP 2:478-9, 1908 Dec 28). Strictly speaking, this is the >> *only >> *universe that nominalists recognize as real, since it includes >> qualities that are *instantiated *in existents. Of course, Peirce >> considers that position to be untenable. >> >> >> >> CSP: I do not think that such a thing as a consistent Nominalism is >> possible. Thus, Pearson, after a long discussion founded on a Nominalism so >> explicit as to say that it is we who make the Laws of Nature, at last >> remarks that of course he does not deny the concatenation of events. But >> Nominalism--or, at least, modern Nominalism,--is precisely the doctrine >> that the Universe is a heap of sand whose grains have nothing to do with >> one another, and to recognize concatenation is to recognize that there is >> something that is not Individual and has another mode of Being than that of >> an Individual Existent. (SWS 283, 1909 Nov 7) >> >> >> >> Another example is that although "Leibniz was an extreme nominalist" >> (1.19), "A great deal of the Leibnizian philosophy consists of attempts to >> annul the effect of nominalistic hypotheses"; most notably, "his *principle >> of sufficient reason*, which he regarded as one of the fundamental >> principles of logic. This principle is that whatever exists has a *reason >> *for existing, not a blind cause, but a *reason*. A reason is something >> essentially general, so that this seems to confer reality upon generals" >> (CP 4.36, 1893). >> >> >> >> Regards, >> >> >> >> Jon >> >> >> >> On Thu, Sep 18, 2025 at 8:46 AM Mary Libertin <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> Jon, Atila, List, >> >> >> >> Here is another passage discussing “fact,” from *Collected Writings*, *Volume >> I. Principles of Philosophy / Book 1: General Historical Orientation >> / Chapter 1: Lessons from the History of Philosophy / §1. Nominalism. * >> >> >> >> Peirce, in the passage below, connects Aristotle’s “entelechy” to his >> development of three modes of being. These three modes are described from >> the perspective of a definition of “fact.” This may be where Peirce is >> describing, early on, the relationship of abduction — based on probability >> from a future perspective or retroduction, as does Baynes, who was aware of >> Peirce’s discussion of abduction — to the other two modes of being. >> >> >> >> I will let these passages speak for themselves, leaving it open for your >> discussion. Our discussions will affect how the future will interpret the >> meaning of “fact." >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Mary Libertin >> >> 22. Aristotle, on the other hand, whose system, like all the greatest >> systems, was evolutionary, recognized besides an embryonic kind of being, >> like the being of a tree in its seed, or like the being of a future >> contingent event, depending on how a man shall decide to act. In a few >> passages Aristotle seems to have a dim *aperçue* of a third mode of >> being in the *entelechy.* The embryonic being for Aristotle was the >> being he called matter, which is alike in all things, and which in the >> course of its development took on form. Form is an element having a >> different mode of being. The whole philosophy of the scholastic doctors is >> an attempt to mould this doctrine of Aristotle into harmony with christian >> truth. This harmony the different doctors attempted to bring about in >> different ways. But all the realists agree in reversing the order of >> Aristotle's evolution by making the form come first, and the individuation >> of that form come later. Thus, they too recognized two modes of being; but >> they were not the two modes of being of Aristotle. >> >> 23. My view is that there are three modes of being. I hold that we can >> directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time before the >> mind in any way. They are the being of positive qualitative possibility, >> the being of actual *fact,* and the being of law that will govern *facts* >> in the future. >> >> 24. Let us begin with considering actuality, and try to make out just >> what it consists in. If I ask you what the actuality of an event consists >> in, you will tell me that it consists in its happening *then* and >> *there.* The specifications *then* and *there* involve all its relations >> to other existents. The actuality of the event seems to lie in its >> relations to the universe of existents. A court may issue *injunctions* >> and *judgments* against me and I not care a snap of my finger for them. >> I may think them idle vapor. But when I feel the sheriff's hand on my >> shoulder, I shall begin to have a sense of actuality. Actuality is >> something *brute.* There is no reason in it. I instance putting your >> shoulder against a door and trying to force it open against an unseen, >> silent, and unknown resistance. We have a two-sided consciousness of effort >> and resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense of >> actuality. On the whole, I think we have here a mode of being of one thing >> which consists in how a second object is. I call that Secondness. >> >> 25. Besides this, there are two modes of being that I call Firstness and >> Thirdness. Firstness is the mode of being which consists in its subject's >> being positively such as it is regardless of aught else. That can only be a >> possibility. For as long as things do not act upon one another there is no >> sense or meaning in saying that they have any being, unless it be that they >> are such in themselves that they may perhaps come into relation with >> others. The mode of being a *redness,* before anything in the universe >> was yet red, was nevertheless a positive qualitative possibility. And >> redness in itself, even if it be embodied, is something positive and *sui >> generis.* That I call Firstness. We naturally attribute Firstness to >> outward objects, that is we suppose they have capacities in themselves >> which may or may not be already actualized, which may or may not ever be >> actualized, although we can know nothing of such possibilities [except] so >> far as they are actualized. >> >> 26. Now for Thirdness. Five minutes of our waking life will hardly pass >> without our making some kind of prediction; and in the majority of cases >> these predictions are fulfilled in the event. Yet a prediction is >> essentially of a general nature, and cannot ever be completely fulfilled. >> To say that a prediction has a decided tendency to be fulfilled, is to say >> that the future events are in a measure really governed by a law. If a pair >> of dice turns up sixes five times running, that is a mere uniformity. The >> dice might happen fortuitously to turn up sixes a thousand times running. >> But that would not afford the slightest security for a prediction that they >> would turn up sixes the next time. If the prediction has a tendency to be >> fulfilled, it must be that future events have a tendency to conform to a >> general rule. "Oh," but say the nominalists, "this general rule is nothing >> but a mere word or couple of words!" I reply, "Nobody ever dreamed of >> denying that what is general is of the nature of a general sign; but the >> question is whether future events will conform to it or not. If they will, >> your adjective 'mere' seems to be ill-placed." A rule to which future >> events have a tendency to conform is *ipso facto* an important thing, an >> important element in the happening of those events. This mode of being >> which *consists, *mind my word if you please, the mode of being which >> *consists* in the *fact *that future *facts* of Secondness will take on >> a determinate general character, I call a Thirdness. >> >> On Sep 18, 2025, at 8:57 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> Atila, List: >> >> >> >> Peirce indeed prepared the entry >> <https://server-66-113-234-189.da.direct/century-dictionary.com/html/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=03&page=336&query=fact> >> for "fact" in *The Century Dictionary*--the complete list of his >> contributions is here >> <https://www.depts.ttu.edu/pragmaticism/collections/works/bibliography.pdf>, >> pp. 43-83--and his second definition is indeed the one that is relevant to >> what we have been discussing. >> >> >> >> CSP: A real state of things, as distinguished from a statement or belief; >> that in the real world agreement or disagreement with which makes a >> proposition true or false; a real inherence of an attribute in a substance, >> corresponding to the relation between the predicate and the subject of a >> proposition. By a few writers things in the concrete and the universe in >> its entirety are spoken of as *facts*; but according to the almost >> universal acceptation, a *fact *is not the whole concrete reality in any >> case, but an abstract element of the reality. Thus, Julius Caesar is not >> called a *fact*; but that Julius Caesar invaded Britain is said to have >> been a *fact*, or to be a *fact*. To this extent, the use of the word *fact >> *implies the reality of abstractions. With the majority of writers, >> also, a *fact*, or *single fact*, relates only to an individual thing or >> individual set of things. Thus, that Brutus killed Caesar is said to have >> been a *fact*; but that all men are mortal is not called a *fact*, but a >> *collection >> of facts*. By *fact *is also often meant a true statement, a truth, or >> truth in general; but this seems to be a mere inexactness of language, and >> in many passages any attempt to distinguish between the meanings on the >> supposition that *fact *means a true statement, and on the supposition >> that it means the real relation signified by a true statement would be >> empty subtlety. *Fact *is often used as correlative to *theory*, to >> denote that which is certain or well settled--the phenomena which the >> theory colligates and harmonizes. *Fact*, as being special, is sometimes >> opposed to *truth*, as being universal; and in such cases there is an >> implication that *facts *are minute matters ascertained by research, and >> often inferior in their importance for the formation of general opinions, >> or for the general description of phenomena, to other matters which are of >> familiar experience. >> >> >> >> In short, a fact is not *itself *a representation, it is what a *true >> proposition* represents. As Peirce writes elsewhere, "What we call a >> 'fact' is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to >> be an element of the very universe itself" (EP 2:304, 1901); and, "A *fact >> *is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be >> wholly represented in a simple proposition" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). We >> often colloquially use "fact" when referring to "a true statement," but it >> is terminologically more precise to use "fact" as instead referring to "the >> real relation signified by a true statement," i.e., an "abstract state of >> things" that is prescinded from the "one *individual*, or completely >> determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality" (ibid.). As >> Peirce observes, this effectively "implies the reality of abstractions," >> which is fully consistent with scholastic realism and utterly incompatible >> with nominalism. >> >> >> >> Regards, >> >> >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> >> >> On Wed, Sep 17, 2025 at 4:39 PM Atila Bayat <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> I think the Stoic definition of “fact” confuses the sense Peirce was >> driving at. Your entry seems to reflect the 1st entry in Century Dictionary >> which Peirce wrote, I believe. >> >> >> >> Actually the second entry is more fitting for a discussion on fact and >> truth. I think Peirce suggests/implies a representative characteristic to >> fact in his semiotics. Or I will check into that again later today. But I >> had the Century dictionary vols handy. >> >> >> >> Atila >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE >> FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your >> default email account, then go to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE >> FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your >> default email account, then go to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE > FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your > default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
