Howard,
HP: To keep the discussion on the subject of Frederik's book let me explain where I see modern physics differing from Peirce's views. GF: What does that have to do with the subject of NP? Until you can explain that, I'm changing the subject line of this thread. HP: First, I want to emphasize that in general I agree with Peirce's philosophy of science as an attitude, not a methodology, but an attitude freed from any predisposition. I see a difference in the demands of empirical discoveries, unknown to Peirce of course, that have shown that physical laws cannot be encumbered or blocked by either analytic logics or epistemologies. GF: Where does Peirce (or anyone!) argue that physical laws can be encumbered or blocked by either analytic logics or epistemologies? HP: I agree with Peirce (following Hertz): ". . . the power that connects the conditions of the mathematicians diagram with the relations he observes in it is just as occult and mysterious to us as the power of Nature that brings about the results of the chemical experiment." I also agree with the Pragmatic Maxim, especially with the meaninglessness of many issues and linguistic artifacts. But Peirce is mistaken when he claims that physicists do not doubt the reality of their results. GF: Where does Peirce claim that physicists do not doubt the reality of their results? gary f. From: Howard Pattee [mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com] Sent: 16-Oct-14 7:55 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [biosemiotics:7245] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter At 01:02 PM 10/15/2014, Benjamin Udell wrote: Then in some cases you [Howard] say that you didn't say those things and I show where you said them. If those are not inconsistencies but instead reflect your changes of mind or your corrections of your misphrasings, then please say so. HP: I stand by what I said; no corrections or mind changes, but I will try to make my beliefs clearer. Your rephrasings altered my meanings. I think the reason I appear to you as inconsistent is because you do not recognize the empirical necessity of complementarity and hierarchic levels of models. Also, we have a different view of scientific models. Your response also illustrates my original point that such disputes over undecidable epistemological ideologies can not only be a waste of time, but are often misleading; or worse, they can become name-calling contests over the -isms, distracting otherwise productive discussions over substantive scientific theories. That does not mean that epistemologies are unimportant. In physics, epistemologies of many forms are entertained (not believed) as important explorations of conceptual and formal theories. That is, they are a form of thought experiment, not unlike the non-existent Maxwell demon. For example, Wigner entertained solipsism as a logically consistent interpretation of quantum theory, but he does not believe in solipsism. QM has also engendered novel epistemologies, like Many Worlds, that are often entertained but seldom believed. That is what I was getting at when I said: "I often think realistically. I see no harm in it as long as I don't see it as the one true belief." As evidence, ask yourself: For how many years have the greatest minds been arguing over realism vs. nominalism? Is there any obvious trend toward a consensus? If not, why not? Do you know of any mathematical theorem, physical, biological, or brain theory that would be altered if either the truth or falsity of either view were revealed? To keep the discussion on the subject of Frederik's book let me explain where I see modern physics differing from Peirce's views. First, I want to emphasize that in general I agree with Peirce's philosophy of science as an attitude, not a methodology, but an attitude freed from any predisposition. I see a difference in the demands of empirical discoveries, unknown to Peirce of course, that have shown that physical laws cannot be encumbered or blocked by either analytic logics or epistemologies. I agree with Peirce (following Hertz): ". . . the power that connects the conditions of the mathematicians diagram with the relations he observes in it is just as occult and mysterious to us as the power of Nature that brings about the results of the chemical experiment." I also agree with the Pragmatic Maxim, especially with the meaninglessness of many issues and linguistic artifacts. But Peirce is mistaken when he claims that physicists do not doubt the reality of their results. This is long enough for one post. I will give examples of the necessity of complementarity and hierchic levels later. In logic and mathematics, Peirce's (and Aristotle's, Descartes', Cantor's, Dedekind's, et al's) problem with defining discreteness and continuity is one example. Reversible and irreversible models, and deterministic and probabilistic models are others. Howard
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