Frank, Gary F., Gary R., list,
When I said that the method of opinion came to seem to me to consist in
authority trying to operate in a situation of the method of development
of opinion (the _/a priori/_), I meant that it came to seem to be a
composite method, a view that you suggest at one point in your post.
At some point I was thinking of associating inference modes with the
method, only I did it a little differently. But unlike with other things
that I say below, I kept quiet at the time, because I had already
discussed the three unscientific methods of inquiry at length.
You associated abductive inference with tenacity; inductive inference
with authority; and deductive inference with the _/a priori/_. I
'switched' the partners of the first two.
**Inductive inference and the method of tenacity.** I saw the method of
tenacity as involving a kind of misapplication of the method of learning
(not necessarily cognitive inquiry) by practice and repetition, which is
first of all a method of learning how to do things skillfully (practice
makes perfect). One keeps repeating one's opinion, as if to do so were a
gradual induction in support of it. But it's a willful induction indeed.
The opinion itself may be generated by any means, as long as it is one's
first opinion on the given subject, since to the extent that the opinion
is not initial, the method is not a method of persistence, repetition,
willful inertia.
**Abductive inference and the method of authority/contest.** I had seen
method of authority as a species or phase of a method of struggle or
contest or vying, a phase such that one side becomes dominant. The
method of contest involves a kind of misapplication of the learning
method of trial and error (and variation), which is first of all a
method of learning how to struggle and develop character. In this
mis-application, one tries to impose one's opinion, as if to do so were
an abductive inference producing it ("I'm right because I'm gonna win!")
- an abductive inference is, after all, itself a kind of experimental
trial, testing a presupposition of one's capacity to guess; in the
method of contest, the test really is of one's capacity to win, but the
winner's opinion wins too on the view that _/might makes right/_. In the
authoritarian phase, most have joined, or acquiesced to, the winning
side. But the winner's might, even when not kinetically active, remains
in place, holding others down. The 'might' may be any kind of what the
anthropologists have called 'mana' - political and martial strength,
wealth (funding etc.), glory and charisma, and status. The opinion
itself may have originally been reached by whatever means.
**Deductive inference and the method of _**/a priori/**_.** Before this
thread, I thought of the method of _/a priori/_ as the method of
contest/authority of glamour, charisma, etc., but now I think that at
most they intersect. In the method of a priori, an opinion is adopted,
not because it is the most popular or glamorous or hip opinion, but
because it is indeed to one's taste. It is a kind of mis-application of
the learning method of appreciation and emulation, better known as
'identification and imitation', which is first of all a method of
learning to value and developing sensibiity. The opinion represents some
values that one likes or admires, or is the opinion of some figure whose
values one likes or admires, and adopts. It's not necessarily one's
first opinion, instead it is, if anything, one's latest opinion (not
necessrily one's last and final opinion), one's personal fad; this is
the most hedonistic method, in which opinion is not a weapon or a means,
but a culminal pleasure itself, in virtue of its content. That is, the
method focuses on _/telos/_ as culmination and ignores entelechy. Still,
the shift of the apriori-arrived opinion may be slow in time; and while
it is personal, it is also social, insofar as it involves freely chosen
self-herding and emulation not only of idealized models but of actual
people. Peirce does discuss it in terms of the development of
intellectual fashion and taste of the public, not just of the
individual; and there may be fashion leaders and fashion followers. One
selects the opinion from among the various opinions on offer at the
buffet of the currents of thought. From its pleasantness and
agreeability, one infers as if by deduction its truth; or more precisely
one likes and expresses it as if the liking and expressing were a
deduction, a necessary inference, compelled not by authority or tenacity
but by the current of one's thought. It fits with one's other likings
and is 'agreeable to reason.'
Well, I gave it a try.
Best, Ben
On 5/7/2014 1:01 AM, Frank Ransom wrote:
Gary F., Gary R., Ben, List,
Gary F, I'm basically leaning on Liszka's scholarship. In his book, he
identifies the method of public opinion as a fifth method, positioned
between the method of authority and the method of the a priori (which
positioning Ben suggests as well). Having seen what you and Ben
reference, I suppose Liszka might have been mistaken. Then again, I
find myself agreeing with Ben that there seems to be something
distinct about the method of public opinion. As Ben also supposes, the
method of consensus might be a species of the method of the a priori.
If the method of public opinion is really about consensus, as it seems
to me to be, then perhaps Peirce replaced the method of public opinion
or consensus with the method of the a priori because the method of the
a priori incorporates public opinion or consensus while also covering
other cases pertinent to the fermentation of ideas.
Personally, I suppose I would consider the method of public opinion,
or consensus, distinct from the method of the a priori, due mostly to
the fact that I have always considered the method of the a priori to
be characteristically a method pursued by a single mind like Plato,
Descartes, or Kant, sifting through ideas and ending with what they
are inclined to think must be the best answer to a given question or
problem; while the method of public opinion strikes me as more a
matter of coherence, not so much between ideas, but between the
beliefs of the members of a community. Thinking on it like this, I'm
inclined to view the method of public opinion as after, not before,
the method of the a priori, since the method of science will, in
facing reality, inevitably lead to a consensus in the community--the
key difference between the method of public opinion and the method of
science consisting in the difference between what the community is led
to believe today versus what the community is destined to believe.
But perhaps this makes the method of public opinion unduly overlap
with the method of authority. I have to admit that placing the method
of public opinion between the method of authority and the method of
the a priori appears more reasonable in light of this, since it shares
in both the community-orientation of the method of authority and the
free play of ideas in the method of the a priori. I think Peirce is
himself not altogether clear about how to properly characterize the
method of public opinion, whether it is a sort of softer approach to
the method of authority, or whether it is a kind of community approach
to the comparing of ideas found in the method of the a priori.
Then again, I have wondered about what makes the three non-scientific
methods what they are, and I have something of an idea about them that
I offer for consideration. If considered from the standpoint of
inference and taking a hint from the division of the kinds of
inference (which partially makes sense, since methodeutic follows upon
the work of critical logic), the method of tenacity might be a strict
adherence to one's abductions, the method of authority might rely on
enforced inductions (that is, involving some rather brutal facts,
pardon the wordplay), and the method of the a priori might rely mostly
on deduction, a comparing of ideas with one another and their
consistency or inconsistency with one another. This last would
certainly engender the coherence theory of truth, as Gary F suggests
the method of the a priori, considered as the method of consensus,
would. As for the method of public opinion, and its gradual
metamorphosis into the method of the a priori, I wonder whether it
might originally have involved some combination of two of the kinds of
inference without the third, but over time Peirce (probably not
consciously) came to want to make each of the three non-scientific
methods as distinct from one another as possible, leading to each one
signifying a method primarily committed to one kind of inference over
the other two; whereas the method of science will involve all three
kinds working together. If my hypothesis has some truth to it, then it
should be possible to consider three methods, distinct from the four
identified in "The Fixation of Belief," that involve combinations of
two kinds of inference while minimizing the third. But this would
probably get a bit messy, as one would likely be inclined to see
similarities between examples of these hybrid methods with the other,
simpler methods and look to categorizing any given example of the
hybrid methods as more or less falling into one of the simpler methods
(tenacity, authority, a priori), or perhaps as a part of a larger
example of the method of science.
Whether this idea regarding the methods can be reconciled with
Peirce's discussion of just what makes the method of science what it
is--direct engagement with, and testing of, reality--I don't know. I
suppose it can be objected that the fact that the method of science
deals with reality and the idea that the method of science needs all
three kinds of inference do not have a clear connection with another.
Also, it can be argued that the other three methods really do use all
three kinds of inference, or perhaps at least two (as one might
imagine that the a priori method involves not only deduction but also
abduction). Well, I admit that both objections are reasonable. But the
latter objection is a little weak, as it involves a point about how to
properly classify the methods, and I find that the proper
classification is the one that would lead to more fruitful results,
which I would maintain is associated more with my proposed approach
(though admittedly further inquiry is needed to prove it so). As to
the former objection, I have no way to meet it as of yet, but can only
say that because no connection is immediately apparent is no real
argument against there being such connection. So, I guess I'm just
saying that there's room for further reflection on the suggestion of
associating the most basic division of kinds of method with the
reliance of a given kind of method upon one or more of the modes or
kinds of inference.
--Franklin
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