Jeffrey, Ah! Aquinas. Maybe that's why Peirce's scholasticism has always seemed so clear to me. I spent 11 of my first twelve years of schooling in Tucson Catholic schools. (4th grade, in a Palo Alto "public" school). I understand Aquinas' rationale but still hold with Gould's domain concept. I think there must be many better examples out there than transubstantiation for explaining the pragmatic maxim.
Regards, Phyllis -----Original Message----- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: Wednesday, April 30, 2014 2:53 PM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology Mara, Phyllis, List, In order to understand the point of the example concerning transubstantiation, it would help to have a clear target in mind. One good candidate is the position Aquinas takes (e.g., in Summa Theologica and The Quodlibetal Questions). Once the theses and arguments are made clear, I suspect that it will be easier to understand the points Peirce is making. Given the fact that the pragmatic maxim is being used by Peirce to clarify scientific conceptions, it will help to think of the claims Aquinas is making as a series of metaphysical assertions. Aquinas presents the claims as a development of Aristotle's metaphysics, so that seems fair. Each of the assertions about the bread and the body and the wine and blood illustrate more general principles of how the substantial identity of existing things can change--and how God can be the cause of those changes. Here is a short summary of a few key points: 1. The bread and wine are substantially changed into body and blood. It is not a mere symbolic change in terms of what they mean to us. Rather, the bread and the wine are themselves quite literally transformed into a new kind of thing. 2. This happens through the sacrament delivered by the priest, but Christ himself is the agent of the change. 3. When the changes occur, the bread and wine are not moved somewhere else, and they are not annihilated. Rather, the form of the bread and wine are changed into the form of body and blood. 4. The accidental properties of what they look, smell and taste like do not change. That would be repulsive for creatures like us. Rather, all of the observable properties stay the same--only the form has changed. Mara, you ask: "What about the habit of interpreting wine as becoming the blood of Christ when in the type of setting, and preceded by the special type of words spoken by a special type of person?" Notice that the habit of how the sacrament is interpreted is not part of Aquinas's explanation of what really taking place when the sacrament is being delivered. Insofar as we are interested in questions about the real nature of the bread and wine themselves when the sacrament is performed, we are working on the logical presumption that the real nature of the things is independent of what you, or I or any other individual happens to think. This assumption may turn out to be a poor account of the nature of what is real, but we are starting with a nominal definition that is based on common sense. In order to apply the pragmatic maxim, it will help to have some competing hypotheses. There are quite a number to pick from. Aquinas was responding to an ongoing controversy within the Catholic church, and we understand his arguments in terms of objections made by the likes of Luther. Let's keep things simple. Let me forward a metaphysical explanation. One possibility is that, when the words are uttered, no real changes take place in the bread and the wine themselves. The utterance of the words can definitely have an effect on the people who interpret those words. Everyone to the debate accepts that much. The question is, what is the meaning of saying 1-4 above? In particular, what is the import of the fourth provision? Can you conceive of any test that would separate the explanation Aquinas is offering from the hypothesis I've ventured to put forth? Aquinas insists that, as a matter of principle, there are no observable differences. If that is part of his explanation, I can't conceive of any test that would separate the competing explanations. Can you? If we can't, then there is no real difference in the respective meaning of the competing hypotheses. That is, Aquinas is using more words in (4), but he isn't really saying anything different than what is contained in my hypothesis. It might appear that, when we think about the familiar meanings of the words, that there is a difference, and there is. What is more, a careful analysis of the meanings of the conceptions used will show that the conceptions are distinct. Having said that, there are no real differences between the hypotheses insofar as they are considered to be scientific explanations. Real difference requires two things: a conceivable test that could be run, and an observable difference we would expect to see. Hope that helps to explain why this is a good example of how we might use the pragmatic maxim to clarify the meaning of competing metaphysical hypotheses. --Jeff P.S. There is a nice summary of Aquinas's position in Teresa Whalen's The Authentic Doctrine of the Eucharist (pp. 12-19) if you want to see more detail. Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Phyllis Chiasson [ath...@olympus.net] Sent: Wednesday, April 30, 2014 1:39 PM To: 'Mara Woods'; 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology Mara & List, I do not see a proof of pragmatism in this section either. Nor have I seen such a proof anywhere else, though I know many people are working on it, most via a proof of abduction/retroduction. If Abduction/Retroduction is the whole of pragmatism, as Peirce claims, then we need a proof of abductive inference to prove pragmatism. I was thinking in this vein when I wrote Abduction as an aspect of Retroduction for Semiotica in 2005. I do, however, think that Kees has the first parts of the sequence right: phenomenology for discerning, then semiotic (informed by aesthetics& ethics) for grounding [my next post addresses this], then logical critic. I'm going to be proposing though, that none of these is capable, alone or taken together, of proving pragmatism. The issue of system (as opposed to patterns of language, inference etc), which Gödel assures us cannot be proven from within, requires more--and Peirce provides for that in Methodeutic. In addition, the pragmatic maxim is a criterion, not a process, so it can be used as a pre/post tool or measure, but not as proof. I'll clean up my second post (7.2.2) and get it out soon. As for transubstantiation: When I complained to Gary R. about this example, he pointed out that it was from Peirce himself. (Peirce didn't care much for the belief systems of Catholics, the cognitive capabilities of blacks, or the mathematical abilities of women--a Larry Summers of his time?) I think this example is a poor one for demonstration purposes and will get to that in post 7.3. Im with the late Stephen J. Gould on religion & science belonging to different domains (in one sense, even different umwelts); one should not expect valid results by applying the methods of one domain to the other. I include Peirces Neglected Argument in this, because Reason, his summum bonum and the ultimate aim of what he calls religionism (see ethical classes of motives--motive #5) is just science redefined in religious words, but still meaning scientific concepts--e.g. no inexplicable ultimates. Meanwhile, as for proving pragmatism I keep recommending E. David Ford's book, SCIENTIFIC METHOD FOR ECOLOGICAL RESEARCH. It is an excellent demonstration of how methodeutic might operate in practice. Since the field of ecology examines consequences within open, as well as closed, systems, Ford's book seems to me to address the reciprocal nature of the process of retroduction. Though he doesn't use that word in the book, he did use it for his classes at the University of Washington back when I met with him in the late 1980's. Regards, Phyllis Chiasson ________________________________ From: Mara Woods [mailto:mara.wo...@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, April 29, 2014 8:20 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology Phyllis, List, To be honest, I am not sure I see a proof of pragmatism in this section (7.2). Rather, I see a justification for pragmatism being that it was constructed using the pragmatic maxim. As far as I understand it, this essentially means that signs are only meaningful if they can be translated into thought-signs that have an effect on belief (and, thereby, also possibly on actions). If I may jump ahead a touch to section 7.3, the example of transubstantiation is used to demonstrate how a concept can be devoid of meaning because it has no practical consequences. As far as I understand this section, the reason why it is said to have no practical consequences is because no change in the phaneron occurs to signal a shift. This perhaps goes back to an implied proof of pragmatism that Phyllis alluded to with her vivid and useful description of her pre-Peircean cultivation of phaneroscopic abilities, "It seems that the call for the proof of pragmatism to begin with phaneroscopy speaks to the examination of relevant properties (qualities of affect, sense, reason) of whatever fact is under consideration." Now, the fact that I do not see the issue of transubstantiation as an example of the pragmatic maxim applied suggests strongly to me that I am missing something important here. My objection here is that it is more than the mere qualities get involved in the development of higher grades of clarity of a concept. What about the habit of interpreting wine as becoming the blood of Christ when in the type of setting, and preceded by the special type of words spoken by a special type of person? Tokens of these types are also part of the phaneron when receiving communion, but somehow only the qualities of the wine and bread are considered relevant. It would seem that this example is suggesting that knowledge of substance cannot be gained through dynamic objects mediated by symbols but only through immediate objects. Perhaps the issue is that only beliefs that are fixed by the method of science are considered to be pragmatic, and since the belief in transubstantiation is fixed by authority, it is excluded. That idea doesn't seem to fit, however, especially given the connection of the pragmatism to abduction. If the question is to whether the belief would have any practical consequences, I'm not sure why the answer would be no since any proposition that asserts the truth of transubstantiation also asserts a whole host of other beliefs which must also be accepted, which in itself leads to practical consequences on thought and action. I'd really appreciate explanations that may possibly lead to some clarification. Mara Woods M.A., Semiotics -- University of Tartu On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 3:46 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Phyllis, List, Thank you, first, for sharing your personal pragmatic story. It brought up many thoughts for me beginning with how Peirce commented that pragmatism is merely the formalizing of critical commonsensism as we move from a logica utens to a logica docens. In addition, your remark that you don't consider yourself to be a 'real' philosopher reminded me that the very democratic structure of this forum was conceived by Joe Ransdell with a sense that, from the standpoint of cenoscopic philosophy, we are all at least potential philosophers, and that academic philosophy is not the be-all and end-all of philosophical pragmatism, while academic philosophy has its own dangers and pitfalls, something Joe spoke of informally, for example, in email messages to Ben and me, and wrote of more formally. As Joe conceived it, the Peirce forum was to be a place where anyone interested in the work of Peirce could discuss his philosophy. Furthermore, my own experience in college teaching was, for example, to teach a course titled "Critical Thinking" (which is not a course in formal logic) from this cenoscopic standpoint, and informally, that is, as critical commonsensism, logic not yet brought to the formal development whereas pragmatism is placed within methodeutic in semeiotic. In a word, I think it is valuable that thinkers like yourself seem to find pragmatic principles alive and valuable, and even long before they've formally studied Peirce and pragmaticism. So, I'm very much looking forward to discussing these and other related matters with you and others, including how we pragmatically educate our young people, like you grandson, to become excellent critical thinkers. As for the proofs of pragmatism beginning in phenomenology and continuing into the normative sciences, that some of the later articles in EP2 are structured and titled along these lines by Nathan Houser, has for some time now aided me in considering Peirce's requirement that he prove his own brand of pragmatism unlike the other pragmatists who felt no such compulsion. In EP2 Nathan was, unfortunately, but understandably, not able to address Peirce's proof employing Existential Graphs. However, Peirce's discussion of "the valency of concepts" and his informal proof of the Reduction Thesis in MS 908, which Nathan gives the title, "The Basis of Pragmatism in Phaneroscopy," seems to me already to anticipate the case that is to be made by Peirce that the strongest proof comes from EGs. There's much more to be said in this matter, but for now I'll conclude with an except from MS 908 which I hope we'll have occasion to discuss as it connects deeply to this matter of the proof of pragmatism beginning in phenomenology. [U]nless the Phaneron were to consist entirely of elements altogether uncombined mentally, in which case we should have no idea of a Phaneron (since this, if we have the idea, is an idea combining all the rest), which is as much as to say that there would be no Phaneron, its esse being percipi if any is so; or unless the Phaneron were itself our sole idea, and were utterly indecomposable, when there could be no such thing as an interrogation and no such things as a judgment [. . .], it follows that if there is a Phaneron [. . .] or even if we can ask whether there be or no, there must be an idea of combination (i.e., having combination for its object thought of). Now the general idea of a combination must be an indecomposable idea. For otherwise it would be compounded and the idea of combination would enter into it as an analytic part of it. It is, however quite absurd to suppose an idea to be a part of itself, and not the whole. Therefore, if there is a Phaneron, the idea of combination is an indecomposable element of it. This idea is a triad; for it involves the ideas of a whole and of two parts [. . .] Accordingly there will necessarily be a triad in the Phaneron. (EP2:363-4). This "idea is a triad" is almost immediately followed by valental diagrams of medads, monads, dyads, triads, pentads, and hexads by way of examples illustrating the Reduction Thesis. Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 5:17 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <ath...@olympus.net<mailto:ath...@olympus.net>> wrote: Listers I would like to approach this section about Kees discussion of the proof of pragmatism backwards--from experience to theory. I came into my understanding of pragmatism in this way and still find it difficult to analyze from the other direction. Ive many years of practical experience with these concepts (15 of the nearly 40 years pre any knowledge that they WERE concepts, let alone Peircean). This experience still shapes the way I am most able to think clearly about these issues. In 1975, circumstances that left me without any other materials with which to teach junior and senior language arts students forced me to make use of a set of unused workbooks called, Creative Analysis, by Albert Upton. Once my students and I made it through the first three sections of that workbook, we all (me included) had learned to qualify (affective, sensory, rational), to analyze based upon diagrams developed by deliberate qualitative choices and to understand and apply the immensely complex construct that Upton simply called Signs. So, I feel that everyone should know that I am not a real philosophermy only credentials are that I was able to write my first book (and everything else) in isolation (I have still never met a formally trained Peircean in the flesh). I started my first book pre-searchable discs, using only my limited collection (3 anthologies) of Peirces writings, a few well-answered questions from Dr. Ransdell, Cathy Legg (and some amiable Deweyans) and what I knew (know) from Creative Analysis, as well as a non-verbal assessment of Peirce-based non-verbal inference patterns, which I also did not know was based on Peirce. If Howard Callaway had not read an early snippet from the manuscript and suggested I send it to Rodopi via him when it was complete & if John Shook had not refereed that manuscript and accepted it for publication, that first book would probably still be just a manuscript. If I had not made an online (and now actual and close) friend of Jayne Tristan (a Deweyan) who vetted my manuscript for philosophical trigger wordslike necessary, I would probably have made a complete fool of myself. (I still worry a lot about that, but should probably just say dayenu here). Thus, it is from this perspective of an aging and experience-based amateur that I invite Peirce-l to join me in this excellent adventure. Kees points out that any proof should begin with phaneroscopy and then run through the normative sciences. I understand this as meaning that the proof of pragmatism begins with a close examination of the qualities (potential as well as actual) of phanera (as facts and occurrences). Peirce says that an occurrence is a slice of the Universe [that] can never be known or even imagined in all its infinite detail and that every fact within every occurrence is inseparably combined with an infinite swarm of circumstances, which make no part of the fact itself (Rosenthal, 1994, pp. 5-6). Peirce points out that a fact, which can be extracted from this swarm of circumstances by means of thought, is only so much of reality as can be represented by a proposition (Rosenthal, 1994, p. 5). One aspect of preparing a proposition for testing is determining which factors within the swarm of circumstances matter and which do not. It seems that the call for the proof of pragmatism to begin with phaneroscopy speaks to the examination of relevant properties (qualities of affect, sense, reason) of whatever fact is under consideration. Since Peirce allows for comparison & contrast, as well as sorting (and by implication) diagrammatic thinking (as a perceptual, rather than a logical judgment) in this non-normative branch of philosophy, it seems there is much work that a phenomenologist can do here before engaging the normative sciences, in particular, logic as semiotic (the semiotic paradigm) to craft the theoretical construct. It seems to me that the individual strands of the rope are discovered and explored within phaneroscopy, based upon their qualities and their possible relevance to something &/or one another. Only then would they be tested against norms before being added to the rope-like braid that Kees describes. I wonder how many others also see the Proof beginning in phenomenology in this sense of discerning? In another sense? 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