Gary, List: The triadic triad is a set of relative terms that must function as a logic unit. Otherwise it is meaningless. Just rhetoric.
All 8 terms must be proto-propositions in one sense or another, otherwise there is no entelechy for the construct of five new syntactical terms needed to justify an argument, including the ill-defined concept of dicisign, whatever it may mean. The argument(s) generated from the triadic triad must not only be consistent with chemical valence but also with all possible arguments if one accepts the concept that pragmaticism is grounded in facts and reasoning. The forest remains a forest, even if you cut down one tree. This level of discourse has declined below my threshold. Cheers Jerry > > Jerry, yes, Peirce does say in many places that the structure of a rheme, or > a predicate, has a valency analogous to chemical valency. But if you look at > my statement carefully, you’ll see that it is about Peirce’s doctrine of the > Dicisign, not about the structure of a rheme. > > Nothing that you cite here indicates that either Peirce’s doctrine of the > Dicisign or his existential graphs are attempts to represent the structure of > molecules. They are tools of logical analysis, i.e. the analysis of > reasoning, as Stjernfelt and Roberts make very clear. The fact that Peirce > occasionally drew an analogy from chemistry to explain his logical > conceptions does not override the more general fact that he was doing logic > as semiotic — he wasn’t trying to theorize about chemistry. > > gary f. > > From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] > Sent: 2-Nov-14 4:04 PM > To: Peirce List > Cc: Gary Fuhrman > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter four > > List: > > On Nov 2, 2014, at 8:05 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: > > > Jerry, to give a short answer to your question: > No, neither Peirce’s doctrine of Dicisigns nor Frederik’s explanation of it > in NP have anything to do with “chemical causality” or with the structure of > molecules. Nor do Peirce’s existential graphs have anything to do with that; > they are attempts to depict the process of reasoning as iconically as > possible. > > gary f. > > > The Critique of Arguments, 3.421 describes chemical causality in terms of > rhema which he defines as: > > "A rhema is somewhat closely analogous to a chemical atom or radical with > unsaturated bonds." > > With regard to existential graphs, Don Roberts, p. 17, quotes CSP with > respect to graph theory which is an integral part of CSP's logic of > propositions > . > In the Three Grades of Clearness, in the relation of third grade of > clearness, (3.468-472), CSP compares the diagram of the proposition "John > gives John to John" and compares it directly to the diagram for ammonia. > Does this suggest CSP visualized propositional icons as relatives of chemical > icons? > > These are facts from CSP writings. > > CSP asserts in 3.417, "Not only is every fact really a relation but your > thought of the fact implicitly represents it as such." > > The assertion > "No, neither Peirce’s doctrine of Dicisigns nor Frederik’s explanation of it > in NP have anything to do with “chemical causality” or with the structure of > molecules." > > appears to be a lapse in memory. > > BTW, the term "chemical radical" has a different meaning in the language of > chemistry today; it is rather used in the very general sense as in these > paragraphs, but commonly used as a neutral particle with one unpaired > electron. > > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > > From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] > Sent: 2-Nov-14 12:13 AM > To: Peirce List > Cc: Jeffrey Brian Downard > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter > four > > List: > > (NB: This post contains many technical terms which are used within the > rhetoric of chemistry but not acceptable to many philosophers.) > > On Nov 1, 2014, at 4:42 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > > > > At root, what Peirce seems to see is that the underlying organization of the > periodic chart is driven more by the question of what kinds of bonds can be > formed between different kinds of elements and less by the series of of > atomic numbers. > (I concur with some connotations of this comment.) > > Just a historical note responding to the denotations of this assertion that > are of substantial importance to CSP's logic and the chemical sciences and > its relevance to the book "Natural Propositions" in general. > > One must distinguish between chemical terms as representations of sets of > well-documented facts and physical measurements from their role in > philosophical rhetoric. > > This comment focuses on the distinction between the physical concept of > "mass" and the physical concept of "electricity" in relation to CSP's > invention of the "triadic triad" as a scientific mode of representation in > light of recent problematic assertions to this list. > > As a logic term "chemical element" specifies a unique form of matter. It is > irreducible to any other member of the table of elements. (But it is > separable, in physical terminology, into electrical parts, nuclei and > electrons.) > > The term, "atomic number" is an integer modified by an adjective. It suffices > to distinguish gold from lead from copper from.... But it DOES NOT suffice > to distinguish chemical isomers or chemical handedness. As a number, it > specifies an linear ordering relations among the complete set of chemical > elements. Every chemical element has an atomic number and every atomic > number specifies a chemical element with a proper name. > > The atomic number may specify any one of several isotopes of a chemical > element. The term originates from physics, not from chemistry. > Each isotope of an atomic number has the same atomic number but differs by > the mass of the nucleus, that is, as a predicate. > > The term "atomic number" was invented to explain the electrical structure of > the names of a chemical elements. This was first introduced by Moseley ( a > student of the Nobel Laureate, Rutherford). The concept of a linear order of > chemical elements that is consistent with a tabular order of electrical parts > was not firmly established by physicists/chemists until the 1920s, long after > CSP past in1914. It is the atomic numbers that were used as the basis of > quantum mechanics by Schrodinger and hence the modern logic of chemical > analysis and chemical synthesis (In CSP terminology, the numerical relations > between Qualisigns, sinsigns and legisigns.). > > Certainly, CSP was concerned about the nature of the fusion of atoms into > molecules (see his comments on "interpenetration"), but, historically, he > could not have considered the electrical nature of the parts of the atom in > terms of numbers of electrical particles. Thus, as stated, Jeff's assertion > lacks historical veracity. > > This is verifiable by studying CSP's brief (in the 1890's) about his > calculations for a table of elements, which shows a series of columns > suggested by similar valences. Compare with the tabular form of the current > table of elements which establishes a linear order, not merely a set of > similar columns compared by mass, not electricity. > > Consequently, CSP attempted to use the concept of mass (as real numbers) as > the basis for his logic of chemistry, rather than the discrete numbers of > electrical particles that are the basis quantum physics. Does this > contribute to CSP's avoidance of the concept of electricity in his > description of signs in general and his failed attempts with alpha, beta and > gamma graphs? > > While this subtle distinction may seem trivial to philosophers and those of a > physical bent, it plays a critical role in the logic of the mathematical > proof of structure (that is, the propositions that link sinsigns to icons and > the propositions that link icons to rhema and the propositions that link both > indices and rhema to dicisigns and hence to propositional arguments.) > > In Chapter three of NP, FS elects to skirt these mathematical and logical > distinctions and seeks to create a grammatical basis (Decisigns/predicates) > and hence a grammatical basis for chemical causality. This philosophy is > scientifically problematic, at least to me. > > Does the FS theory of " Natural Propositions" face the challenge of > constructing a proof of the iconic structures of molecules from grammatical > beliefs alone? > > Cheers > > jerry > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More > athttp://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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