Koihiro, lists,
With this one I would get more out of my depth than usual. It gets into
the question known as that of Bertlmann's socks, about which I read many
years ago and was left shaking my head. Anyway, from what little I
understand, the experimentally shown violation of Bell's inequalities
conflicts with (classical physical) local _/realism/_, not with locality
by itself without the 'realist' assumption that particles have
determinate quantitative values in all measurable respects prior to a
given act of measurement. I tend to chalk such phenomena up as a
potential validation of Peirce's realism about modalities (such as
possibility) and absolute chance, although I don't understand the
physics well enough to make a serious argument. A related question is,
is Peirce's idea of absolute chance consistent with the idea of the
deterministic continuous time evolution of the wave function (from which
probabilities are calculated)? I don't know.
Best, Ben
On 11/8/2014 7:24 PM, Koichiro Matsuno wrote:
At 1:40 AM 11/09/2014, Benjamin Udell wrote:
In particular, Peirce regards individual existence as a matter not
merely of location or proximity in space and time, but of reaction,
resistance, interaction, like so many natural measurements. This is
congenial to the QM view of things as becoming determinate through
interaction with the environment, the 'observer', the 'measurer', etc.
In a related context, John Bell (1964) said:
"In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to
determine the results of individual measurements, without changing the
statistical predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the setting
of the one measuring device can influence the reading of another
instrument, however remote."
The violation of Bell’s inequality in QM reveals the failure of
Einstein locality or local realism strictly on the experimental
ground. I am not well acquainted with how Peirce or Peirceans would
have responded to this observation.
Koichuro
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