Phyllis, List, To be honest, I am not sure I see a proof of pragmatism in this section (7.2). Rather, I see a justification for pragmatism being that it was constructed using the pragmatic maxim. As far as I understand it, this essentially means that signs are only meaningful if they can be translated into thought-signs that have an effect on belief (and, thereby, also possibly on actions).
If I may jump ahead a touch to section 7.3, the example of transubstantiation is used to demonstrate how a concept can be devoid of meaning because it has no practical consequences. As far as I understand this section, the reason why it is said to have no practical consequences is because no change in the phaneron occurs to signal a shift. This perhaps goes back to an implied proof of pragmatism that Phyllis alluded to with her vivid and useful description of her pre-Peircean cultivation of phaneroscopic abilities, "It seems that the call for the proof of pragmatism to begin with phaneroscopy speaks to the examination of relevant properties (qualities of affect, sense, reason) of whatever fact is under consideration." Now, the fact that I do not see the issue of transubstantiation as an example of the pragmatic maxim applied suggests strongly to me that I am missing something important here. My objection here is that it is more than the mere qualities get involved in the development of higher grades of clarity of a concept. What about the habit of interpreting wine as becoming the blood of Christ when in the type of setting, and preceded by the special type of words spoken by a special type of person? Tokens of these types are also part of the phaneron when receiving communion, but somehow only the qualities of the wine and bread are considered relevant. It would seem that this example is suggesting that knowledge of substance cannot be gained through dynamic objects mediated by symbols but only through immediate objects. Perhaps the issue is that only beliefs that are fixed by the method of science are considered to be pragmatic, and since the belief in transubstantiation is fixed by authority, it is excluded. That idea doesn't seem to fit, however, especially given the connection of the pragmatism to abduction. If the question is to whether the belief would have any practical consequences, I'm not sure why the answer would be no since any proposition that asserts the truth of transubstantiation also asserts a whole host of other beliefs which must also be accepted, which in itself leads to practical consequences on thought and action. I'd really appreciate explanations that may possibly lead to some clarification. Mara Woods M.A., Semiotics -- University of Tartu On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 3:46 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>wrote: > Phyllis, List, > > Thank you, first, for sharing your personal pragmatic story. It brought up > many thoughts for me beginning with how Peirce commented that pragmatism is > merely the formalizing of critical commonsensism as we move from a logica > utens to a logica docens. > > In addition, your remark that you don't consider yourself to be a 'real' > philosopher reminded me that the very democratic structure of this forum > was conceived by Joe Ransdell with a sense that, from the standpoint of > cenoscopic philosophy, we are all at least potential philosophers, and that > academic philosophy is not the be-all and end-all of philosophical > pragmatism, while academic philosophy has its own dangers and pitfalls, > something Joe spoke of informally, for example, in email messages to Ben > and me, and wrote of more formally. As Joe conceived it, the Peirce forum > was to be a place where anyone interested in the work of Peirce could > discuss his philosophy. > > Furthermore, my own experience in college teaching was, for example, to > teach a course titled "Critical Thinking" (which is *not *a course in > formal logic) from this cenoscopic standpoint, and informally, that is, as > critical commonsensism, logic not yet brought to the formal development > whereas pragmatism is placed within methodeutic in semeiotic. > > In a word, I think it is valuable that thinkers like yourself seem to find > pragmatic principles alive and valuable, and even long before they've > formally studied Peirce and pragmaticism. So, I'm very much looking forward > to discussing these and other related matters with you and others, > including how we pragmatically educate our young people, like you grandson, > to become excellent critical thinkers. > > As for the proofs of pragmatism beginning in phenomenology and continuing > into the normative sciences, that some of the later articles in EP2 are > structured and titled along these lines by Nathan Houser, has for some time > now aided me in considering Peirce's requirement that he* prove* his own > brand of pragmatism unlike the other pragmatists who felt no such > compulsion. In EP2 Nathan was, unfortunately, but understandably, not able > to address Peirce's proof employing Existential Graphs. However, Peirce's > discussion of "the valency of concepts" and his informal proof of the > Reduction Thesis in MS 908, which Nathan gives the title, "The Basis of > Pragmatism in Phaneroscopy," seems to me already to anticipate the case > that is to be made by Peirce that the strongest proof comes from EGs. > > There's much more to be said in this matter, but for now I'll conclude > with an except from MS 908 which I hope we'll have occasion to discuss as > it connects deeply to this matter of the proof of pragmatism beginning in > phenomenology. > > *[U]nless the Phaneron were to consist entirely of elements altogether > uncombined mentally, in which case we should have no idea of a Phaneron > (since this, if we have the idea, is an idea combining all the rest), which > is as much as to say that there would be no Phaneron, its esse being > percipi if any is so; or unless the Phaneron were itself our sole idea, and > were utterly indecomposable, when there could be no such thing as an > interrogation and no such things as a judgment [. . .], it follows that if > there is a Phaneron [. . .] or even if we can ask whether there be or no, > there must be an idea of combination (i.e., having combination for its > object thought of). Now the general idea of a combination must be an > indecomposable idea. For otherwise it would be compounded and the idea of > combination would enter into it as an analytic part of it. It is, however > quite absurd to suppose an idea to be a part of itself, and not the whole. > Therefore, if there is a Phaneron, the idea of combination is an > indecomposable element of it. This idea is a triad; for it involves the > ideas of a whole and of two parts [. . .] Accordingly there will > necessarily be a triad in the Phaneron. (EP2:363-4).* > > > This "idea is a triad" is almost immediately followed by valental diagrams > of medads, monads, dyads, triads, pentads, and hexads by way of examples > illustrating the Reduction Thesis. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > > > > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 5:17 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <ath...@olympus.net>wrote: > >> Listers >> >> I would like to approach this section about Kee’s discussion of the >> ‘proof of pragmatism’ backwards--from experience to theory. I came into my >> understanding of pragmatism in this way and still find it difficult to >> analyze from the other direction. I’ve many years of practical experience >> with these concepts (15 of the nearly 40 years pre any knowledge that they >> WERE concepts, let alone Peircean). This experience still shapes the way I >> am most able to think clearly about these issues. >> >> In 1975, circumstances that left me without any other materials with >> which to teach junior and senior language arts students forced me to make >> use of a set of unused workbooks called, “Creative Analysis,” by Albert >> Upton. Once my students and I made it through the first three sections of >> that workbook, we all (me included) had learned to qualify (affective, >> sensory, rational), to analyze based upon diagrams developed by deliberate >> qualitative choices and to understand and apply the immensely complex >> construct that Upton simply called “Signs.” >> >> So, I feel that everyone should know that I am not a ‘real’ >> philosopher—my only credentials are that I was able to write my first book >> (and everything else) in isolation (I have still never met a formally >> trained Peircean in the flesh). I started my first book pre-searchable >> discs, using only my limited collection (3 anthologies) of Peirce’s >> writings, a few well-answered questions from Dr. Ransdell, Cathy Legg (and >> some amiable Deweyans) and what I knew (know) from Creative Analysis, as >> well as a non-verbal assessment of Peirce-based non-verbal inference >> patterns, which I also did not know was based on Peirce. >> >> If Howard Callaway had not read an early snippet from the manuscript and >> suggested I send it to Rodopi via him when it was complete & if John Shook >> had not refereed that manuscript and accepted it for publication, that >> first book would probably still be just a manuscript. If I had not made an >> online (and now actual and close) friend of Jayne Tristan (a Deweyan) >> who vetted my manuscript for philosophical trigger words—like “necessary,” >> I would probably have made a complete fool of myself. (I still worry a lot >> about that, but should probably just say *dayenu* here). >> >> Thus, it is from this perspective of an aging and experience-based >> amateur that I invite Peirce-l to join me in this excellent adventure. >> >> Kee’s points out that any “…proof should begin with phaneroscopy and then >> run through the normative sciences.” I understand this as meaning that the >> proof of pragmatism begins with a close examination of the qualities >> (potential as well as actual) of phanera (as facts and occurrences). >> >> Peirce says that an occurrence is “a slice of the Universe [that] can >> never be known or even imagined in all its infinite detail” and that every >> fact within every occurrence is “inseparably combined with an infinite >> swarm of circumstances, which make no part of the fact itself” (Rosenthal, >> 1994, pp. 5-6). Peirce points out that a fact, which can be extracted from >> this swarm of circumstances by means of thought, is only so much of reality >> as can be represented by a proposition (Rosenthal, 1994, p. 5). One aspect >> of preparing a proposition for testing is determining which factors within >> the swarm of circumstances matter and which do not. >> >> It seems that the call for the proof of pragmatism to begin with >> phaneroscopy speaks to the examination of relevant properties (qualities of >> affect, sense, reason) of whatever fact is under consideration. >> >> Since Peirce allows for comparison & contrast, as well as sorting (and by >> implication) diagrammatic thinking (as a perceptual, rather than a logical >> judgment) in this non-normative branch of philosophy, it seems there is >> much “work” that a phenomenologist can do here before engaging the >> normative sciences, in particular, logic as semiotic (the semiotic >> paradigm) to craft the theoretical construct. >> >> It seems to me that the individual “strands” of the rope are discovered >> and explored within phaneroscopy, based upon their qualities and their >> possible relevance to something &/or one another. Only then would they be >> tested against norms before being added to the rope-like braid that Kees >> describes. >> >> I wonder how many others also see the ‘Proof’ beginning in phenomenology >> in this sense of discerning? In another sense? Or do some of you see it >> beginning somewhere else altogether? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > >
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