I understand -Still, Only an individual, a subject, dependent on societys semiotic processes, can represent with his understanding something about biological realm. Semiotic analysis about X is premodalized by ones understanding on Peirces ideas, for example. Knowledge changes. Thanks for the link.
Kindly, markku Lähetetty Samsungin tablettitietokoneesta -------- Alkuperäinen viesti -------- Lähettäjä: Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> Päivämäärä: 19.12.2014 16.15 (GMT+02:00) Saaja: marccu s <mar...@hotmail.fi>,biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee,peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Aihe: Re: [biosemiotics:7792] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations Markku- I'm not, in my semiosic analysis, referring to what HUMANS are talking about with their metalanguage. I'm talking about the semiosic processes that go on in the biological realm, within the, for example, cell - which has nothing to do with human understanding. Here's a nice analytic site that shows the 'three spokes/Relations of the semiosic sign and explains what is going on. http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/hoffmann/p-sighof.htm Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: marccu s To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu ; Edwina Taborsky Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 6:17 AM Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:7792] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations X can talk about a biochemical process only by some metalangue. Therefore X represents his ideas about bioproc. or for example Peirces ideas by signs. Re-presentation includes human understanding, it is not a mechanical process. Am I wrong? kindly markku sormunen Lähetetty laitteesta Windowsin sähköposti Lähettäjä: Edwina Taborsky Lähetetty: torstai, 18. joulukuuta 2014 21:22 Vast.ott: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee, peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Thanks for your comments, Ben. See mine below, but I think the post is getting messy and incomprehensible with the various post/responses all mixed up. You are probably the only one who will read it and I hope you can figure it out. I'll try colour-coding my current responses. 1) EDWINA: No- 'represents' is, to me, conceptually similar. To me, semiosis is a transformative process; it doesn't just replace 'x' with 'y'. It actually takes data from X (let's say, a food source for a cell) and transforms it within the Sign (the cell) , to a new 'bit' of information (a component of that cell). BEN: So semiosis samples the object data and represents it with a sign. The semiosis arranges for itself to be determined by, and thereby represent, the object. But the _sign_ doesn't sample the object, instead it is a representative sample or representative product of the sample from the object. EDWINA: No, no, I don't see this 'represents the object data with a sign'. That's a linguistic perspective, where a cognitive system, which happens to be linguistic, re-presents what the agent observes (eg, Object: a cat sitting out there) and re-presents that image with the linguistic sign of 'cat'. That, to me, is superficial and hardly acknowledges the strength of Peircean semiosis. What I'm talking about is a biochemical process, where, let's say, a cell (which is a cognitive system) ingests some external data (water, nutrients) (Object) and, semiosically transforms that input data, via its mediative habits-of-organization (the Representamen)...into ..parts of that cell (Interpretant). 2) EDWINA: I agree; the ten classes of signs are defined by their relations. I didn't say that they 'are the relations defined'. A dicisign is a triad and I understand that it is defined by the whole Sign's relation to BOTH the object and the interpretant - which is why it is understood as 'conveying information' (2.309--). BEN: Yet you continually call the representamen a relation. Back on 8/26/2014 you called the difference between correlation and correlative "nitpicking". EDWINA: Yes, it is a Relation-in-Itself. There are three Relations: the one between the Representamen-and-the-Object; the one between the Representamen-and-the-Interpretant; and the Representamen-in-Itself. The Representamen, is 'in itself', because is has a vital function; it mediates between the Object and the Interpretant Relations. And, the Representamen is often (in six) in the mode of Thirdness, which is a mode of generalization, against which particular input data is referenced and 'interpreted'. ------------------------------ From now on, the post/replies/comments...are getting messy. [8/26/2014] >>>> BEN: Again, Peirce calls sign, object, and interpretant the semiotic >>>> correlates, not the semiotic correlations. He typically distinguishes >>>> between representation as the relation or operation of representing, on >>>> one hand, and sign, or representamen, as that which represents, on the >>>> other hand. He never refers to a sign or representamen as a representation >>>> except when he is using the word 'representation' in one of its popular >>>> senses, to mean _something that represents_, as when we say that a >>>> painting is a representation of something, or that somebody made a >>>> representation in court. >>> EDWINA: Agreed - but I think that 'correlates' and 'correlations' is >>> nit-picking. I am aware when he uses the terms 'representamen' and >>> 'representation' and again, I don't think that changes my outline. [End quote] 3) BEN: If a dicisign is a triad (consisting of representamen-object-interpretant) then what class of representamen is in its triad? Another dicisign? A dicent representamen? EDWINA: The representamen in the three dicisigns is not in a class but in a mode; in the Dicent Sinsign, the representamen is in a mode of Secondness, and in the Dicent Indexical Legisign and the Dicent Symbolic Legisign, the representamen is in a mode of Thirdness. And I have the same problem with some of your comments below, regarding the Representamen- where you talk about it as if it were a 'class', while I see it as within a 'mode'. --------------------------------------------- 4) >EDWINA: I don't think that the term 'relation' can be reduced to a 'state' (which is what 'quality' is); the term 'relation', to me, means an interaction. I don't think that 'blue' is in itself a relation. BEN: The point is not confusing the abstraction (quality or relation) with the concrete source. A quality is static if only color, odor, etc. are considered. But there are also rhythm, melody, harmony, qualities of motion and form, etc. Peirce considered 'tuone', a cross between 'tune' and 'tone', as a term for qualisign. 3) >>>> BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves "relations", on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you; I mean I sometimes have trouble following what you say. >>> EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms. >> BEN: No, and you've never provided an example of his so expressing himself. > EDWINA: I've given numerous examples of Peirce using the terms of 'relation' > to refer to the interactions/connections within the semiosic triad; eg, to > repeat yet again, 8.335, "in respect to their relations to their dynamic > objects'.... BEN: That's not what I denied. I said "your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves 'relations', on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you...." And you just said back in (2a): " the ten classes of signs are defined by their relations. I didn't say that they 'are the relations defined'." Now here's the quote that you cite: CP 8.335. In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I divide signs into Icons, Indices, and Symbols (a division I gave in 1867). I define an Icon as a sign which is determined by its dynamic object by virtue of its own internal nature. Such is any qualisign, like a vision, — or the sentiment excited by a piece of music considered as representing what the composer intended. Such may be a sinsign, like an individual diagram; say a curve of the distribution of errors. I define an Index as a sign determined by its dynamic object by virtue of being in a real relation to it. Such is a Proper Name (a legisign); such is the occurrence of a symptom of a disease. (The symptom itself is a legisign, a general type of a definite character. The occurrence in a particular case is a sinsign.) I define a Symbol as a sign which is determined by its dynamic object only in the sense that it will be so interpreted. It thus depends either upon a convention, a habit, or a natural disposition of its interpretant or of the field of its interpretant (that of which the interpretant is a determination). Every symbol is necessarily a legisign; for it is inaccurate to call a replica of a legisign a symbol. [End quote] As you say in (2a), he classifies them in respect of their relations and not as said relations themselves.` 6) > EDWINA: See my examples above; I don't think your rewriting the above is 'the answer'! He also will sometimes capitalize other terms (Symbol, Icon, Index, Representamen) and at other times, use lower case. It was 'the answer' for the quote that you chose to cite. You're the one who said "And often, he'll refer to the whole triad as lower case 'sign' (see 2.243)!". You have provided no example where he uses either uncapitalized 'sign' or capitalized 'Sign' to mean the whole triad, much less a quote where he stipulates that he is doing so. Replacing instances of 'sign' with 'triad' shows that your interpretation of CP 2.243 doesn't work. 5) > EDWINA: I'm sure you know that he often refers to the whole triad in lower case; 'the readiest characteristic test showing whether a sign is a Dicisign or not...' 2.310. "Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign" 2.303. And see 8.334-- I don't see it there in any of those quotes. Let's try the substitution test with the text that you cite from CP 2.303. It is Peirce's definition of 'sign' in the Baldwin Dictionary, §4. Sign 303. Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum. [End quote, redness added] Substituting with 'triad' in the sense of 'representamen-object-interpretant' triad': §4. Triad 303. Anything which determines something else (the triad's interpretant) to refer to an object to which the triad itself refers (the triad's object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a triad, and so on ad infinitum. The representamen-object-interpretant triad determines something _else_, which is the triad's interpretant? EDWINA: Yes - As you know, a triad (Sign) does connect to something else... another Sign and so on ad infinitum... ------------- And again I wonder what are the classes of representamina inside those triads. Are they of the same classes as the triads? If so, then what is gained by calling the whole triad the 'Sign' and classifying it the same way as the representamen? EDWINA: I have no idea what you mean by 'class of representamina'. Representamens exist within the categorical modes. Not classes. And I certainly don't classify the whole triad (the Sign) in the same way as the Representamen. After all, consier a Rhematic Indexical Legisign; it has THREE categorical modes within it, in order, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. Let's try it with another text that you cite: CP 8.334. As it is in itself, a sign is either of the nature of an appearance, when I call it a _qualisign_; or secondly, it is an individual object or event, when I call it a _sinsign_ (the syllable _sin_ being the first syllable of _sem_el, _sim_ul, _sin_gular, etc.); or thirdly, it is of the nature of a general type, when I call it a _legisign_. [....] [End quote, redness added] Replacing 'sign' with 'triad' in the sense of 'representamen-object-interpretant triad': As it is in itself, a triad is either of the nature of an appearance, when I call the triad a _qualisign_; or secondly, the triad is an individual object or event, when I call the triad a _sinsign_ (the syllable _sin_ being the first
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