Helmut wrote: The singular-plural thing I was wondering about, is, that according to Peirce, the immediate object ist the (one) object as represented in the sign. But I feel, that one representamen can represent (call) eg. three memory contents: quality, entity, possible relations between both. Perhaps my irritation is based on my identifying "called memory content" with "object", but the object (singular) would rather be the three called memory contents as picked up and brought together by the representamen.
Phyllis responds: Dear Helmut, I suspect that you must be coming from a linguistics focus. I spent several hours yesterday with two young linguistics graduates whose training had taught them to collapse qualities & entities into things and call them all things without differentiation and to identify them with "memory content(s)." They, too, argued that one representamen could be three things, each "thing" being qualities or entities, but merely labeled as memory content. I do not see the advantage to semiotic research & development in collapsing the three into the one term, and labeling it all undifferentiated "memory content", without acknowledging the quality, thing (entity), relationship triad. It seems as though the simplification of the terminology of semiotic structure could lead to difficulty analyzing/interpreting structural and operational meaning. Regards, Phyllis Chiasson Phyllis Chiasson <ath...@olympus.net> wrote: Yes, I think it would be more correct from Peirce's perspective to say that green is a quality (property, characteristic) of some frogs. Qualities may (or likely do) relate to the physical properties of humans in some way, but Peirce's semiotic is normative, logically objective and not dependent upon human minds. It's both the whole of formal logic and the lead of formal logic, as speculative grammar. The late semiotician, Thomas Sebock developed a thoroughgoing "semiotic web" that is shown in diagrammatic form in John Deeley's intro to the book "FRONTIERS IN SEMIOTICS." I find that diagram and Deeley's introduction to this book as a very useful overview for understanding/explaining the breadth/depth of Peircean semiotics (and its contrast with de Saussure). Regards, Phyllis Chiasson Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: (oops, ok, not klick answer, but fill in peirce list adress) So would it be better not to say, the name of the object is "green", but: "Green is a quality things can have"? This would be a memory content, and I assume, that memory contents are parts of the form of a human (possible objects): They have their limited space somewhere (in the cortex), but are permanent in time. Behaviour parts (possible representamens) are limited in time (like an impulse), but have no spatial limits in the system of interpretance: Like the sighting of a green frog. Phyllis Chiasson <ath...@olympus.net> wrote: Can a quality be an object? Or is an object a relationship between a quality (or qualities) and a thing? Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: Dear Peircers, I think, there is one assumption that hinders the understanding of semiotics: The triad of representamen-object-interpretant suggests, that there be only one object implied. I think that this is not so. In one semiosis, there are most likely more than one objects involved. Example: Representamen being the sighting of a green frog. You being a young child, who knows a frog from a black-and-white sketch in a fairy tale book. Also you know colours. One object is "frog", the other is "green", the third is the concept you already have about relations between attitude and entity, namely: "A sighted trait might be typical for the sighted thing". This third object is also called by the representamen, because the representamen is carrying with it a trait (green) and a frog. Now the representamen fits to these three objects, and in an abductive process of your mind, a new object is created: "possibly all frogs are green". This object is (by induction) strenghened by the subsequent sighting of some more green frogs. But then you spot a red frog, and you have a deduction: The object is inverted: "possibly all frogs are green" is deleted and replaced by: "Not all frogs are green". The object "A sighted trait might be typical for the sighted thing" is slightly weakened. Well, thats how I assume, thinking works, dont you think so? A reflexive process always implies abduction, induction and deduction, and at least abduction requires more than one object. Now dont say, that the green frog is the one object: He is long gone, diven into the water, as you are still thinking about it, dont you? Best, Helmut ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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