Helmut, List, I haven't a linguist's knowledge of Chomsky's theory. While over the years I've read a significant amount of material related to it, and especially in recent years that which appears in the work of that quintessentially Peircean linguist, Michael Shapiro, my comments are strictly those of a layman.
So, necessarily, are my questions. So, for example, you suggest that "without the innate 'language acquisition device', a human would not be able to acquire language." Now since most researchers think Homo sapiens existed for tens of thousands, possibly over 100,000 years before spoken language emerged, did Chomsky's 'Universal Grammar, his innate cognitive architecture, simply lay dormant for that period of time? Or did it somehow evolve in the homo sapien brain over that vast period? Perhaps this question has been addressed in the literature, but I'm not aware of it. You wrote: " But [Universal Grammar] wouldn´t say, that a child would not need communicative practice too, to learn a language. It neither would say, that language is not a mode of sign activity, nor, that the structure of the "language acquisition device" is not evolutionally adopted from, and adapted to, the rules of semiotics, the logical base of communication." I think you may have a point here as my understanding is that Chomsky’s theory does not logically *exclude *communication or semiotic considerations . However, his theory does not at all rely on them nor positively develop them. They remain peripheral rather than foundational, which is a point that critics like Shapiro make. To expand on this a bit, I suppose that in principle one could reinterpret Chomsky’s framework in semiotic terms. However, this would be an external reconstruction rather than something he himself developed. It is certainly possible to argue that the language faculty evolved under certain *communicative pressures* and that its structures reflect *semiotic constraints*. However, Chomsky does not derive UG from semiotic principles, nor does he treat grammar as emerging from a general theory of signs. And although he acknowledges communicative explanations, he challenges them in favor of internal constraints. So, in a word, language as sign activity is not denied by Chomsky but, to the extent that it appears at all, it is subordinated to formal internal constraints such that semiotics and a broader logic of communication is mainly absent from his framework. Best, Gary R On Wed, Apr 29, 2026 at 5:42 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary, List, > > Does he really "reduce" language acquisition to a fixed internal > mechanism, or just the ability of language acquisition? Because, if it is > the ability, it is not a reduction of the thing language itself. It just > would say, that, without the innate "language acquisiton device", a human > would not be able to acquire language. But it wouldn´t say, that a child > would not need communicative practice too, to learn a language. It neither > would say, that language is not a mode of sign activity, nor, that the > structure of the "language acquisition device" is not evolutionally adopted > from, and adapted to, the rules of semiotics, the logical base of > communication. > > Best, Helmut > 29. April 2026 um 17:56 > "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > Helmut, List, > > You wrote: " One then only might say that [Chomsky] limits his inquiry to > linguistics . . ." > > While not a linguist, I've taken a keen interest in the field, especially > after coming to know Michael Shapiro and his work a couple of decades ago. > However, at this point I can't add more than what I've already written: > > > Chomsky’s rationalist model treats language as grounded in an innate > cognitive architecture -- Universal Grammar -- so that language acquisition > consists largely in the 'triggering' of a pre-existing 'cognitive system'. > Michael [Shapiro] argues that Chomsky's emphasis on formal syntactic > structure *abstracts language from communicative practice* and, so, > renders it static in principle, as well as largely asocial and non-semiotic > (since language is approached as an internal code rather than a process of > sign use). > > > The point is *exactly* linguistic: In my view, *Chomsky reduces language > acquisition to a fixed internal mechanism and, further, abstracts language > from communicative practice. *Following Shapiro, I tried to make the > point that, very different from this, Peirce sees language not as a formal > system but as a *mode of sign activity* and all that follows from that in > his semeiotics. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > > On Wed, Apr 29, 2026 at 6:20 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Gary, List, > > I have often wondered, whether Chomsky only "abstracts" or "renders" his > universal grammar as something innate to all humans, or claims it for basic > in the sense of axiomatic. Because, if he doesn´t do that latter thing, I > think he cannot be blamed of denying social, communicative, semiotic, and > logical deeper sources of universal grammar. One then only might say, that > he limits his inquiry to linguistics, which is his main interest and > research field. > > Best, Helmut > > 29. April 2026 um 05:10 > "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > Dan, List, > > I've only had a chance to read the abstract of your paper, but I hope to > read it in its entirety in the next week or so as the thesis sounds most > interesting and, to me at least, a bit provocative. As you probably know -- > and as long term readers of the List may know -- I tend to agree with the > linguist, Michael Shapiro's, that supports Peirce's, as opposed to > Chomsky's, view of the acquisition of language. > > For Shapiro, the contrast between Chomsky and Peirce turns on > fundamentally different conceptions of language and its acquisition. As is > well known, Chomsky’s rationalist model treats language as grounded in an > innate cognitive architecture -- Universal Grammar -- so that language > acquisition consists largely in the 'triggering' of a pre-existing > 'cognitive system'. Michael argues that Chomsky's emphasis on formal > syntactic structure *abstracts language from communicative practice* and, > so, renders it static in principle, as well as largely asocial and > non-semiotic (since language is approached as an internal code rather than > a process of sign use). Shapiro, on the other hand, argues that “language > is not an autonomous formal system but a mode of sign activity,” and he > argues against “the hypostatization of grammar as an object independent of > its use.” As he sees it, generative grammar mistakes analytic constructs > for innate mental realities and, in the doing, obscures the fundamentally > semiotic character of linguistic phenomena. > > Shapiro finds in Peirce a model that situates language within semiosis -- > an ongoing, *socially embedded process of sign interpretation* in which > what is innate is, as I think you suggest in your abstract, less a > determinate structure than *a capacity for abductive inference*. Here > language acquisition is developmental and open-ended: this involves the > formation and revision of habits through interaction, *fallible > hypothesis formation* rather than the unfolding of a fixed system. So > Shapiro emphasizes that “grammar is *not* given in advance but emerges > from the functioning of signs in communicative life,” thus aligning > linguistic structure with evolving patterns of use. > > An essential difference, I think, lies in their respective notions of > instinct: for Chomsky, as noted, it is a structured internal grammar, > whereas for Peirce it is an evolutionary tendency toward successful > abduction, a probabilistic 'bias', shall we say, that integrates biological > predispositions with learning and language and cultural transmission. > > For Shapiro, the Peircean account is superior because it integrates > biology, learning, culture, and communication without reducing language to > a fixed internal mechanism. I've cc'd Michael who, I expect, will correct > me if I've misrepresented any of his views. > > Best, > > Gary Richmond > > On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 7:23 PM Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > Semeiosis is the foundation of all inference. I refer to this in the paper > linked below as “The Foundational Habit.” It is: > > Sign —> Sign > > It is a recursive procedure and on this all of science emerges. > > CONCEPTIONS OF INSTINCT IN LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION: PRAGMATIST VS. > RATIONALIST APPROACHES - lingbuzz/009854 > ling.auf.net > [image: favicon.ico] <https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/009854> > > DLE > > On Apr 28, 2026, at 19:13, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > > *[EXTERNAL]:* This email originated from outside of Bentley University. > Do not click on any links or open any attachments unless you recognize the > sender and know the content is safe. Please contact Bentley Help Desk with > any questions or concerns. > > Gary R, List > > Yes, you are quite correct- the function is a* rule* of mediation - and I > said that quite clearly in my outline - when I referred to and gave > examples of the HABITS or rules or laws of mediation - and mediation is of > course, a ‘mode of connection - but, more, it is a mode of transformation, > where it transforms, via its rules, habits, knowledge base... input data > into a viable interpretation. . > > And yes, this semiosis triad, which I compare to the function [ and I am > hardly the only person to do so!!!] does lead to , at a specific time and > place, *one interpretation*. It has to -otherwise the world is chaos. And > since this function is a triad, with each node containing vital data - > it’s not a dyadic process - and you are quite incorrect to claim such - ie, > the function is not the same as a a mathematical equal sign - which IS > dyadic!!! > > . This triad/function/ is a vital action- I must interpret the input > sounds or images to be: one interpretation at this specific time and > space.Not multiple interpretations,but ONE. My neighbour is saying Hello - > and is NOT an evil witch putting a curse on me. …I must interpret the image > I see to be Rain- and not gold coins…or harmful chemicals or angels > dropping from the sky or... > > As for the concept of continuous semeiois - that’s basic to Peirce - but > my outline of ONE specific action of semiosis hardly nullifies the concept > of the world as a continuous semiosic process. > > > Edwina > > > > > > On Apr 28, 2026, at 6:40 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > Doug, List, > > Since she mentioned it in her response to you, I must remark that Edwina > Taborsky's interpretation of Peirce’s semiosis as a function, *f(x) = y*, > where x is the object, f is the sign, and y is the interpretant, is > exceedingly problematic in my view. In her model the sign 'operates' on the > object to 'produce' the interpretant. This would mean that the interpretant > is generated through a* transformation *comparable to a mathematical > mapping*.* While this model may seem appealing to those trained in > analytic philosophy or, say, Shannon's classical information theory -- > since it offers a clean *input-output *picture of semiosis -- > nonetheless, it replaces Peirce’s open and continuous semiotic mediation > with a closed system of transformation. > > Further, a function implies a dyadic and determinate relation: one value > of x leads to one value of y. Peirce’s semiosis, however, is at its very > heart triadic and relational. Yes, the object determines [in Peirce's sense > of 'constrains'] the sign which determines [constrains] the interpretant, > but *none of these determinations is mechanical*. For Peirce the sign > does not * transform *the object into an interpretant; rather, it *mediates > *between them within a process that remains open and continuous. In > reducing semiosis to transformation,Taborsky's model ignores the potential, > and the creative aspects which animate Peirce’s semeiotics, including as > regards his conception of meaning. > > In short, the formula f(x) = y collapses Peirce’s open-ended process of > mediation (3ns) into a fixed act of transformation (2ns) in that* it > substitutes function for a law of habit*. Whereas a function ends with an > output, Peirce’s semiosis generates new interpretants as new > signs indefinitely, each interpretant, in turn, becoming a sign. This > process has no definite closure. Some have called this 'infinite > semiosis': the process where the interpretant of a sign becomes a new sign > for the same object, and so initiates an endless chain of meaning. It > implies that meaning-making is never static or fully realized, but is > always open to further interpretation and unfolding. > > And there is one additional danger: that of over-formalizing Peirce’s > ideas. While it is true that Peirce himself sometimes used mathematical > analogies (although, and for prime example, he strongly argued against > using his system of Existential Graphs as a calculus), his semeiotic is > anything but computational. By turning semiosis into a neat function, one > is treating signs as static conversions rather than as *evolving acts of > interpretation* rooted in culture, experience, and inquiry (there are > biological analogies of these). In addition, it's important to note > that Peirce’s semeiotic is deeply entangled with his phenomenology and > metaphysics (see, for example,“An Outline Classification of the Sciences” > in the 1903 *Syllabus*) and is, in my view, not fully detachable from > them. > > There is, perhaps, a limited sense in which Taborsky’s metaphor might be > helpful. But if so, she would have to treat the 'function' *not as a > deterministic formula but as a rule of mediation*; that is to say as a > pattern of relational continuity rather than causal mapping. As such it > might serve as a shorthand for the way the sign organizes its reference. > But then Taborsky would have to acknowledge that* f* here is *not an > operator but a habit*: a mode of connection among object, sign, and > interpretant within a continuum of semiosis, something I think that she is > unlikely to do. > > Perhaps the greatest flaw in Taborsky’s model as I see it is that it > doesn’t capture the continuity -- the evolutionary continuity -- the > *vitality* in Peirce’s thought. His semeiotic came out of his own > evolving ideas about synechism and habit-formation, stressing the > continuity and growth of interpretation. A fixed function like *f(x)=y* > freezes what Peirce understood as a living, evolutionary process. For these > reasons, in my view such essentially dyadic models as Taborsky's > misunderstand and misinterpret Peirce’s semiosis. > > Best, > > Gary Richmond > > On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 2:00 PM doug mackenzie <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Hi all, > > I've just joined this mailing list because I am finally taking the > opportunity to dig into Peirce's writings. I am a sessional instructor at > UBC and I will be teaching COGS 303 (Research Methods in Cognitive Systems) > this September for the second time. I taught the course last September and > hewed closely to the syllabus as it was designed by Dr. Ron Rensink > (details here > <https://www.cs.ubc.ca/~rensink/publications/download/preparingUgrads-rr.pdf> > ). > > I've been sold on the Team-Based Learning approach and I'm in the process > of designing the modules which will compose the course. I'm now reading The > Fixation of Belief and How to Make Our Ideas Clear, and Peirce's ideas > about the scientific method and doubt seem really to fit with the course's > focus on self-awareness of cognitive biases. > > I was wondering if anyone has made use of Peirce's writings or ideas in > courses on research methods or the philosophy of science. > > Best, > > Doug Mackenzie > Vancouver, BC > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or > "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go > to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L > <[email protected]> . But, if your subscribed email account is > not your default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE > PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben > Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or > "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go > to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L > <[email protected]> . But, if your subscribed email account is > not your default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE > PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben > Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
