> On Sep 24, 2014, at 6:24 AM, Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > > But as Frederik points out in his footnote (p. 51) about “degeneracy,” not > all Dicisigns are symbols — only propositions are. Does this mean that > non-symbolic Dicisigns — or “natural propositions” — are degenerate in some > sense? And if so, what are the implications of this for Peirce’s doctrine of > Dicisigns?
I want to reread this section before saying too much. However I took the degeneracy to be over whether the dicisign expressed a general predicate or an index. If the later then it is degenerate because it is missing the general predicate. I should also note, given our discussion in the prior two chapters on Husserl that this position of Peirce’s flows rather well into the Ricouer/Derrida take of metaphors as foundational for language rather than literal meaning. Peirce manages to bridge this with the dicisign expressing its meaning via syntax but that this meaning is either the metaphor or extreme vagueness in the case of the index. It might be helpful to quote the following from Minute Semeiotic which has a very nice summary of the dicisign, although one I’m not sure everyone will agree with. It’s cast in a slightly different form from Frederik. Secondness in the Third Correlate originates Dicisign: the Sign that incorporates the meaning expressed by the Syntax, i.e. the effect in the Interpreter’s mind of the copula between the Index and the Universe which this Index refers to. If this Universe is not a General Predicate, the Dicisign will be indexical and the effect on the interpreter will be just to call his attention to “something” that remains opaque. It is for this reason that we say that the Index points “blindly”. If the Universe is a General Predicate (a Metaphor), the copula will produce a Metonymy which is cognition. In this case, we will have an informative Proposition. Note that the Dicisign is not the Syntax, but the result or final effect of the copula. It occurs, therefore, on the axis of the Signification, where the flux of Information of Semiosis passes. A Proposition means a “state of things” that can be expressed in many different modes: affirmative, negative, interrogative, conditional etc without the Proposition ever suffering any type of alteration in the Information it carries. Every Dicisign is the instantiation of an Induction and, therefore, exists in the interior of the leading principle that rules the Inductions in direction to the final Argument. http://www.minutesemeiotic.org/?page_id=266 I’m not sure I’d call a general a metaphor. I do think the use of metaphor in continental philosophy is getting towards that issue - but that’s probably one problem with continental philosophy in that these things are vague and ambiguous. I’m not sure I agree with their comments about induction either, but I think I understand why they’d say that. The Digital Peirce has some nice quotes as well I’ll include since they get at the issue of rhemes which is important in Fredrik’s chapter. His treatment was very well done I thought - especially how he ties parts to the process of an argument. It is a key element that for Peirce propositions must be conceived in terms of a kind of process philosophy rather than a static philosophy of presence. That difference is why I think there’s such a big difference from analytic philosophy which largely has its course set via Frege. 1903 | Syllabus: Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations, as far as they are determined | EP 2:292 A Dicent Sign is a sign, which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of actual existence. It cannot, therefore, be an icon, which affords no ground for an interpretation of it as referring to actual existence. A Dicisign necessarily involves, as a part of it, a rheme, to describe the fact which it is interpreted as indicating. But this is a peculiar kind of rheme; and while it is essential to the dicisign, it by no means constitutes it. [—] Or we may say […] that a Dicisign is a sign which is understood to represent its object in respect to actual existence… 1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:275-276 The readiest characteristic test showing whether a sign is a Dicisign or not is that a Dicisign is either true or false, but does not directly furnish reasons for its being so. This shows that a Dicisign must profess to refer or relate to something as having a real being independently of the representation of it as such, and further that this reference or relation must not be shown as rational, but must appear as a blind Secondness. But the only kind of sign whose object is necessarily existent is the genuine Index. This Index might, indeed, be a part of a Symbol; but in that case the relation would appear as rational. Consequently a Dicisign necessarily represents itself to be a genuine Index, and to be nothing more. 1904-10-12 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 33-34 In regard to its relation to its signified interpretant, a sign is either a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument. This corresponds to the old division Term, Proposition, & Argument, modified so as to be applicable to signs generally. [—] A proposition as I use that term, is a dicent symbol. A dicent is not an assertion, but is a sign capable of being asserted. But an assertion is a dicent. [—] I define a dicent as a sign represented in its signified interpretant as if it were in a Real Relation to its Object. (Or as being so, if it is asserted.)
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