Cathy, lists, Cathy wrote: Re. 3.9: Love the 'top-down' functional analysis of arguments whereby they are not **composed** of propositions and terms, but rather the latter are prescinded after the fact.
Closely related to this in 3.9 is something which might be of particular interest to biosemioticians. Immediately following the Peirce quote which includes the phrase that "an Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is built up of positions" (78), Frederik comments that, for Peirce, according to the principle of continuity it is the reasoning process--the chain of reasoning--which is primitive. Frederik comments in a footnote: Taking the chain of reasoning as primitive may give a new idea of biological sign evolution. Instead of assuming simple organisms use very simple signs which then compose to more complex sign during evolution, we can assume that simple organisms use unarticulated implicit arguments so that semiotic sophistication during evolution rather has the character of the ongoing articulating and making explicit the semiotic machinery, such as the two functions of Dicisigns (fn 27, p 79) Frederik refers the reader of this footnote to Chapter 6, where the argument he's building up is applied directly to biosemiosis. Still, as Gary F. noted in his sketch of 3.10 today, there are so many fresh ideas in Chapter 3 of considerable value in our possibly rethinking aspects of semiotics and biosemiotics, that I'm beginning to see why Frederik decided to take a 'minute' semiotic' approach to the question of the Dicisign! So, I will this week continue to patiently study each section of Chapter 3, increasingly convinced that Peirce's and Frederik's insights have the potential to perhaps shake up or even revolutionize our (at least my) thinking in these fields. Chapters 4 and 5 promise to be just as intriguing as 3 has been, For example, in the relatively short Chapter 4 which Tyler Bennet will be leading commencing next Monday as Gary noted, the first "consequence of the Dicisign doctrine" is given as the "Naturalization of Propositions." But I don't want to get ahead of things, so for now I'll turn to Chapter to see if I can get a handle on some of the interesting points of 4.10 which Gary F. outlined earlier today. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 2:20 AM, Catherine Legg <cl...@waikato.ac.nz> wrote: > Hi everyone, > > > > I've made some progress reading chapter 3. > > > > Re. 3.7: I'm very excited by this idea of replacing a copula with an > index. (Subject and predicate are joined by "an index pointing to the *real > fact *joining the Subject and the Object.") I see how this idea lines up > with the originality in Peirce's theory of perception (which I've only > recently got my head around) whereby the perceptual judgement is not a * > *copy** of the percept but an **index** of it. This is such a powerful > new idea Peirce offers to Western philosophy. > > > > Re. 3.9: Love the 'top-down' functional analysis of arguments whereby they > are not **composed** of propositions and terms, but rather the latter are > prescinded after the fact. > > > > Cheers, Cathy > > > > *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Tuesday, 7 October 2014 12:46 p.m. > *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > *Cc:* Peirce List > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions, > Chapter 3.7 > > > > Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists, > > > > I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological > discussions relating, on the one hand, to the *subject (*such as *denote* > , *designate, indicate*, etc). and on the other to the *predicate*, (such > as *signify, comprehend, connote, etc.)* It seems to me that Frederik > here employs such terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in > his extraordinary development and vast expansion of the proposition as the > *dicisign > concept *in, especially, the* Syllabus* and *Kaina Stoicheia* ca.1903*.* > > > > I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis > that Peirce of this period (and Frederik) is saying: > > > > *In considering the proposition (dicisign)*: > > *[the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the > Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign) * > > > > And, further, for Peirce these two are joined *not*, as they've > traditionally been, by a *copula, *but rather by an *index *of a peculiar > kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the *real > fact *joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right, > the formulation* breadth x depth = information (*i.e,, the sum of these > two as equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that *true > information represents a real fact in some world of experience*. > > > > In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that > Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact > being represented, the index being the *necessary *sign for joining the > replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This > syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in > this case, exactly the juxtaposition of the two, that is, their > * co-localization*, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it. > > > > *The* > > * co-localization of the elements of the dicisign*: > > *[Subject](Predicate)* > > > > (Such a *co-localization syntax* is further understood to be primitive > and pre-linguistic.) > > > > This syntax claims that the dicisign "is* really indexically connected* to > the *real fact* to which the subject and predicate correspond" > (Stjernfelt, 66), and *how* this happens forms the argumentation of the > rest of this section and some of the next (centering on the* two objects* of > the co-localizing index) . But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd > like to ask if the above summary represents a correct understanding of the > terminology dthat Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents > the argument being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7? > > > > Understanding that there are in this syntax *two objects *helps explain > how Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the > fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica > (Secondary Object) that the *existentia*l relation especially applies, > while the *reality* (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds > of Experience, and in that sense is different and altogether greater than > its replica. So the language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is > a bit unnerving to me for* both* Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70 > and the Peirce quotes on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the > language of reality (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the > Syllabus) where both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that > I may be making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes > simply loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding I've > argued for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a significant change > in terminology from the Syllabus to KS) > > > > Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the > Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather > complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization synta > *x *were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks! > > > > Best, > > > > Gary > > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *C 745* > > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > > > On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 8:01 AM, Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > > Lists, > > > > We have now arrived (slightly behind schedule) at NP 3.7, which is > considerably longer and more difficult than the previous sections of > Chapter 3. Readers who have taken in those previous sections should be > prepared to take on 3.7, but instead of adding any commentary of mine to > it, I'm going to simply direct your attention to it and wait a few days for > questions about it, before we move on to 3.8. According to the schedule > (attached), we have another two weeks to 'cover' Chapter 3. I'd encourage > those who haven't yet posted questions about NP to do so now. Don't worry > if you feel that your command of the terminology is imperfect; I doubt that > anyone, including me, has it 'down pat', with the possible exception of > Frederik! As you've probably seen by now, the Dicisign is a complex and > difficult concept, but an important one, so we need whatever questions can > make it a little easier. > > > > gary f. > > > > } { > > www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics > > > > >
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