Gary R., Jeff, lists,
I didn't see this before I replied to Jeff's post the other day. Yes, in
some places Peirce finds only dichotomies. But as I said to Jeff, Peirce
in physical metaphysics found a tyche-anance-agape trichotomy of which
two, but only two, members are represented by divisions of idioscopic
research; moreover, the chief divisions of his broadest three
departments of discovery sciences are, in number, 3, 3, 2, respectively.
One would expect 1, 2, 3, or 3, 3, 3, because they are such broad
divisions, where a Peircean would expect trichotomical logicality rather
than idiosyncrasy.
However, in reviewing the material, I've found that I've mistakenly
omitted a consideration of taxon. Peirce in the Feb-April 1902 "Detailed
Classification" divides the _/class/_ Idioscopy into two _/subclasses/_,
physical and psychical. He divides the class Philosophy (cenoscopy) into
two subclasses as well http://www.textlog.de/4260-2.html - epistemy
(Peirce's usual idea of cenoscopic philosophy) and theoric (which
resorts to special observations for certain "minute details"). In later
classifications he drops the idea of theoric. Now, as to divisions of
class into subclasses, Peirce does this:
Mathematics: 1 (i.e., no distinct subclasses)
Philosophy: 2 or 1
Idioscopy: 2
The divisions into phaneroscopy, normative science, and metaphysics is
not a division into _/subclasses/_, but into _/orders/_.
http://www.textlog.de/4260-2.html
Definitions of class and order:
238. The first great division of science will be according to its
fundamental purpose, making what I shall term branches of science. A
modification of a general purpose may constitute a subbranch. All
knowledge whatever comes from observation; but different sciences
are observational in such radically different ways that the kind of
information derived from the observation of one department of
science (say natural history) could not possibly afford the
information required of observation by another branch (say
mathematics). I call groups based on such considerations
/_classes_,/**and modifications of the same nature
_/subclasses/_.**Observation is, in Agassiz's phrase, the "ways and
means" of attaining the purpose of science. Of two departments of
science /A/ and /B/, of the same class, /A/ may derive special facts
from /B/ for further generalization while supplying /B/**with
principles which the latter, not aiming so high, is glad to find
ready-made. /A/ will rank higher than /B/, by virtue of the greater
generality of its object, while /B/ will be richer and more varied
than /A/. I call groups based on these considerations *orders, *or
if based on modifications of the same sort of idea, _/suborders/_.
[February-April 1902, "A Detailed Classification of the Sciences"
http://www.textlog.de/4261.html ]
If different sorts of conceptions are dealt with in the different
families of a depart|353|ment, but the general type of inquiry is
the same, I call it an _/order/_ of science. If the types of inquiry
of the different orders of a department are different, yet these
orders are connected together so that students feel that they are
studying the same great subject, I call the department a _/class/_
of science. [July 1902, Memoir 1, Carnegie application
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-02.htm
<http://www.iupui.edu/%7Earisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-02.htm>
]
The quote from Peirce mentioning dreams and paranormal things discusses
people's and other animals' being applied physicists and applied
psychists because of how it serves their needs, and he brings up dreams
and the paranormal as possibly a case where people and other animals
_/lack/_ well-developed powers of grasping a mode of relations among
things in space and time. I guess that, to Peirce, such would be why
such things seem and indeed are fringy. Since Peirce already has
essentially anancistic (physical) and agapistic (psychical) wings of
idioscopy, I'd guess that he was trying to think of something tychistic,
absolutely chancy stuff that doesn't obey strict laws. Now, If one tried
to associate the odd things with quantum correlation, 'alternate' ways
of connecting spacetime, the subjectivity of particular observations in
quantum physics, it suggests that there would be no way to usefully
transmit or receive information superluminally through dreams and
paranormal-seeming things, and that would certainly fit in. Well, I
don't really believe that there's a nontrivial connection between
dreams, supposed 'spiritual' phenomena, etc. and quantum physics, but
it's hard to completely close the door, and Peirce kept it a crack open
in a similar way in his time.
Best, Ben
On 12/8/2014 3:33 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jeff, Ben, lists,
The reason why Peirce includes only two branches of the special
sciences in his classification of the sciences may simply be that
there are some situations where there naturally are only dyads, and
one sees this, for example, in places in mathematics and physics.
The quotation Ben gave which /perhaps/ hints at where one /might /
look for a possible third special science doesn't suggest at all
anything presently capable of /scientific / study: "Astrology, magic,
ghosts, prophecies." So a third branch seems to me highly unlikely.
One should note, however, that the classifications from 1902 on (the
"perennial classification" as Kent calls it) do divide each of the two
branches of the special sciences into /three / sub-branches, namely
the descriptive, classificatory, and nomonological. So trichotomies do
occur /within/ the branches of the two special sciences
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*
On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 2:44 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Ben, Lists,
Given the principles that are being used to guide the formation of
the classification of the sciences, why is the division between the
physical and the physical sciences a dichotomy and not a trichotomy?
If this is a natural divisions between kinds of special sciences,
then there should be an explanation. What is it?
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Benjamin Udell
Sent: Monday, December 08, 2014 9:32 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee <mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee> ;
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7705] Peirce's classifications
- WAS Re: Natural Propositions Chapter 6
Dear Tommi, lists,
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