Gary, lists,
Responses interleaved.
On 11/4/2014 3:11 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
> [GF] Ben,
I considered including the whole /Monist/ passage in my post, but
decided against it. Anyway, I too see Peirce mentioning two
conceptions for which he says that the term “experience” is not
suitable; but they’re not the same two that you see. I see both of
them at the very end of the passage that we both quoted. This is the
first:
CSP: You may think of an element of knowledge which thus resists his
superficial tendencies; but to express precisely that idea you must
have a new word: it will not answer the purpose to call it /experience/.
This is the second:
CSP: You may also reflect that every man's environment is in some
measure unfavorable to his development; and so far as this affects his
cognitive development, you have there an element that is opposed to
the man's nature. But surely the word /experience/ would be ill-chosen
to express that.
The first is about the immediate tension between momentary surprise
and habit (“superficial tendencies”), while the second is about the
cognitive development affected by that tension over time. What I wrote
was about both of them:
GF: Peirce did not say so in this short /Monist/ piece, but I’d say
that his own term for the resistant “element of knowledge” was
/Secondness/. So he’s saying here that the Secondness of “man's
environment” (to himself) “affects his cognitive development”.
[BU] I think that by "superficial tendencies" he meant both habits and
surprise apart from deeper instinctual attunement to nature by having
something in common with nature, which he had just been discussing. The
first conception is of something like experience as informed by
instinct. The second conception is that of limitedness of experience, a
limitedness that affects cognitive development.
> [GF] I left the (causal) connection between the two implicit, as I think
Peirce did also, on this occasion.
When Peirce says “The idea of the word “experience” was to refer to
that which is forced upon a man's recognition, will-he nill-he, and
shapes his thoughts to something quite different from what they
naturally would have been”, I don’t think he’s objecting to using the
word in that way. In fact that sentence very closely resembles the
definition of “experience” that Peirce gives elsewhere (EP2:435, for
instance).
[BU] I likewise didn't think that he was objecting to that. My bracketed
"[1st more precise conception]" referred to the text that followed it,
not to the text that preceded it ("The idea of the word "experience" was
to refer" etc.).
Best, Ben
gary f.
*From:*Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com]
*Sent:* 4-Nov-14 1:04 PM
*To:* 'Peirce List'; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5
Gary F., Mara, Clark, lists,
In your quote from "Mr. Peterson's Proposed Discussion" (_The Monist_
v. XVI n. 1, January 1906, pages 147-151,
http://books.google.com/books?id=3KoLAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147),
Peirce discusses not one but two conceptions that need names other
than that of experience. I'm not sure whether you were focusing on
just one of the conceptions or on both at once. In the paragraph
before the one from which the quote is taken, Peirce discusses the
idea of instinct compelling a man to a cognition about something
outside his previous personal experience (Peirce's example is a woman
as cognized by a man who has lived only among men). Peirce says that
that cognition indeed
[http://books.google.com/books?id=3KoLAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA150&lpg=PA150
, also CP 5.612-613 Bracketed text mine, enlargings of Peirce's
text mine]
would be the ineluctable result of "_/observation employed
concerning an external sensible object/_." The word "experience,"
however, is employed by Locke chiefly to enable him to say that
human cognitions are inscribed by the individual's life history
upon a _/tabula rasa/_, and are not, like those of the lower
animals, gifts of inborn instinct. His definition is vague for the
reason that he never realized how important the innate element of
our directest perceptions really is.
To such an objector, I might say, My dear fellow, you must be
joking; for under the guise of an objection you reinforce what I
was saying with a new argument for restricting the use of the word
"experience" to the expression of that vague idea which Locke so
well defines. You make it plain that a distinct word is wanted, or
rather two distinct words, to express the two more precise
concepts which you suggest. [Here's where your quote begins] The
idea of the word “experience” was to refer to that which is forced
upon a man's recognition, will-he nill-he, and shapes his thoughts
to something quite different from what they naturally would have
been. [1st more precise concept] But the philosophers of
experience, like many of other schools, forget to how great a
degree it is true that the universe is all of a piece, and that we
are all of us natural products, naturally partaking of the
characteristics that are found everywhere through nature. It is in
some measure nonsensical to talk of a man's nature as opposed to
what perceptions force him to think. [E.g., perception of the
opposite sex for the first time] True, man continually finds
himself resisted, both in his active desires and in that passive
inertia of thought which causes any new phenomenon to give him a
shock of surprise. You may think of an element of knowledge which
thus resists his superficial tendencies; but to express precisely
that idea you must have a new word: it will not answer the purpose
to call it _/experience/_. [2nd more precise concept] You may also
reflect that every man's environment is in some measure
unfavorable to his development; and so far as this affects his
cognitive development, you have there an element that is opposed
to the man's nature. But surely the word _/experience/_ would be
ill-chosen to express that.
Best, Ben
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