Helmut, List, You wrote: " One then only might say that [Chomsky] limits his inquiry to linguistics . . ."
While not a linguist, I've taken a keen interest in the field, especially after coming to know Michael Shapiro and his work a couple of decades ago. However, at this point I can't add more than what I've already written: Chomsky’s rationalist model treats language as grounded in an innate cognitive architecture -- Universal Grammar -- so that language acquisition consists largely in the 'triggering' of a pre-existing 'cognitive system'. Michael [Shapiro] argues that Chomsky's emphasis on formal syntactic structure *abstracts language from communicative practice* and, so, renders it static in principle, as well as largely asocial and non-semiotic (since language is approached as an internal code rather than a process of sign use). The point is *exactly* linguistic: In my view, *Chomsky reduces language acquisition to a fixed internal mechanism and, further, abstracts language from communicative practice. *Following Shapiro, I tried to make the point that, very different from this, Peirce sees language not as a formal system but as a *mode of sign activity* and all that follows from that in his semeiotics. Best, Gary R On Wed, Apr 29, 2026 at 6:20 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary, List, > > I have often wondered, whether Chomsky only "abstracts" or "renders" his > universal grammar as something innate to all humans, or claims it for basic > in the sense of axiomatic. Because, if he doesn´t do that latter thing, I > think he cannot be blamed of denying social, communicative, semiotic, and > logical deeper sources of universal grammar. One then only might say, that > he limits his inquiry to linguistics, which is his main interest and > research field. > > Best, Helmut > > 29. April 2026 um 05:10 > "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > Dan, List, > > I've only had a chance to read the abstract of your paper, but I hope to > read it in its entirety in the next week or so as the thesis sounds most > interesting and, to me at least, a bit provocative. As you probably know -- > and as long term readers of the List may know -- I tend to agree with the > linguist, Michael Shapiro's, that supports Peirce's, as opposed to > Chomsky's, view of the acquisition of language. > > For Shapiro, the contrast between Chomsky and Peirce turns on > fundamentally different conceptions of language and its acquisition. As is > well known, Chomsky’s rationalist model treats language as grounded in an > innate cognitive architecture -- Universal Grammar -- so that language > acquisition consists largely in the 'triggering' of a pre-existing > 'cognitive system'. Michael argues that Chomsky's emphasis on formal > syntactic structure *abstracts language from communicative practice* and, > so, renders it static in principle, as well as largely asocial and > non-semiotic (since language is approached as an internal code rather than > a process of sign use). Shapiro, on the other hand, argues that “language > is not an autonomous formal system but a mode of sign activity,” and he > argues against “the hypostatization of grammar as an object independent of > its use.” As he sees it, generative grammar mistakes analytic constructs > for innate mental realities and, in the doing, obscures the fundamentally > semiotic character of linguistic phenomena. > > Shapiro finds in Peirce a model that situates language within semiosis -- > an ongoing, *socially embedded process of sign interpretation* in which > what is innate is, as I think you suggest in your abstract, less a > determinate structure than *a capacity for abductive inference*. Here > language acquisition is developmental and open-ended: this involves the > formation and revision of habits through interaction, *fallible > hypothesis formation* rather than the unfolding of a fixed system. So > Shapiro emphasizes that “grammar is *not* given in advance but emerges > from the functioning of signs in communicative life,” thus aligning > linguistic structure with evolving patterns of use. > > An essential difference, I think, lies in their respective notions of > instinct: for Chomsky, as noted, it is a structured internal grammar, > whereas for Peirce it is an evolutionary tendency toward successful > abduction, a probabilistic 'bias', shall we say, that integrates biological > predispositions with learning and language and cultural transmission. > > For Shapiro, the Peircean account is superior because it integrates > biology, learning, culture, and communication without reducing language to > a fixed internal mechanism. I've cc'd Michael who, I expect, will correct > me if I've misrepresented any of his views. > > Best, > > Gary Richmond > > On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 7:23 PM Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > Semeiosis is the foundation of all inference. I refer to this in the paper > linked below as “The Foundational Habit.” It is: > > Sign —> Sign > > It is a recursive procedure and on this all of science emerges. > > CONCEPTIONS OF INSTINCT IN LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION: PRAGMATIST VS. > RATIONALIST APPROACHES - lingbuzz/009854 > ling.auf.net > [image: favicon.ico] <https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/009854> > > DLE > > On Apr 28, 2026, at 19:13, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > > *[EXTERNAL]:* This email originated from outside of Bentley University. > Do not click on any links or open any attachments unless you recognize the > sender and know the content is safe. Please contact Bentley Help Desk with > any questions or concerns. > > Gary R, List > > Yes, you are quite correct- the function is a* rule* of mediation - and I > said that quite clearly in my outline - when I referred to and gave > examples of the HABITS or rules or laws of mediation - and mediation is of > course, a ‘mode of connection - but, more, it is a mode of transformation, > where it transforms, via its rules, habits, knowledge base... input data > into a viable interpretation. . > > And yes, this semiosis triad, which I compare to the function [ and I am > hardly the only person to do so!!!] does lead to , at a specific time and > place, *one interpretation*. It has to -otherwise the world is chaos. And > since this function is a triad, with each node containing vital data - > it’s not a dyadic process - and you are quite incorrect to claim such - ie, > the function is not the same as a a mathematical equal sign - which IS > dyadic!!! > > . This triad/function/ is a vital action- I must interpret the input > sounds or images to be: one interpretation at this specific time and > space.Not multiple interpretations,but ONE. My neighbour is saying Hello - > and is NOT an evil witch putting a curse on me. …I must interpret the image > I see to be Rain- and not gold coins…or harmful chemicals or angels > dropping from the sky or... > > As for the concept of continuous semeiois - that’s basic to Peirce - but > my outline of ONE specific action of semiosis hardly nullifies the concept > of the world as a continuous semiosic process. > > > Edwina > > > > > > On Apr 28, 2026, at 6:40 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > Doug, List, > > Since she mentioned it in her response to you, I must remark that Edwina > Taborsky's interpretation of Peirce’s semiosis as a function, *f(x) = y*, > where x is the object, f is the sign, and y is the interpretant, is > exceedingly problematic in my view. In her model the sign 'operates' on the > object to 'produce' the interpretant. This would mean that the interpretant > is generated through a* transformation *comparable to a mathematical > mapping*.* While this model may seem appealing to those trained in > analytic philosophy or, say, Shannon's classical information theory -- > since it offers a clean *input-output *picture of semiosis -- > nonetheless, it replaces Peirce’s open and continuous semiotic mediation > with a closed system of transformation. > > Further, a function implies a dyadic and determinate relation: one value > of x leads to one value of y. Peirce’s semiosis, however, is at its very > heart triadic and relational. Yes, the object determines [in Peirce's sense > of 'constrains'] the sign which determines [constrains] the interpretant, > but *none of these determinations is mechanical*. For Peirce the sign > does not * transform *the object into an interpretant; rather, it *mediates > *between them within a process that remains open and continuous. In > reducing semiosis to transformation,Taborsky's model ignores the potential, > and the creative aspects which animate Peirce’s semeiotics, including as > regards his conception of meaning. > > In short, the formula f(x) = y collapses Peirce’s open-ended process of > mediation (3ns) into a fixed act of transformation (2ns) in that* it > substitutes function for a law of habit*. Whereas a function ends with an > output, Peirce’s semiosis generates new interpretants as new > signs indefinitely, each interpretant, in turn, becoming a sign. This > process has no definite closure. Some have called this 'infinite > semiosis': the process where the interpretant of a sign becomes a new sign > for the same object, and so initiates an endless chain of meaning. It > implies that meaning-making is never static or fully realized, but is > always open to further interpretation and unfolding. > > And there is one additional danger: that of over-formalizing Peirce’s > ideas. While it is true that Peirce himself sometimes used mathematical > analogies (although, and for prime example, he strongly argued against > using his system of Existential Graphs as a calculus), his semeiotic is > anything but computational. By turning semiosis into a neat function, one > is treating signs as static conversions rather than as *evolving acts of > interpretation* rooted in culture, experience, and inquiry (there are > biological analogies of these). In addition, it's important to note > that Peirce’s semeiotic is deeply entangled with his phenomenology and > metaphysics (see, for example,“An Outline Classification of the Sciences” > in the 1903 *Syllabus*) and is, in my view, not fully detachable from > them. > > There is, perhaps, a limited sense in which Taborsky’s metaphor might be > helpful. But if so, she would have to treat the 'function' *not as a > deterministic formula but as a rule of mediation*; that is to say as a > pattern of relational continuity rather than causal mapping. As such it > might serve as a shorthand for the way the sign organizes its reference. > But then Taborsky would have to acknowledge that* f* here is *not an > operator but a habit*: a mode of connection among object, sign, and > interpretant within a continuum of semiosis, something I think that she is > unlikely to do. > > Perhaps the greatest flaw in Taborsky’s model as I see it is that it > doesn’t capture the continuity -- the evolutionary continuity -- the > *vitality* in Peirce’s thought. His semeiotic came out of his own > evolving ideas about synechism and habit-formation, stressing the > continuity and growth of interpretation. A fixed function like *f(x)=y* > freezes what Peirce understood as a living, evolutionary process. For these > reasons, in my view such essentially dyadic models as Taborsky's > misunderstand and misinterpret Peirce’s semiosis. > > Best, > > Gary Richmond > > On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 2:00 PM doug mackenzie <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Hi all, > > I've just joined this mailing list because I am finally taking the > opportunity to dig into Peirce's writings. I am a sessional instructor at > UBC and I will be teaching COGS 303 (Research Methods in Cognitive Systems) > this September for the second time. I taught the course last September and > hewed closely to the syllabus as it was designed by Dr. Ron Rensink > (details here > <https://www.cs.ubc.ca/~rensink/publications/download/preparingUgrads-rr.pdf> > ). > > I've been sold on the Team-Based Learning approach and I'm in the process > of designing the modules which will compose the course. I'm now reading The > Fixation of Belief and How to Make Our Ideas Clear, and Peirce's ideas > about the scientific method and doubt seem really to fit with the course's > focus on self-awareness of cognitive biases. > > I was wondering if anyone has made use of Peirce's writings or ideas in > courses on research methods or the philosophy of science. > > Best, > > Doug Mackenzie > Vancouver, BC > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or > "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go > to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L > <[email protected]> . But, if your subscribed email account is > not your default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE > PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben > Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
