Hi John, list, John surely feels a lot stronger about this issue than I do. I'm largely following Fisch indeed and, John may be dismayed to hear this, I'm following John Locke. I don't have the earlier editions of Locke's Essay on my desk for obvious reasons (they're quite expensive), but judging Nidditch's critical edition, the fourth edition (the last edition to be published during Locke's life) clearly and unmistakably included the epsilon, as do all subsequent editions that I personally know of. Now it may be that Nidditch has it all wrong, as John claims he has (for one thing Nidditch found only four editions overseen by Locke, whereas John found five), but that notwithstanding, the spelling with the epsilon had become the textus receptus long before Peirce's time, obliterating, for good or for bad, Locke's idiosyncratic spelling (and just as John is challenging my speculations, I would like to see some concrete evidence that Locke truly intended to distance himself from its use in medicine by deliberately spelling it differently.) To give one example of the term's received form, the Delasartians, the influence of whom on Peirce Iris recently wrote about, included the epsilon, and they no doubt got that from their reading of Locke. As far as I know, spelling it semiotics is a twentieth-century post-Peirce affair, but I may be wrong about that. In sum, even if Locke had deliberately decided to struck the epsilon and that for clearly articulated reasons that were preserved, as John intimates he did, it evidently didn't stick.
Peirce often changed his mind on how to spell his terms or on how to name something, and he came always with good reasons for his choice, even though these reasons seldom included an account of why he changed his mind and why the reasons he provided earlier no longer hold (assuming he even remembered). Now I have to admit that this doesn’t necessarily make it a trivial issue, but it does put some question marks to the great importance sometimes given to a particular spelling or word choice by Peirce and the need to single out one of them as "the correct one." Notwithstanding any disputes about the word's spelling, however, I still fully stand behind what I wrote about Locke, namely that “in essence, Locke proposes to apply the method developed for interpreting the symptoms of diseases to all knowledge, and his Essay, particularly Book 4, is an attempt to do this.” That "Locke did not propose Σημειωτική as his name for a general doctrine of signs," as John claims to be the case, strikes me as odd, as Locke himself says that his "Third Branch may be called Σημειωτική, or the Doctrine of signs" (IV.xxi.4; italics in original), unless this part of the critical edition of Locke's Essay is also wrong. Cheers, kees From: "Deely, John N." <[email protected]> Reply-To: "Deely, John N." <[email protected]> Date: Thursday, March 27, 2014 7:50 PM To: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Kees Chapter 5: TITLE, Post 1 of 2 -- spelling of first word in title Bear with me. I am going to make this post in two parts, 1. proper spelling, and 2. the actual coinage in Locke. Both posts are extracts from a lengthy review I am writing of Kees’ book that will appear this summer in The American Journal of Semiotics (TAJS 30), there with the full scholarly apparatus of footnotes and dated references historically layered. I interject these extracts here online only because this Chapter 5 of Kees’ generally fine book really goes off the rails: beginning with the first word of its title, and continuing to the end (as Vinicius has already called to the list’s attention) by failing to point out to the readers the true arc of semiotics as subtending the whole of Peirce’s work, it being as cenoscopic science the framework presupposed in all idioscopic development. (Also, in that full TAJS review will be explained why, rather than following Peirce’s own idioscopic/ideoscopic distinction, I prefer to substitute the latter for the former spelling; but that is a side-issue here.) Properly Spelling “Semiotics”: a “Trivial Issue”? (Hardly!) When it comes to deciding on what single word might best be used to describe or name today the inquiry into what has been called “the doctrine of signs” (from its beginning with Augustine [397ad]) to its Latin culmination in the work of Poinsot [1632a], and from its renaming as Σημιωτική with Locke [1689/90] to its usage by Sebeok [e.g., 1971, 1976] as earlier by Peirce), Kees grants (p. 75) that ‘semiotics’ “is the variant most commonly used today” in the academic community at large. But he precedes this remark by claiming (ibid.) that “proper spelling of the word” is “one rather trivial issue”; and he chooses (for trivial reasons?) to use a variant found in Peirce (note: the most rare of the variants found in Peirce) — “semeiotics”, in preference to “semiotic” (the variant most used in Peirce) or “semiotics” (the variant that has come to prevail for naming the community of inquirers into the doctrine of signs today for reasons we will see in Post 2.). Mats Bergman (2009: 38–39) agrees with Kees in his own choice of one-word spelling as including the “ε” not included in Locke’s coinage (as Post 2. will show), but Bergman also advises frankly (and rightly, I would say) that “This is not a trivial matter” (or should not be for Peirceans), as Peirce “argues that a crucial phase of the effort to render philosophy scientific is a reform of its vocabulary”. Peirce went so far as to urge the adoption of an “ethics of terminology” in relation to which we have an obligation to develop a “suitable technical nomenclature”. Given what scholarship has since established concerning Locke’s coinage, as we will see in Post 2., and as Kees either does not know or has inexplicably chosen to ignore, there is no way that “semeiotic” or “semeiotics” any longer can be legitimately proposed etymologically to distinguish the cenoscopic science of signs from the idioscopic branch of medical science concerned with the study of symptoms of illness. Max Fisch (1911-1991) was one of the greatest Peirce scholars indeed, but he worked prior to the accomplishment of a detailed investigation of the actual editions of Locke’s Essay as Locke himself supervised them before his death. Fisch was the main figure to popularize the “semeiotic” spelling for Peirce’s development of the doctrine of signs. Peirce followers latched on to this variant spelling precisely to distinguish Peirce within, and sometimes from, the broader development that has come to be known today as “semiotics”, without any second “e” (one cannot help but think of early anti-Obama voters supposedly latching on to guns and bibles). That this variant was actually Peirce’s own centrally “preferred spelling” I recently had occasion to expose as a terminological mythology (“Clearing the Mists of a Terminological Mythology”, posted to Peirce-L by Joseph Ransdell at <http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/deely/clearing.pdf>); but, as logic (even when supported by scholarship) seldom triumphs quickly (and sometimes never) over custom, the discovery that their choice of spelling for Peirce’s doctrine of signs is based on myth rather than fact, while causing some discomfort, has so far not dissuaded Peircean epigones from clinging to their variant when speaking of Peirce’s views on the general matter of signs. Kees carries this clinging to a new extreme, latching on to the variant spelling least used in Peirce’s own writings; we can only hope that this extreme may mark the end of the “semeiotic/semeiotics” line outside of medicine, even in relatively closed Peircean circles! So we have to ask ourselves, in the larger intellectual culture, why has the variant “semiotics” become the one “most commonly used today”, despite the ongoing insistence of the post-Fisch Peirceans to use “semeiotic” or (after Kees) “semeiotics”? Why, furthermore, do these Peirceans prefer to swim against the tide (especially if the matter is “trivial”)? The answer to the first part of our question is quite simply that the English variant “semiotics” has “come to be preferred” because it stands alone in directly rendering Locke’s proposal to rename the doctrine of signs using the Greek characters Σημιωτική, as I will demonstrate in the details of post 2. As to the second part of our question, obdurateness seems the most likely answer. Consider one of Peirce’s own direct comments, rather late in the game (1907), on the matter of this second part (bold added): I have often thought that if it were not that it would sound too German ... I would entitle my logic-book (which is now coming on) “Logic considered as Semeiotic” (or probably Semeotic without the i); but everybody would think I was translating als Semeiotik betrachtet, which I couldn't stand. Or again, a little earlier (c.1902): With Speculative Rhetoric, Logic, in the sense of Normative Semeotic, is brought to a close. Besides this “semeotic” (three occurrences in CP), we find in Peirce three other variant spellings proposed as one-word synonyms for the doctrine of signs: semiotic (as in “Semiotic Society of America”; six occurrences in CP); semeiotic (four occurrences in CP); semeiotics (nowhere in CP, and one [!] occurrence in EP 2.327 — the least frequent in all Peirce’s usages). What might scholarship contribute to the understanding of this matter? There is a considerable difference between scholarship and philosophy, a difference not always well understood by many professors. Pushed to the extreme, philosophy pursued without much accompanying scholarship is well illustrated in the work of Wittgenstein, in that the success of his work in the hands of late-modern readers is largely consequent upon the ignorance of the Latin Age which Descartes (1628) and his followers (in this regard including even the “empiricists”) so successfully promoted as essential to the “new beginning” they believed philosophy needed to achieve Enlightenment. (Nonetheless, be it said that, in that context, the advice to stop reading the Latins was not a bad idea, even though, in retrospect, from the specific point of view of semiotics as “the doctrine of signs”, the move was overwhelmingly damaging in the delay it has caused for later thinkers to realize the importance of historical consciousness as, in effect, the equivalent for cenoscopic enquiries to what the laboratory is for idioscopic advances). 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