Dear John, lists, I think you're right - Peirce saw thought as an argument chain whose resting points were propositions. Best F
Den 22/09/2014 kl. 18.46 skrev John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> : At 01:41 PM 2014-09-13, Frederik wrote: Dear Sung, lists - To take thought to be but the result of thinking is an idea that may lead us astray - especially if you take thinking in all its aspects to be a psychological process only. Thought is not determined by thinking only but, importantly, by the object of thought and the structure of sound reasoning. So, you might as well say that thought is the result of the norms of reasoning and the features of the object thought about. Thinking then is the process combining these - but not the process producing thought as such. Just like the TV-series you watch is not the product of the printing of the DVD only. Or the meal you prepare in your casserole is not only the product of the cooking process - but also of the objects you add to the casserole and the recipe you follow. Best F I agree with what you say here, but I was wondering if it does not go further. Frege used "thought" to refer to propositions, as I understand him, and I am not clear whether Peirce did the same. (I studied with a number of Frege experts, but never had a Peirce expert on my committee, though my thesis does make homage to Peirce.) I am thinking in particular of a peculiar passage that Vinicius Romanini brought to my attention: () if, for example, there be a certain fossil fish, certain observations upon which, made by a skilled paleontologist, and taken in connection with chemical analyses of the bones and of the rock in which they were embedded, will one day furnish that paleontologist with the keystone of an argumentative arch upon which he will securely erect a solid proof of a conclusion of great importance, then, in my view, in the true logical sense, that thought has already all the reality it ever will have, although as yet the quarries have not been opened that will enable human minds to perform that reasoning. For the fish is there, and the actual composition of the stone already in fact determines what the chemist and the paleontologists will one day read in them. () It is, therefore, true, in the logicians sense of the words, although not in that of the psychologists, that the thought is already expressed there (EP2: 455). This passage makes much more sense to me, and fits much better my information based ontology, if "thought" means what I would mean by "proposition". John Frederik wrote: "Thinking, in this sense, may be the object of, (6729-1) psychology thought not so ." Can you separate thinking and thought? Isn't the latter the result of the former? If so, why can't the latter be the object of psychology as well ? With all the best. Sung ________________________________ John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier <http://web.ncf.ca/collier>
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