At 07:37 AM 10/17/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Howard said: To keep the discussion on the subject of Frederik's
book let me explain where I see modern physics differing from Peirce's views.
GF: What does that have to do with the subject of NP? Until you can
explain that, I'm changing the subject line of this thread.
HP: Frederik begins NP with some 30 pages on the historical
antipsychologism movement. In Chapter 4, in order to Naturalize
propositions he associates nominalism with psychologism (p. 106) with
more arguments against both. Somewhere, Frederik is afraid that
cognitive sciences will introduce nominalism and psychologism by the
back door.
I think fighting or worrying about nominalism or psychologism is not
only unnecessary, but likely to miss out on discoveries about how
brains recognize and associate patterns. I am arguing that these
should not be either-or epistemic or metaphysical choices. As many
physicists have suggested, these are complementary interpretations
that are very useful, but not empirically decidable. Trying to
eliminate one or the other is counterproductive. That is why I
suggested thinking about these questions:
"For how many years have the greatest minds been arguing over realism
vs. nominalism? Is there any obvious trend toward a consensus? If
not, why not? Do you know of any mathematical theorem, physical,
biological, or brain theory that would be altered if either the truth
or falsity of either view were revealed?"
HP: First, I want to emphasize that in general I agree with Peirce's
philosophy of science as an attitude, not a methodology, but an
attitude freed from any predisposition. I see a difference in the
demands of empirical discoveries, unknown to Peirce of course, that
have shown that physical laws cannot be encumbered or blocked by
either analytic logics or epistemologies.
GF: Where does Peirce (or anyone!) argue that physical laws can be
encumbered or blocked by either analytic logics or epistemologies?
HP: Frederik says, "Peirce based himself on the Kantian principle
that any assumptions on metaphysical existence should be based upon
logic. . ."
For example, continuity was a fundamental epistemological or logical
assumption. Peirce: " Now continuity, it is not too much to say, is
the leading conception of science. The complexity of the conception
of continuity is so great as to render it important wherever it
occurs. Now it enters into every fundamental and exact law of physics
or of psychics that is known. The few laws of chemistry which do not
involve continuity seem for the most part to be very roughly true. It
seems not unlikely that if the veritable laws were known continuity
would be found to be involved in them."
In Peirce's time, continuity was popular. However, theory and
experiment demonstrated that this metaphysics was mistaken. Nature
has an irreducible discrete component. QM also showed that classical
analytic logic (the distributive law) did not fit the empirical evidence.
HP: I agree with Peirce (following Hertz): ". . . the power that
connects the conditions of the mathematicians diagram with the
relations he observes in it is just as occult and mysterious to us
as the power of Nature that brings about the results of the chemical
experiment." I also agree with the Pragmatic Maxim, especially with
the meaninglessness of many issues and linguistic artifacts. But
Peirce is mistaken when he claims that physicists do not doubt the
reality of their results.
GF: Where does Peirce claim that physicists do not doubt the reality
of their results?
HP: Frederik says, "To Peirce, no scientist in his heart doubt the
reality of the general results of his research." (p.107)
Howard
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
