Jon,
I like your diagram, Figure 1, which differs somewhat from mine, Figure 2.
As you can see both these diagrams are 4-node networks. One of the
differences between Figures 1 and 2, however, is that S is located at the
periphery in the former while it is at the hub in the latter. This
topological difference may or may not be of fundamental significance.
Another difference may be that, in Figure 1, the triadic sign relation <R|
is a part of the diagram, whereas, in figure 2, it is represented by the
whole diagram itself. (The R appearing in Figure 2 is not "Relation" but
"representamen", as you know.)
S
/
O--<R|
\
I
Figure 1. Jon's diagram for the Peircean sign.
R
/
O---S
\
I
Figure 2. Sung' diagram for the Peirecan sign. R = representamen, not
"triadic relation", <R|.
With all the best.
Sung
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14182
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14184
> SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14187
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14194
>
> Sung, List,
>
> Consider Figure 1
>
> â
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/images/0/01/Aristotle%27s_Sign_Relation.gif
>
> from Awbrey & Awbrey (1995)
>
> â
> https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry
>
> What is a diagram like that intended to represent? Being one of the very
> authors who intended it to represent something I can tell you with some
> authority what I had in mind.
>
> There's a part of it that looks like this:
>
> S
> /
> O--<R|
> \
> I
>
> That part of the picture is supposed to represent a sign relation that we
> find
> in Aristotle's "On Interpretation", where O is the object, S is the sign,
> I is
> the impression that the object makes on the interpreter, and R is the
> triadic
> sign relation that relates the preceding three entities.
>
> I guess I used to assume that diagrams like that are largely
> self-explanatory,
> but years of being called on to supplement their ostensible
> self-explanations
> with volume after volume of my own explanations has taught me otherwise.
>
> So let's eye these diagrams a little more closely to see where they lead
> astray.
>
> Jon
>
> Jon Awbrey wrote:
>>
>> Sung, List,
>>
>> Let's see if we can turn our discussion of these paltry stick figures to
>> some good purpose in the task at hand, namely, to investigate the uses
>> (and abuses) of diagrams and to examine the forms of understanding (and
>> misunderstanding) to which they give rise.
>>
>> People have used these sorts of figures to illustrate the structures of
>> triadic sign relations for as long as I can remember, but their use
>> depends on grasping the stylistic conventions that determine their
>> intended interpretation. We can call them "icons" without being totally
>> wrong, but the meaning of an icon always depends on knowing what
>> features or structures of its object it bears in common. Because these
>> figures depend on knowing or guessing the stylistic conventions involved
>> in their use, they are also symbols, and very much so.
>>
>> To be continued ...
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> Sungchul Ji wrote:
>>> (For undistorted figures and table, see the attached PDF file.)
>>>
>>> Jon cites the following post he wrote on 6/11/2002:
>>>
>>> "I am still a few hypotheses shy of an explanation of all that
>>> (091914-1)
>>> our Mister Tuesday Afternoon was saying just now, or a little
>>> while ago, about icons and indices, and their symmetries, but
>>> I am under the perhaps too facile impression that I have long
>>> understood the gist of it, by dint of the particular examples
>>> that arise in my application to systems theory, many of which
>>> seem to fit the pattern of what Peirce seems to be describing.
>>>
>>> And so, here for comparison is the picture of an iconic sign:
>>>
>>> o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o
>>> | Objective Framework | Interpretive Framework |
>>> o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o
>>> | |
>>> | q o |
>>> | ·· |
>>> | · · |
>>> | · · |
>>> | · · |
>>> | · · |
>>> | · · |
>>> | · · |
>>> | · · |
>>> | · v |
>>> | · o u |
>>> | · / |
>>> | v / |
>>> | x o------@ |
>>> | \ |
>>> | \ |
>>> | o v |
>>> | |
>>> o-----------------------------------------------------------o
>>> | Sign u is an Icon of Object x by Virtue of Property q |
>>> o-----------------------------------------------------------o
>>>
>>> And here is the putatively dual figure of an indexical sign:
>>>
>>> o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o
>>> | Objective Framework | Interpretive Framework |
>>> o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o
>>> | |
>>> | o u |
>>> | / |
>>> | / |
>>> | x o------@ |
>>> | ^ \ |
>>> | · \ |
>>> | · o v |
>>> | · ^ |
>>> | · · |
>>> | · · |
>>> | · · |
>>> | · · |
>>> | · · |
>>> | · · |
>>> | · · |
>>> | ·· |
>>> | t o |
>>> | |
>>> o-----------------------------------------------------------o
>>> | Sign v is an Index of Object x by Virtue of Instance t |
>>> o-----------------------------------------------------------o
>>>
>>> The reason that the indexical style of picture appears almost
>>> immediately
>>> recognizable in a systems-theoretic context is because the state space
>>> of
>>> a complex dynamic system is a setting in which "objects have
>>> instances".
>>> In effect, an object is an abstract unity that comprises a collection
>>> of
>>> components and connects a sequence of state points in an orbit over
>>> time.
>>>
>>> Now, an "abstract unity" is a funny sort of thing -- it is partly
>>> a whole and wholly a part, in other words, a whole in its own right
>>> that is merely a face of some more complete and full-bodied whole.
>>> What this means in the present setting is that we can view the
>>> whole system and the temporal state of the whole system as objects,
>>> the latter being an "instant" of the former.
>>>
>>> For example, two people in a dialogue may be viewed as a "dyadic
>>> system",
>>> and each person's experience of the interaction is a facet of the
>>> whole.
>>> One's experience is an index of the other's experience, and vice versa,
>>> by virtue of their actual connection in the instantaneous state of the
>>> whole system. And if one of them points to a common object, to which
>>> the other independently or by dint of that pointer attends, then each
>>> of their experiences, in that moment, becomes an index of that
>>> object.â
>>>
>>>
>>> In [biosemiotics:2181] dated 2013 (?), I introduced the 4-node network
>>> representation of the Peircean sign which was used in
>>> [biosemiotics:3365]
>>> dated 8/16/2013 (partially reproduced below) to suggest a possible
>>> relation among nominalism, constructivism , realism, and logic.
>>>
>>> I think the 4-node network version of the Peircean sign (4-NNPS) (see
>>> Figure 1 below) may be viewed as an alternative to Jonâs diagrams of
>>> the
>>> Peircean sign reproduced above (see (091914-1)). Although 4-NNPS may
>>> be
>>> missing some aspects of the Peircean sign that Jonâs diagrams are
>>> ideally
>>> suited for , it may have some advantage as well. One such advantage
>>> seems to be that it is logically integrated with the 9 types of
>>> âdyadicâ
>>> signs (see Table 1 below) that Peirce used to construct his 10 classes
>>> of âtriadicâ signs (not shown). Of the 9 types of these what I
>>> called [1]
>>> âelementary â signs, Jonâs diagrams mention only two, i.e., icon
>>> and
>>> index.
>>>
>>> One major difference between Jonâs diagrams and mine may be that the
>>> hub
>>> of Jonâs network seems empty to me, since the symbol located there,
>>> i.e., @, is not mentioned anywhere unless I missed it, whereas that of
>>> mine is occupied by the Peircean sign itslef. This allows the sign in
>>> my
>>> diagram posses three edges (and hence triadically related to R, O, and
>>> I),
>>> whereas the sign in Jonâs diagram, u or v, are not triadic but
>>> dyadic,
>>> each having only two edges. It is clear that Jonâs and my diagrams
>>> can
>>> converge if Jon replaces @ with the tiadic sign of Peirce and u or v
>>> with
>>> Representamen. In other words, Jonâs diagrams represent the
>>> âdyadicâ
>>> signs (or the elementary sign as I called them in [1]), whereas the
>>> 4-NNPS
>>> contains both the âdyadicâ (i.e., R, O, & I sign relations) and
>>> âtriadicâ
>>> signs or sign relations (i.e., the R- S<R-I relation). (Let us
>>> remind
>>> us that âa sign relationâ is a sign. Not realizing this basic
>>> aspect of
>>> the Peircean sign has led to many confusions and unnecessary debates on
>>> these lists in the past couple of years.)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> o-------------------------------------------------------------o
>>> | Figure 1. An alternative diagram of the Peircean sign, S |
>>> | |
>>> | R = representamen |
>>> | O = object |
>>> | I = interpretant |
>>> |-------------------------------------------------------------o
>>> | |
>>> | |
>>> | R |
>>> | | |
>>> | | |
>>> | | |
>>> | S |
>>> | / \ |
>>> | / \ |
>>> | / \ |
>>> | O I |
>>> | |
>>> | |
>>> | |
>>> o-------------------------------------------------------------o
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________________________
>>>
>>> Table 1. The 9 types of âelementaryâ signs of Peirce [1]
>>> _______________________________________________________________
>>>
>>> Sign (S) Firstness Secondness Thidness
>>> _______________________________________________________________
>>>
>>> R qualisign sinsign legisign
>>>
>>> O icon index symbol
>>>
>>> I rheme dicisign argument
>>> ________________________________________________________________
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
>>> - -
>>>
>>> (A partial reproduction of [biosemiotics:3365] dated 8/16/2013)
>>>
>>> Statement (3363-2) is a Peircean sign (a very complex one, called
>>> âargument symbolic legisignâ). I introduced in [biosemiotics:2181]
>>> the
>>> 4-node network representation of a sign:
>>>
>>> Representamen
>>> |
>>> |
>>> |
>>> Sign
>>> / \
>>> / \
>>> / \
>>> Object Interpretant
>>>
>>>
>>> Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of the three relations of a
>>> sign.
>>>
>>>
>>> If all signs can be represented graphically as in Figure 1, Statement
>>> (3363-2) should also be representable as a 4-node network. One such
>>> attempt is shown in Figure 2.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> âConstructed imagesâ
>>> (Representamen)
>>> CONSTRUCTIVISM/NOMINALISM
>>> |
>>> |
>>> |
>>> Sign
>>> / \
>>> / \
>>> / \
>>> âNaturally necessary âLogically necessary
>>> consequentsâ consequentsâ
>>> (Object) (Interpretant)
>>> REALISM LOGIC
>>>
>>>
>>> Figure 2. The Hertz thesis (see quoted phrases) expressed as a
>>> Peircean
>>> sign (see the parentheses) demonstrating the irreducible triadicity of
>>> nominalism, realism and logic.
>>>
>>> - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
>>> - -
>>>
>>>
>>> With all the best.
>>>
>>> Sung
>>> ___________________________________________________
>>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
>>> Rutgers University
>>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
>>> 732-445-4701
>>>
>>> www.conformon.net
>>>
>>> Reference:
>>> [1] Ji, S. (2014). The Quark Model of Peircean Signs. In: Semiotics
>>> of Life: A Unified Theory of Molecular Machines, Cells, the Mind,
>>> Peircean Signs, and the Universe based on the Principle of
>>> Information-Energy Complementarity. PDF available at
>>> http://www.conformon.net under Publications > Proceedings and Abstract.
>>> Pp. 78-85.
>>>
>>
>
> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
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