Coinage and Actual Spelling of Locke’s Term “Semiotics”

      Everyone agrees that “semiotics” in whatever variants comes originally 
from John Locke’s Essay concerning Humane Understanding, published in December 
of 1689 but bearing the date of 1690. Kees refers to the 1690 text, but he 
cites only the 1975 [supposedly “critical”] Oxford edition, which, along with 
most editions made after Locke’s death, “corrected”, i.e., silently distorted, 
both the text and the intention of its author in the matter of his proposal 
that the doctrine of signs be called semiotica, i.e., σημιωτική, “semiotics”.
      It is well known that the main Greek term for “sign” is σημείον. The 
etymologically “obvious” spelling for the study of signs thus would be 
σημειωτική, except for one slight detail: that is not the name that Locke gave 
to his proposal precisely because he wanted to distinguish his proposal for a 
“new general science” from the specific branch of medicine already known in his 
time as σημειωτική, i.e., “semeiotics” transliterated.
      In ancient Greek philosophy the only signs commonly recognized were what 
would come to be known after Augustine as natural signs, σημεία. The main study 
of signs of this type (outside of divination, “astrology”) was in medicine, 
where by Locke’s time symptomatology had already been named Σημειωτική. Kees 
(p. 73) cites the 1625 Anatomy of Urine by James Hart (though Kees does not 
include the work in his Bibliography), where “semeiotics [is] the art that 
teaches us the nature, causes, and substance of a disease by its signs.” Kees 
then tells his readers (p. 73) that “in essence, Locke proposes to apply the 
method developed for interpreting the symptoms of diseases to all knowledge, 
and his Essay, particularly Book 4, is an attempt to do this.” Although good 
enough as a guess, Kees on this point needs to attend to the third phase of 
inquiry, where a developed guess is tested against the facts. The only way for 
Kees to maintain his abduction on this point is by avoiding what would best be 
termed “retroduction” (“induction” in Peirce’s sense of that term – details in 
the full TAJS review), i.e., a scholarly testing of his hypothesis.2
      Tested against the facts, what Kees tells his readers on this score turns 
out to be factually false — generating for his readers a needless perplexity, 
since the facts in question have been on public record for some years now 
before Kees published his Guide for the Perplexed.
      To begin with, Locke did not propose Σημειωτική as his name for a general 
doctrine of signs. He proposed rather Σημιωτική, which would transliterate into 
Latin as “semiotica”, and into English as “semiotics”. Further, he did not 
propose Σημιωτική as an extension to all knowledge of “the method of 
interpreting symptoms of diseases”, as Kees (p. 73) would have his readers 
believe. Locke proposed Semiotics as an entirely new science (or “doctrine of 
signs”, as he synonymously stated expressly) embracing the whole of speculative 
knowledge as well as of practical knowledge (under which latter branch alone 
would symptomatology belong), conventional signs as well as natural signs – a 
general science, in cognizant contrast to the special science of symptomatology.
      Now take note of this fact. Not only did Locke use his own new spelling, 
Σημιωτική, to name the general study of signs, in the original 1690 edition of 
his Essay. He undertook personally to oversee the completion of four subsequent 
editions for publication; and in every one of these five editions prepared 
within his own house and lifetime, the spelling Σημιωτική is retained.
      Only after his death in 1704 do we find Σημιωτική replaced by Σημειωτική, 
usually (always so far as I have been able to examine editions) with no 
explanation given. Unless the editors had themselves examined all five of the 
Locke editions between 1689 and 1704, scholars could readily assume that 
Σημειωτική was the “correct” form according to established Greek orthography. 
But Locke was not writing from that point of view. He was writing from the 
point of view of an entirely new proposal for Logic and Philosophy, that 
thinkers recognize and develop a new general science of signs via a distinction 
of the means whereby all knowledge is acquired and developed which would unite 
in a transdisciplinary perspective both speculative and practical fields of 
knowing – a distinction which would not confuse this “new science” with the 
already extant special science of symptomatology.
      Locke’s proposal was not received by his fellow moderns, early or late, 
with any enthusiasm, with the partial exception of Berkeley, who nonetheless 
did not systematically take up the proposal. (See “Reception of the Proposal 
among the Moderns” in Four Ages of Understanding, pp. 592-93.) Often enough, 
when a later modern abridged version of the Essay was published, the concluding 
chapter on semiotics would be omitted. The modern preoccupation with 
“epistemology” took the center stage of philosophical attention among the 
philosophers, not Locke’s proposal for the doctrine of signs (still less 
Poinsot’s systematic Treatise on Signs published the year of Locke’s birth, but 
in Latin, and in Spain).
      So the answer is readily available to Kees’s implicit perplexity (p. 75) 
as to why in the world has “semiotics” become “the variant most commonly used 
today”, instead of the variant “semeiotic” (let alone “semeiotics”) preferred 
(not really by Peirce himself, but for some years now) by the self-styled 
Peirceans after Fisch:

The term “semiot­ics” as a name for the doctrine of signs had a powerful 
advantage when the time finally came that authors began to think seriously 
about the prospects and thematic development of such a doctrine. It not only 
had the Greek pedigree of a derivation from σημείον, it had the further 
advantage of derivation therefrom by way of medicine, “very likely the most 
deeply rooted”, as Sebeok put it (1975: 181), “leg upon which semiotics rests.” 
And its spelling, however inferior from the point of view of the purist of 
Greek orthography, has the advantage of directly reflecting the spelling Locke 
chose for naming the doctrine of signs, σημιωτικὴ, in its distinction from the 
medical specialization of similar nomination, σημειωτική.

An observation made by Sebeok as far back as 1971 provides some amusement in 
the present context:

A minute holdout dismisses both [“semiotic” and “semiotics”], in favor of 
semeiotics, on the argument that “the spelling is better etymology than 
semiotics, and it avoids the ambiguity of semi-. Semi-otics would be nonsense.

Would Kees have the would-be Peirceans continue to cling to a variant spelling 
(“semeiotic” or “semeiotics”) which in fact confuses the general study Locke 
proposed with a specific branch of medical science? Such a “clinging to” is 
counterproductive, both etymologically and theoretically.
            The title of Kees Chapter 5 could have been fully correct and 
appropriate had he followed what Ransdell – never cited by Kees, an oddity 
considering Ransdell’s looming online presence regarding Peirce – had plainly 
and accurately said in his 1989 inquiry “Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?” 
(original English version online at 
<http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/phenom.htm>): “Logic is 
identified with Peirce’s general theory of representation (theory of signs), 
for which Peirce’s usual technical term is ‘semiotic’.”
            End of Post 2 re title of Chap. 5.


________________________________
2 See Section 4c. below, “The Semiotic Spiral”, p. ff.
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