Gary F, List, My proposal was to follow Kant, and to characterize the difference in terms of the way the methods presuppose and answer to the question: why should I be logical? Following Kant, I think the methods of tenacity and authority methods appeal to ends and incentives that are material and subjective. That is the proposal, although some may think it is not sufficient.
--Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Gary Fuhrman [g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: Saturday, May 03, 2014 6:55 AM To: 'Peirce List' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science I'm inclined to agree with Jeff D. that "random" doesn't really capture the quality common to the first two methods - but I can't think of a single positive word that does, and I don't think Jeff has proposed one either. "Insistent" maybe? "Imperative"? I think "random" will do in a thumbnail sketch of the four methods, as long as we read it as the opposite of "reasonable" (but still open to rationalizing). gary f. -----Original Message----- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 2-May-14 7:39 PM Cc: Peirce List Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science Gary R., Gary F., Cathy, List Having pointed to an alternate basis for classifying the other methods for fixing belief, let me offer a comment on your suggestion. The methods of tenacity and authority need not be random. In fact, great effort in reasoning can be spent defending one's own beliefs against evidence to the contrary, and similar efforts can be spent defending those held by the authorities that be. Instead of focusing on a lack of direction in those methods, I would recommend focusing on the instrumental way in which the the reasoning is being construed. The a priori method purports to hold higher ends, but contrary to what it is often asserted in defense of this method, it too treats the rules as instrumental in character. The advantage of the alternate reconstruction I am recommending is that it recognizes that these alternatives treat the requirements of valid reasoning as prudential and not moral requirements. The distinction between methods based on principles of prudence and the one method that treats the requirements of logic as ethical obligations does help to articulate Peirce's point in moralizing at the end of the essay--such as when he says that what is more wholesome than any belief is integrity of belief. What is more, it helps to makes sense of the suggestions in the text that, for these other methods, the requirements are all held to be conditional. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: Friday, May 02, 2014 1:51 PM To: Gary Fuhrman Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science Gary, Cathy, list, So, slightly modifying Cathy's list in consideration of Gary F's comments we get (and, personally, with an eye to introducing these methods to students): Method of Tenacity: private, random Method of Authority: public, random Method of Consensus: public, reasoned Method of Science: public, reasoned and tested Best, Gary R.
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