X can talk about a biochemical process only by some metalangue. Therefore X
represents his ideas about bioproc. or for example Peirces ideas by signs.
Re-presentation includes human understanding, it is not a mechanical process.
Am I wrong?
kindly markku sormunen
Lähetetty laitteesta Windowsin sähköposti
Lähettäjä: Edwina Taborsky
Lähetetty: torstai, 18. joulukuuta 2014 21:22
Vast.ott: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee, peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Thanks for your comments, Ben. See mine below, but I think the post is getting
messy and incomprehensible with the various post/responses all mixed up. You
are probably the only one who will read it and I hope you can figure it out.
I'll try colour-coding my current responses.
1) EDWINA: No- 'represents' is, to me, conceptually similar. To me, semiosis
is a transformative process; it doesn't just replace 'x' with 'y'. It actually
takes data from X (let's say, a food source for a cell) and transforms it
within the Sign (the cell) , to a new 'bit' of information (a component of that
cell).
BEN: So semiosis samples the object data and represents it with a sign. The
semiosis arranges for itself to be determined by, and thereby represent, the
object. But the _sign_ doesn't sample the object, instead it is a
representative sample or representative product of the sample from the object.
EDWINA: No, no, I don't see this 'represents the object data with a sign'.
That's a linguistic perspective, where a cognitive system, which happens to be
linguistic, re-presents what the agent observes (eg, Object: a cat sitting out
there) and re-presents that image with the linguistic sign of 'cat'. That, to
me, is superficial and hardly acknowledges the strength of Peircean semiosis.
What I'm talking about is a biochemical process, where, let's say, a cell
(which is a cognitive system) ingests some external data (water, nutrients)
(Object) and, semiosically transforms that input data, via its mediative
habits-of-organization (the Representamen)...into ..parts of that cell
(Interpretant).
2) EDWINA: I agree; the ten classes of signs are defined by their relations. I
didn't say that they 'are the relations defined'. A dicisign is a triad and I
understand that it is defined by the whole Sign's relation to BOTH the object
and the interpretant - which is why it is understood as 'conveying information'
(2.309--).
BEN: Yet you continually call the representamen a relation. Back on 8/26/2014
you called the difference between correlation and correlative "nitpicking".
EDWINA: Yes, it is a Relation-in-Itself. There are three Relations: the one
between the Representamen-and-the-Object; the one between the
Representamen-and-the-Interpretant; and the Representamen-in-Itself. The
Representamen, is 'in itself', because is has a vital function; it mediates
between the Object and the Interpretant Relations. And, the Representamen is
often (in six) in the mode of Thirdness, which is a mode of generalization,
against which particular input data is referenced and 'interpreted'.
------------------------------ From now on, the post/replies/comments...are
getting messy.
[8/26/2014]
>>>> BEN: Again, Peirce calls sign, object, and interpretant the semiotic
>>>> correlates, not the semiotic correlations. He typically distinguishes
>>>> between representation as the relation or operation of representing, on
>>>> one hand, and sign, or representamen, as that which represents, on the
>>>> other hand. He never refers to a sign or representamen as a representation
>>>> except when he is using the word 'representation' in one of its popular
>>>> senses, to mean _something that represents_, as when we say that a
>>>> painting is a representation of something, or that somebody made a
>>>> representation in court.
>>> EDWINA: Agreed - but I think that 'correlates' and 'correlations' is
>>> nit-picking. I am aware when he uses the terms 'representamen' and
>>> 'representation' and again, I don't think that changes my outline.
[End quote]
3) BEN: If a dicisign is a triad (consisting of
representamen-object-interpretant) then what class of representamen is in its
triad? Another dicisign?
A dicent representamen?
EDWINA: The representamen in the three dicisigns is not in a class but in a
mode; in the Dicent Sinsign, the representamen is in a mode of Secondness, and
in the Dicent Indexical Legisign and the Dicent Symbolic Legisign, the
representamen is in a mode of Thirdness.
And I have the same problem with some of your comments below, regarding the
Representamen- where you talk about it as if it were a 'class', while I see it
as within a 'mode'.
---------------------------------------------
4) >EDWINA: I don't think that the term 'relation' can be reduced to a 'state'
(which is what 'quality' is); the term 'relation', to me, means an interaction.
I don't think that 'blue' is in itself a relation.
BEN: The point is not confusing the abstraction (quality or relation) with the
concrete source. A quality is static if only color, odor, etc. are considered.
But there are also rhythm, melody, harmony, qualities of motion and form, etc.
Peirce considered 'tuone', a cross between 'tune' and 'tone', as a term for
qualisign.
3) >>>> BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves
"relations", on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you; I mean I
sometimes have trouble following what you say.
>>> EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms.
>> BEN: No, and you've never provided an example of his so expressing himself.
> EDWINA: I've given numerous examples of Peirce using the terms of 'relation'
> to refer to the interactions/connections within the semiosic triad; eg, to
> repeat yet again, 8.335, "in respect to their relations to their dynamic
> objects'....
BEN: That's not what I denied. I said "your generally calling relatives or
correlates themselves 'relations', on the other hand, makes it difficult for me
to read you...."
And you just said back in (2a): " the ten classes of signs are defined by their
relations. I didn't say that they 'are the relations defined'."
Now here's the quote that you cite:
CP 8.335. In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I divide
signs into Icons, Indices, and Symbols (a division I gave in 1867). I define an
Icon as a sign which is determined by its dynamic object by virtue of its own
internal nature. Such is any qualisign, like a vision, — or the sentiment
excited by a piece of music considered as representing what the composer
intended. Such may be a sinsign, like an individual diagram; say a curve of the
distribution of errors. I define an Index as a sign determined by its dynamic
object by virtue of being in a real relation to it. Such is a Proper Name (a
legisign); such is the occurrence of a symptom of a disease. (The symptom
itself is a legisign, a general type of a definite character. The occurrence in
a particular case is a sinsign.) I define a Symbol as a sign which is
determined by its dynamic object only in the sense that it will be so
interpreted. It thus depends either upon a convention, a habit, or a natural
disposition of its interpretant or of the field of its interpretant (that of
which the interpretant is a determination). Every symbol is necessarily a
legisign; for it is inaccurate to call a replica of a legisign a symbol.
[End quote]
As you say in (2a), he classifies them in respect of their relations and not as
said relations themselves.`
6) > EDWINA: See my examples above; I don't think your rewriting the above is
'the answer'! He also will sometimes capitalize other terms (Symbol, Icon,
Index, Representamen) and at other times, use lower case.
It was 'the answer' for the quote that you chose to cite. You're the one who
said "And often, he'll refer to the whole triad as lower case 'sign' (see
2.243)!". You have provided no example where he uses either uncapitalized
'sign' or capitalized 'Sign' to mean the whole triad, much less a quote where
he stipulates that he is doing so. Replacing instances of 'sign' with 'triad'
shows that your interpretation of CP 2.243 doesn't work.
5) > EDWINA: I'm sure you know that he often refers to the whole triad in lower
case; 'the readiest characteristic test showing whether a sign is a Dicisign or
not...' 2.310.
"Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an
object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant
becoming in turn a sign" 2.303. And see 8.334--
I don't see it there in any of those quotes. Let's try the substitution test
with the text that you cite from CP 2.303. It is Peirce's definition of 'sign'
in the Baldwin Dictionary,
§4. Sign
303. Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an
object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant
becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum.
[End quote, redness added]
Substituting with 'triad' in the sense of 'representamen-object-interpretant'
triad':
§4. Triad
303. Anything which determines something else (the triad's interpretant) to
refer to an object to which the triad itself refers (the triad's object) in the
same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a triad, and so on ad infinitum.
The representamen-object-interpretant triad determines something _else_, which
is the triad's interpretant?
EDWINA: Yes - As you know, a triad (Sign) does connect to something else...
another Sign and so on ad infinitum...
-------------
And again I wonder what are the classes of representamina inside those triads.
Are they of the same classes as the triads? If so, then what is gained by
calling the whole triad the 'Sign' and classifying it the same way as the
representamen?
EDWINA: I have no idea what you mean by 'class of representamina'.
Representamens exist within the categorical modes. Not classes. And I
certainly don't classify the whole triad (the Sign) in the same way as the
Representamen. After all, consier a Rhematic Indexical Legisign; it has THREE
categorical modes within it, in order, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.
Let's try it with another text that you cite:
CP 8.334. As it is in itself, a sign is either of the nature of an appearance,
when I call it a _qualisign_; or secondly, it is an individual object or event,
when I call it a _sinsign_ (the syllable _sin_ being the first syllable of
_sem_el, _sim_ul, _sin_gular, etc.); or thirdly, it is of the nature of a
general type, when I call it a _legisign_. [....]
[End quote, redness added]
Replacing 'sign' with 'triad' in the sense of
'representamen-object-interpretant triad':
As it is in itself, a triad is either of the nature of an appearance, when I
call the triad a _qualisign_; or secondly, the triad is an individual object or
event, when I call the triad a _sinsign_ (the syllable _sin_ being the first
syllable of _sem_el, _sim_ul, _sin_gular, etc.); or thirdly, the triad is of
the nature of a general type, when I call the triad a _legisign_. [....]
Best, Ben
On 12/17/2014 4:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Thanks for your comments - see mine below.
1) EDWINA: I prefer the term 'relation' because it implies (at least to me) the
idea of active interaction, while the 'stands as/for/to' implies (at least to
me) the idea of static, mechanical cut-and-paste
[End quote]
Then substitute 'represents' for 'stands'. Stylistic question merely.
EDWINA: No- 'represents' is, to me, conceptually similar. To me, semiosis is a
transformative process; it doesn't just replace 'x' with 'y'. It actually takes
data from X (let's say, a food source for a cell) and transforms it within the
Sign (the cell) , to a new 'bit' of information (a component of that cell).
2) You wrote,
EDWINA:That is, at least to me, what I do when I refer to the same three
trichotomies and I use the same term as Peirce 'relation'.
BEN: Peirce says that the classes of signs are defined by relations, not that
they are themselves the relations defined. A dicisign _is_ a sign of a certain
class, defined by said sign's relation to interpretant. If something is related
to something, it does not consist merely in that relation, any more than
something's having a quality makes it consist merely in that quality. Something
is blue, that doesn't make the thing be blueness. The being of each correlate
is not confined to the abstracted semiotic relation but instead has roots into
the world which give semiosis something to do, to learn, to explore. Otherwise
semiosis is sealed in a bubble.
EDWINA: I agree; the ten classes of signs are defined by their relations. I
didn't say that they 'are the relations defined'. A dicisign is a triad and I
understand that it is defined by the whole Sign's relation to BOTH the object
and the interpretant - which is why it is understood as 'conveying information'
(2.309--). I don't think that the term 'relation' can be reduced to a 'state'
(which is what 'quality' is); the term 'relation', to me, means an interaction.
I don't think that 'blue' is in itself a relation.
That's exactly my point with semiosis - that it is not 'sealed in a bubble' but
is a CAS, a complex adaptive system, a network of transformative interactions.
3) You wrote:
BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves "relations", on
the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you; I mean I sometimes have
trouble following what you say.
EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms.
No, and you've never provided an example of his so expressing himself.
EDWINA: I've given numerous examples of Peirce using the terms of 'relation' to
refer to the interactions/connections within the semiosic triad; eg, to repeat
yet again, 8.335, "in respect to their relations to their dynamic objects'....
4) You wrote,
EDWINA: Jack, who is not the father of Jackson, does not exist within the
Relation of Being The Father of Jackson . But Jack exists only within some
other Relation - even if it is just air and water.
Even better. In a sense - in a sense- the relates always come into being with
the relation. But, as I said, semiosis doesn't occur in a bubble, things from
outside a particular semiosis can enter into a particular semiosis, and be
called into being as 'Jackson-as-index' etc.
The clarity problem remains that, for instance, a dicent indexical sinsign is a
sinsign that also _i_ an index that also _is_ a dicisign. One sign _is_ all
three at once. Yet the dicent relation _is not_ the indexical relation, and
each of them _is not_ the sinsign relation. This sort of thing makes my head
hurt. You're creating unneeded problems with 'A is A'.
EDWINA: A dicent indexical sinsign (each relation in a mode of Secondness). One
Sign (capital S) is 'all three at once'. Yes - exactly, the dicent relation is
not the indexical relation - I fully agree - which is why I refer to it
separately (as one of the three).
5) You wrote, "And often, he'll refer to the whole triad as lower case 'sign'
(see 2.243)!"
CP 2.243 shows him doing just the opposite.
[CP2.243.] Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the
sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law;
secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its object consists in the
sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that
object, or in its relation to an interpretant; thirdly, according as its
Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a
sign of reason.
[End quote, reddish colorations added]
If you were correct about the quote, then Peirce would be mean, replacing
'sign' with 'triad,' by which is to be understood
'representamen-object-interpretant triad
EDWINA: I'm sure you know that he often refers to the whole triad in lower
case; 'the readiest characteristic test showing whether a sign is a Dicisign or
not...' 2.310.
"Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an
object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant
becoming in turn a sign" 2.303. And see 8.334--
6) BEN:Triads are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the
triad in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law;
secondly according as the relation of the triad to its object consists in the
triad's having some character in itself or in some existential relation to that
object, or in the triad's relation to an interpretant; thirdly, according as
the triad's interpretant represents the triad as a triad of possibility or as a
triad of fact or as a triad of reason.
EDWINA: See my examples above; I don't think your rewriting the above is 'the
answer'! He also will sometimes capitalize other terms (Symbol, Icon, Index,
Representamen) and at other times, use lower case.
Best, Ben
On 12/17/2014 3:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Thanks for your comments, Ben. I'll add a few.
1) BEN: How something stands as a sign (for an object to an interpretant) :
qualisign, sinsign, legisign.
How (something as) a sign stands for an object (to an interpretant) :
icon, index, symbol.
How (something as) a sign (for an object) stands to an interpretant :
rheme, dicisign, index.
EDWINA: I'd define the first set as Mediation - a term Peirce uses frequently.
And the second set as the "relations to their dynamic objects" 8.335. And the
third set as "its relation to its signified interpretant" 8.337.
That is, I'm using Peirce's terms of 'relation', not 'stands as/stands
for/stands to'. I prefer the term 'relation' because it implies (at least to
me) the idea of active interaction, while the 'stands as/for/to' implies (at
least to me) the idea of static, mechanical cut-and-paste.
2) You wrote:
BEN: E.g., a rheme is a sign whose signified interpretant represents it as (or
as if it were) a character attributed or imputed to an object.
EDWINA: What bothers me about the above is that it implies (to me) the need for
an agent who does the 'attribution' or 'imputation'. I prefer Peirce's
description of the rheme as "a Sign of qualitative Possibility.....any
Rheme...will afford some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so"
2.250. That is, your description includes some 'attribution' of information,
but I don't think a rheme does that.
3) You wrote:
BEN:On the other hand, I see nothing objectionable about it if the relations
that you discuss, and the variant formulations that I've just discussed, are
considered merely as abstractions from the triadic relation for the sake of
focus.
EDWINA: As Peirce said, "signs are divisible by three trichotomies' 2.243 - and
he outlines them, within the three categories, and, within the relations to the
object and the interpretant: 'the relation of the sign to its object...;
according as its Interpretant represents it...
That is, at least to me, what I do when I refer to the same three trichotomies
and I use the same term as Peirce 'relation'. They are indeed, analytic
abstractions from the full triadic Sign. As I've said numerous times - these
'relations' can't exist per se on their own. But they certainly do 'exist' in
analysis - otherwise - we wouldn't be able to analyze the ten classes of Signs!
4) You wrote:
BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves "relations", on
the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you; I mean I sometimes have
trouble following what you say.
EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms.
5) You wrote:
BEN: Yet in particular cases they often do exist without the relations. Is Jack
the father of Jackson? Jack may not be a father at all, yet still exist
EDWINA: Jack, who is not the father of Jackson, does not exist within the
Relation of Being The Father of Jackson . But Jack exists only within some
other Relation - even if it is just air and water.
6) The reason I prefer to use the capital 'S' when referring to the triad, is
to differentiate it from the many times when Peirce refers to the Representamen
as the 'sign' (lower case). And often, he'll refer to the whole triad as lower
case 'sign' (see 2.243)!
Many thanks for your triadic three cents worth. Much appreciated.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Benjamin Udell
Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; 'Peirce-L'
Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 2:31 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations
Edwina, lists,
I haven't read the whole thread, but...
I think that it's true that many of us have discussed the sign relations quasi-
or pseudo-dyadically for convenience, for example, in the _trikonic _ (2004)
PowerPoint presentation, slide 42, discussing the
9-adic Sign Relations:
as to the sign itself:
qualisign (tone)
▷ legisign (type)
sinsign (token)
as to the interpretant:
rheme ([e.g.,] propositional function)
▷ ▷ argument
dicisign ([e.g.,] proposition)
as to the object:
icon
▷ symbol
index
In each case one is really discussing a triad with something as a sign for
something as an object to something as an interpretant, but there are three
places in there where we trichotomize, playing down some aspects of the triadic
relation in order to focus on others:
How something stands as a sign (for an object to an interpretant) :
qualisign, sinsign, legisign.
How (something as) a sign stands for an object (to an interpretant) :
icon, index, symbol.
How (something as) a sign (for an object) stands to an interpretant :
rheme, dicisign, index.
This playing down has its limits. In particular, the third trichotomy (rheme,
dicisign, argument) depends on how the sign is represented, in its signified
interpretant, as, or as if, character, indexical, or sign of intepretant) of
the object. E.g., a rheme is a sign whose signified interpretant represents it
as (or as if it were) a character attributed or imputed to an object.
So, one could as well say that, among the trichotomies:
The first trichotomy (qualisign, sinsign, legisign)
depends on how a sign stands (or how something stands as a sign).
The second trichotomy (icon, index, symbol)
depends on how a sign stands for an object .
The third trichotomy (rheme, dicisign, argument)
depends on how a sign stands for an object to an interpretant .
But we wouldn't actually think that the first trichotomy involves a trio of
monadic characters, the second involves a trio of two-correlate relations, and
the third a trio of three-correlate relations.
On the other hand, I see nothing objectionable about it if the relations that
you discuss, and the variant formulations that I've just discussed, are
considered merely as abstractions from the triadic relation for the sake of
focus.
Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves "relations", on the
other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you; I mean I sometimes have
trouble following what you say.
You object that to speak of the correlates as correlated things rather than as
relations implies that they would exist without the relations. Yet in
particular cases they often do exist without the relations. Is Jack the father
of Jackson? Jack may not be a father at all, yet still exist. Then Jackson may
not be an index of Jack at all, yet still exist. Jackson will surely be an
index of other people and things, of course. Generally of course it is hard to
conceive of things in general without conceiving of representational relation
in general.
The distinction between correlates and relations helps us focus flexibly on
various aspects of the phenomenon, including when the correlates are real but
not individually existent, and even when a correlate is a figment. Now,
flexibility of focus thanks to potential precision justifies speaking of the
'relations' and the 'relation', which you like to be able to do. It also
justifies and, I'd say, requires, distinguishing relative (or correlate) from
relation, even if the relative were called into being entirely by the relation.
As regards speaking of the semiotic triad as the capital-S 'Sign', I seem to
disagree with an increasing number of people about this. Not only do I see
nowhere Peirce doing this, it seems like a bad move terminologically - it is at
odds with everyday-English word 'sign'; I think that such an everyday-English
word should not be pressed into service as term of art for a technical
conception that has no everyday-English word approximating to it.
I would suggest that the semiotic triad, a.k.a. genuine triad, be called a
'eutriad.'
The eutriad would 'consist' or however one wants to put it, of the three
correlates, their triadic relation, and the relations abstracted from the
triadic relation. The genuine triadic relation itself could be called a
'trilation', and the 'members' or relatives having the trilation could be
called the 'trilates' or 'trilatives'. On the other hand, I'm not sure how this
would gibe with finer-grained classifications in which a sign could be
classified by relations to dynamic object, immediate object, etc.
And that's my three cents worth.
Best, Ben
On 12/17/2014 8:20 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
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