Gary R., List: I appreciate your remarks here and almost entirely agree with them. However, I feel the need to clarify that the truth of facts does not *require *a community of inquirers--propositions representing real facts are true *regardless *of whether any inquirers recognize them as such, or even exist at all, and they are *not* open to revision. On the other hand, our opinions and beliefs--both individually and collectively--*are *open to revision, *in accordance with* facts that we come to learn by means of further inquiry; primarily, when our corresponding habits of conduct are *confounded *by experience. That is how the method of science--unlike the alternative methods of tenacity, authority, and *a priori*--is intrinsically self-correcting, especially in the long run.
As you go on to note, Peirce's point in advocating a *community *of inquirers working together is to facilitate "the disciplined testing of beliefs across many perspectives over many generations." Nevertheless, I want to emphasize once more that true beliefs are not true *because *a finite or infinite community of inquirers actually does or ideally would adopt them collectively; rather, an infinite community *ultimately *would adopt those beliefs because they are true. Peirce's "ethics of inquiry" is, like his approach to ethics in general, grounded in the *summum bonum* as identified by esthetics--the proper *aim *of inquiry is adopting *only *true beliefs, thereby contributing to the growth of concrete reasonableness. "In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods as must develop knowledge the most speedily" (CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Sep 16, 2025 at 10:00 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > > Today I came upon two quotations, one an aphorism by an unknown author, > the other a snippet of a quotation by the Stoic Roman emperor, Marcus > Aurelius, both of which touch upon, albeit loosely, the ethics of inquiry. > First, the aphorism: > > *“A fact is objective information; an opinion is a personal belief; > ignorance is a lack of facts; and stupidity is a rejection of facts in > favor of opinions.”* > > > This view would seem to establish a hierarchy of intellectual 'attitudes': > Facts are seen as objective, while opinions are subjective and even > potentially dangerous when they are opposed to hard evidence. In this view > ignorance is 'curable', but stupidity reflects a willful rejection of > 'objective knowledge'. > > The following quotation seems to me to enrich, or at least to complicate > this hierarchy: > > * “Everything we hear is an opinion, not a fact. Everything we see is a > perspective, not the truth.” *Marcus Aurelius > > > Here Aurelius points to the fallibility of human cognition. What we take > to be fact is mediated by our perspectives and is therefore, from the > standpoint of the individual, *always* provisional. Of course this > doesn't in any way deny the possibility of truth, but rather points out > that our individual access to it is indirect, fallible, and sometimes, > perhaps even often, biased. > > Peirce offers a theory of inquiry which seems to me to synthesize these > two insights. As Jon pointed out recently, the truth of facts -- truth > itself -- requires the 'community of inquirers'; here facts and truth > transcend individual perspectives and, so, remain open to revision. > Opinions, on the other hand, are mere beliefs which may or may not > withstand the tests of experience and, especially, communal inquiry. > Ignorance is simply a lack of tested belief, while the stubborn rejection > of evidence either is Peirce's, or is related to his, 'method of tenacity': > clinging to a belief despite conflicting experience and evidence. > > And Peirce’s fallibilism seems to me to be in sync with Aurelius’ warning. > Every belief, no matter how strongly held, is subject to correction; and > all our perceptions are 'perspectives', not truths, not even facts. > However, Peirce avoids sliding into skepticism by grounding truth in a > long-run 'convergence of inquiry'. While no single perspective delivers > truth, the disciplined testing of beliefs across many perspectives over > many generations can yield stable knowledge. In this way, *Peirce > transforms fallibility into a call for ethical, open, communal inquiry.* > > So, in my view, the aphorism’s concern with rejecting facts in favor of > opinion, and Aurelius’ emphasis on perspective, find common ground in > Peirce’s ethics of inquiry. Facts/truth can be (fallibly) established, but > only as the outcome of ongoing communal investigation. There are a plethora > of opinions, but only those shaped and corrected by experience and > experiment have the right to guide action. In this view, ignorance is a > temporary gap in knowledge, while stupidity is an ethical failure in the > unwillingness to submit belief to rigorous inquiry. By linking his theory > of how we attain knowledge with ethics, Peirce demonstrates that *the > pursuit of truth requires both intellectual rigor and moral integrity.* > > Further, Peirce offers a pragmatic framework for attaining truth: we live > in a world where facts seem sometimes to resist us, where opinions are as > abundant as blackberries, but where truth is (or could become) a communal > goal. I can imagine that Peirce would not be opposed to my saying that this > process of inquiry is not only an intellectual duty but, as well, an > ethical one, that* it is the community of inquiry alone which leads us to > truth.* > > Best, > > Gary R >
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