Jeff K., List,
Smyth is careful to point out that he is only tracing out a few strands in a
much larger cable of arguments. In addition to the Kantian and neo-Kantian
strands, there are empirically grounded strands (that one might call
naturalistic in flavor) that he does not try to reconstruct.
Having said that, I tend to emphasize the fact that Peirce is primarily
interested in the *necessary* requirements for signs to be meaningful, and for
self-controlled inferences to be valid, and for us to communicate our
interpretations of what will help to realize the ends of inquiry. In places,
Short emphasizes the kinds of evidence and strands of the argument that do not
bear on these necessary conditions. This shows up quite prominently in his
interpretation of Peirce's phenomenological account of the categories.
I appreciate the fact that, when it comes to an account of thought, that we can
look at matters from the inside or from the outside. The Kantian approach to
reading the arguments tends to emphasize the internal point of view, while a
Humean approach leads us to emphasize an external point of view. When it comes
to understanding Peirce's account of the normative sciences from an external
point of view, I think that he is pointing to significant weaknesses in the
assumptions and arguments that philosophers such as Hume and Mill are making.
In place of such nominalistic assumptions, I think he is offering explanations
that are grounded more robustly in an evolutionary framework, where that
framework is developed on the basis of a set of realist assumptions. To take
an example, Peirce's externalist account of why induction tends to lead to
convergence is very different from the arguments Hume and Mill have to offer.
My misgivings about reading Peirce's assumptions and arguments from a Humean or
Millean point of view are based on the criticisms he makes in the early
lectures. Having said that, I think Peirce is remarkable good at finding both
common mistakes in widely divergent points of view (e.g., as widely divergent
as Mill and Kant)--as well as common insights where one might least expect to
find them.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Kasser,Jeff [jeff.kas...@colostate.edu]
Sent: Sunday, May 04, 2014 9:04 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science
Thanks, Jeffrey. This is useful, and I think you and Smyth capture something
important about "Fixation." But I follow Short in thinking that Smyth's
interpretation leaves out something essential. If this Kantian moralism were
the heart of Peirce's argument, the whole thing should be a whole lot more a
priori than I think it is. Short emphasizes that the Smyth interpretation
doesn't sit particularly well with Peirce's emphasis on the history of inquiry
and, more generally, with the appeal to experience that Short sees as central
to the paper. Unlike Short, I think that Peirce is giving an argument against
the unscientific methods rather than just issuing an invitation to the reader
to direct her attention appropriately. But I think that Peirce's main argument
at least permits a Humean rather than a Kantian conception of practical reason,
and I take seriously the strand of the argument that says that the unscientific
methods will be, as an apparently contingent fact, unable to hold up in
practice. I agree that Peirce argued that "scientists ought to be logical
because the requirements are overriding," but I think that Peirce argues in a
Humean way as well as a Kantian way that believers ought to be scientists.
Best,
Jeff K.
________________________________________
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: Saturday, May 03, 2014 5:38 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science
Jeff K., List,
You've asked about the relationship between the moral (or logical) and
prudential concerns.
For the sake of simplicity, let me start by stating the matter in terms of
Kant's moral theory. Why should I be moral? Because the principles of
morality express overriding reasons. The worth of an action is based on the
relationship between one's maxim and the principles that govern valid practical
reasoning--and not on the realization of any given end. In effect, one's maxim
has moral worth only if the principles of morality are incorporated into the
maxim as the basis for drawing the the conclusion of the practical reasoning.
Once the argument has been made that the fundamental principle must have the
form of a categorical imperative, what should we say about the particular
obligations that are grounded on such a principle? It is clear that there are
many derivative duties that follow from the primary obligations. For instance,
we have a derivative duty to act in a manner that promotes our own happiness.
Why? Because people who are inattentive to such matters sometimes end up being
so miserable that they find it hard to live up to their other moral
obligations--such as the obligations to be respectful of others. In effect, we
have have a categorical requirement to be respectful of others, and we can
reason on the basis of hypothetical imperatives that furthering one's own
happiness is necessary as a means to overcoming temptations we might face to be
disrespectful. In this pattern of reasoning, the given end in the hypothetical
imperative (i.e., that of living up to requirements of being respectful of
others) is not a contingent end. As such, the requirements might appear to be
prudential (i.e., they appear to have the form of a hypothetical imperative),
but they such derivative imperatives are really grounded on underlying moral
obligations.
Shifting our attention from Kant's moral theory to Peirce's theory of inquiry,
we can see that scientists ought to be logical because the requirements are
overriding. Accepting this fact, should they be respectful of the authority of
the larger scientific community--including those members who are established
authorities in this community? Yes, because science can only effectively be
pursued in the context of such a community effort, and there are prudential
constraints that must be met for this community to function in an organized
manner. In my view, many of the efficiency constraints on scientific inquiry
follow this pattern of justification. We have an obligation to reason
according to the principles of abduction, deduction and induction, but there
are efficiency based requirements that are derivative on the logical
requirements.
Having said that, some of the requirements for reasonable inquiry that might
appear to be efficiency based are really based on regulative principles that
are articulated and established as part of the methodeutic. For instance, the
requirement that we should try to preserve as much of an accepted theory as
possible when we've encountered a surprising phenomena and are considering new
hypotheses is not just a matter of the economy of research. Rather, it is a
regulative goal established by the principle of continuity. I wonder: how
many things that might appear at first glance to be based on matters of
efficiency are really grounded on the regulative principles in the methodeutic?
Hope these quick remarks help to clarify this approach to interpreting "The
Fixation of Belief."
--Jeffrey D.
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Kasser,Jeff [jeff.kas...@colostate.edu]
Sent: Saturday, May 03, 2014 2:52 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science
Thanks for re-energizing our discussion of Chapter 6, Cathy. I was only dimly
aware of your absence, but I was vividly aware that a conversational spark had
been missing, and I hypothesized that Jeffrey D. and I simply hadn't managed to
light that spark. But I think your return to the discussion has cured much of
what was ailing us.
Like Jeffrey D., I think there's a lot to be learned from the Kantian strategy
that Smyth employs, and I would emphasize, in response to Cathy's original post
on the topic, that this Kantian strand offers another way of bringing together
the ethical and the efficiency strands of the argument in "Fixation." As I read
him, Peirce is not arguing that a method like tenacity can't successfully yield
settled beliefs on the time scale of an individual lifetime. Nor is he shifting
illegitimately from the goal of fixing my beliefs in my lifetime to the goal of
fixing everybody's beliefs in the very long run. The main sense in which
tenacity can't work is that it can't be *chosen*. You might be able to fix your
beliefs that way if you're sufficiently stubborn, unreflective, or isolated,
but that still doesn't make tenacity a good answer to the logical question.
Similarly, if I am sitting on 20 and take another card while playing blackjack,
I might get an ace, in which case I'll cry all the way to the bank while you
pronounce my method "irrational," which is, as Peirce says, just name-calling
until we muster a clear account of the source of the relevant normativity. And
this is where Smyth is a big help, though (if memory serves) he keeps his
reading too clear of the efficiency issues for my taste. I would say that the
fact that the method of tenacity sometimes works in sufficiently specific
circumstances doesn't make the method a good one, nor does it make the method
choosable (as opposed to merely pickable) by anybody who's clear about the
logical question. In Jeffrey D.'s terms, I thus think that the argument of
"Fixation" is prudential as well as moral. Do you think that these strands are
combinable, Jeffrey?
The recent discussions of how to characterize the unscientific methods brings
me back to an earlier post of mine that Gary R. found unclear. What I meant to
be asking, Gary, is whether you think that Peirce maintains that there's any
clear sense in which the a priori method is better than the method of authority
which is better than the method of tenacity. Quite a few readings treat the
argument as exhibiting a kind of Hegelian progress, but I take Peirce's comment
that the a priori method differs in no essential way from the method of
authority, which is itself just the method of tenacity writ large, to be an
indication that Peirce sees importantly different strengths and weaknesses
among these methods, but not overall progress. I don't see him commensurating
these strengths and weaknesses into all-things-considered assessments of these
methods in comparison to one another. He does, of course, compare them
unfavorably to the scientific method. I find the text of "Fixation" hard to
interpret along these lines, though. To take one example, the paragraph near
the end where he insists that each of the methods has a "peculiar convenience"
of its own seems to me to descend into a snide condescension that seems to me
in some tension with Peirce's often resourceful and fair-minded assessment of
the unscientific methods.
Best to all,
Jeff K.
________________________________________
From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: Saturday, May 03, 2014 1:35 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science
Gary R., Gary F., Jeffrey D., Cathy, list,
Peirce said that all three unscientific methods lead to accidental and
capricious beliefs - that is, that only the scientific method overcomes
caprice, by hypothesizing that there are real things, and by actually testing
claims about particular real things (including methods themselves).
But I agree that there's something on the more active side about the methods of
authority and tenacity as compared to the method of _a priori_, so as to make
one think of some sort of pushiness. The method of _a priori_ involves allowing
oneself to be carried by the current of thought wherever it leads - even if one
is a thought leader like Hegel. (The scientific method also involves a certain
passivity - allowing, even actively arranging for, oneself to be carried,
determined, to the truth.)
Yet for most people the method of authority involves being subjected to force,
and such seems a situation of passivity, not agency. On a closer look at the
authoritarian regime, however, one sees that many people do both - they
enforce, and they are subjected to enforcement, regimentation. (The scientific
method also involves subjecting oneself to an outer compulsion - that of truth.)
Well, here's still another way maybe to do it:
1. Method of tenacity - rest inertia, patience, durability, stamina, growth
thereof (opinion as resource for hoped-for eventual gain of pleasure /
avoidance of pain).
2. Method of authority - force, agency (opinion as force or weapon for desired
more-or-less direct gain of pleasure / avoidance of pain).
Both of those could be considered instrumentalizations of opinion, similarly as
Jeffrey D. was discussing, if I understood him correctly. But then we come to:
3. Method of _a priori_ (something like taste) - energy, vibrancy, passion,
action as undergone (opinion as 'consumed' for pleasure / non-pain). This is
'passive' in the sense of ancient Greek _páschonta_, undergoing, except with a
decidedly pleasurable or non-painful sense - it is something being acted on,
driven, experiencing action on the receiving end. Latin _patiens_, like
'patient', does not always mean something 'undergoing' in a strong sense
('passion' is closer to the ancient Greek sense). Anyway, this method is more
immediate, less instrument-mediated, than the other methods as a hedonism.
I also wanted to try to address Jeffrey D.'s remarks in
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2014-05/msg00017.html but I've
realized that I'm not sufficiently used to working with Kantian ideas. Jeffrey
D. wrote:
1) Subjective and internal (tenacity)
2) Subjective and external (authority)
3) Objective and internal (a priori)
4) Objective and external (a priori)
I do keep wondering about it.
Best, Ben
On 5/3/2014 1:03 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
I'm not sure "insistent" or "imperative" quite do it either. How about
"arbitrary"? Anyhow, as you noted, Gary, what we're looking for would only work
"for a thumbnail sketch" anyhow.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
E202-O
718 482-5700
*** *** *** ***
"Gary Fuhrman" 05/03/14 9:56 AM >>>
I'm inclined to agree with Jeff D. that "random" doesn't really capture the
quality common to the first two methods - but I can't think of a single
positive word that does, and I don't think Jeff has proposed one either.
"Insistent" maybe? "Imperative"?
I think "random" will do in a thumbnail sketch of the four methods, as long
as we read it as the opposite of "reasonable" (but still open to
rationalizing).
gary f.
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: 2-May-14 7:39 PM
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of
Science
Gary R., Gary F., Cathy, List
Having pointed to an alternate basis for classifying the other methods for
fixing belief, let me offer a comment on your suggestion. The methods of
tenacity and authority need not be random. In fact, great effort in
reasoning can be spent defending one's own beliefs against evidence to the
contrary, and similar efforts can be spent defending those held by the
authorities that be.
Instead of focusing on a lack of direction in those methods, I would
recommend focusing on the instrumental way in which the the reasoning is
being construed. The a priori method purports to hold higher ends, but
contrary to what it is often asserted in defense of this method, it too
treats the rules as instrumental in character. The advantage of the
alternate reconstruction I am recommending is that it recognizes that these
alternatives treat the requirements of valid reasoning as prudential and not
moral requirements. The distinction between methods based on principles of
prudence and the one method that treats the requirements of logic as ethical
obligations does help to articulate Peirce's point in moralizing at the end
of the essay--such as when he says that what is more wholesome than any
belief is integrity of belief. What is more, it helps to makes sense of the
suggestions in the text that, for these other methods, the requirements are
all held to be conditional.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: Friday, May 02, 2014 1:51 PM
To: Gary Fuhrman
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of
Science
Gary, Cathy, list,
So, slightly modifying Cathy's list in consideration of Gary F's comments we
get (and, personally, with an eye to introducing these methods to students):
Method of Tenacity: private, random
Method of Authority: public, random
Method of Consensus: public, reasoned
Method of Science: public, reasoned and tested
Best,
Gary R.
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