Bear with me. I am going to make this post in two parts, 1. proper spelling,
and 2. the actual coinage in Locke. Both posts are extracts from a lengthy
review I am writing of Kees’ book that will appear this summer in The American
Journal of Semiotics (TAJS 30), there with the full scholarly apparatus of
footnotes and dated references historically layered.
I interject these extracts here online only because this Chapter 5 of
Kees’ generally fine book really goes off the rails: beginning with the first
word of its title, and continuing to the end (as Vinicius has already called to
the list’s attention) by failing to point out to the readers the true arc of
semiotics as subtending the whole of Peirce’s work, it being as cenoscopic
science the framework presupposed in all idioscopic development. (Also, in that
full TAJS review will be explained why, rather than following Peirce’s own
idioscopic/ideoscopic distinction, I prefer to substitute the latter for the
former spelling; but that is a side-issue here.)
Properly Spelling “Semiotics”: a “Trivial Issue”? (Hardly!)
When it comes to deciding on what single word might best be used to
describe or name today the inquiry into what has been called “the doctrine of
signs” (from its beginning with Augustine [397ad]) to its Latin culmination in
the work of Poinsot [1632a], and from its renaming as Σημιωτική with Locke
[1689/90] to its usage by Sebeok [e.g., 1971, 1976] as earlier by Peirce), Kees
grants (p. 75) that ‘semiotics’ “is the variant most commonly used today” in
the academic community at large. But he precedes this remark by claiming
(ibid.) that “proper spelling of the word” is “one rather trivial issue”; and
he chooses (for trivial reasons?) to use a variant found in Peirce (note: the
most rare of the variants found in Peirce) — “semeiotics”, in preference to
“semiotic” (the variant most used in Peirce) or “semiotics” (the variant that
has come to prevail for naming the community of inquirers into the doctrine of
signs today for reasons we will see in Post 2.).
Mats Bergman (2009: 38–39) agrees with Kees in his own choice of one-word
spelling as including the “ε” not included in Locke’s coinage (as Post 2. will
show), but Bergman also advises frankly (and rightly, I would say) that “This
is not a trivial matter” (or should not be for Peirceans), as Peirce “argues
that a crucial phase of the effort to render philosophy scientific is a reform
of its vocabulary”. Peirce went so far as to urge the adoption of an “ethics of
terminology” in relation to which we have an obligation to develop a “suitable
technical nomenclature”. Given what scholarship has since established
concerning Locke’s coinage, as we will see in Post 2., and as Kees either does
not know or has inexplicably chosen to ignore, there is no way that “semeiotic”
or “semeiotics” any longer can be legitimately proposed etymologically to
distinguish the cenoscopic science of signs from the idioscopic branch of
medical science concerned with the study of symptoms of illness.
Max Fisch (1911-1991) was one of the greatest Peirce scholars indeed, but
he worked prior to the accomplishment of a detailed investigation of the actual
editions of Locke’s Essay as Locke himself supervised them before his death.
Fisch was the main figure to popularize the “semeiotic” spelling for Peirce’s
development of the doctrine of signs. Peirce followers latched on to this
variant spelling precisely to distinguish Peirce within, and sometimes from,
the broader development that has come to be known today as “semiotics”, without
any second “e” (one cannot help but think of early anti-Obama voters supposedly
latching on to guns and bibles).
That this variant was actually Peirce’s own centrally “preferred
spelling” I recently had occasion to expose as a terminological mythology
(“Clearing the Mists of a Terminological Mythology”, posted to Peirce-L by
Joseph Ransdell at
<http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/deely/clearing.pdf>); but, as
logic (even when supported by scholarship) seldom triumphs quickly (and
sometimes never) over custom, the discovery that their choice of spelling for
Peirce’s doctrine of signs is based on myth rather than fact, while causing
some discomfort, has so far not dissuaded Peircean epigones from clinging to
their variant when speaking of Peirce’s views on the general matter of signs.
Kees carries this clinging to a new extreme, latching on to the variant
spelling least used in Peirce’s own writings; we can only hope that this
extreme may mark the end of the “semeiotic/semeiotics” line outside of
medicine, even in relatively closed Peircean circles!
So we have to ask ourselves, in the larger intellectual culture, why has
the variant “semiotics” become the one “most commonly used today”, despite the
ongoing insistence of the post-Fisch Peirceans to use “semeiotic” or (after
Kees) “semeiotics”? Why, furthermore, do these Peirceans prefer to swim against
the tide (especially if the matter is “trivial”)?
The answer to the first part of our question is quite simply that the
English variant “semiotics” has “come to be preferred” because it stands alone
in directly rendering Locke’s proposal to rename the doctrine of signs using
the Greek characters Σημιωτική, as I will demonstrate in the details of post 2.
As to the second part of our question, obdurateness seems the most likely
answer.
Consider one of Peirce’s own direct comments, rather late in the game
(1907), on the matter of this second part (bold added):
I have often thought that if it were not that it would sound too German ... I
would entitle my logic-book (which is now coming on) “Logic considered as
Semeiotic” (or probably Semeotic without the i); but everybody would think I
was translating als Semeiotik betrachtet, which I couldn't stand.
Or again, a little earlier (c.1902):
With Speculative Rhetoric, Logic, in the sense of Normative Semeotic, is
brought to a close.
Besides this “semeotic” (three occurrences in CP), we find in Peirce
three other variant spellings proposed as one-word synonyms for the doctrine of
signs: semiotic (as in “Semiotic Society of America”; six occurrences in CP);
semeiotic (four occurrences in CP); semeiotics (nowhere in CP, and one [!]
occurrence in EP 2.327 — the least frequent in all Peirce’s usages).
What might scholarship contribute to the understanding of this matter?
There is a considerable difference between scholarship and philosophy, a
difference not always well understood by many professors. Pushed to the
extreme, philosophy pursued without much accompanying scholarship is well
illustrated in the work of Wittgenstein, in that the success of his work in the
hands of late-modern readers is largely consequent upon the ignorance of the
Latin Age which Descartes (1628) and his followers (in this regard including
even the “empiricists”) so successfully promoted as essential to the “new
beginning” they believed philosophy needed to achieve Enlightenment.
(Nonetheless, be it said that, in that context, the advice to stop reading the
Latins was not a bad idea, even though, in retrospect, from the specific point
of view of semiotics as “the doctrine of signs”, the move was overwhelmingly
damaging in the delay it has caused for later thinkers to realize the
importance of historical consciousness as, in effect, the equivalent for
cenoscopic enquiries to what the laboratory is for idioscopic advances).
End of Post 1.
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