Dear Michael, lists, Thank you for a whole essay on markedness - a great essay. I certainly agree with the importance of Jakobson's ideas about assymmetry relations as central to language - as well as with his insistence that semantic issues should receive priority.
It is not completely correct, however, that I have not adressed these issues (certainly not in the NP now discussed, but I did spend a chapter of Diagrammatology on it (ch. 7 on mereology)), Michael may be right I did not go far enough in that direction. My argument there was that Jakobson's markedness doctrine is motivated by mereology (the asymmetry between part and whole) and thus comparable to (and probably inspired by) Husserl's dependency calculus of the 3rd Logical Investigation as well as to Peirce's attempt at a dependency calculus of the 1-2-3 categories (this is developed a bit in ch. 11 of that book). I still have an uncompleted pet project of taking this investigation further to cover also Hjelmslev's vast extension of markedness (he strongly disagreed with Jakobsonian binarism and made a more complex taxonomy of many different types of opposition) … maybe there is some undiscovered gold to be found there … I hope to get around to this someday … Best F Den 17/12/2014 kl. 03.44 skrev Michael Shapiro <poo...@earthlink.net<mailto:poo...@earthlink.net>>: Doug, Gary, Apropos of diagrammatization in language, there is now a considerable body of work done in a Peircean mode that Stjernefelt does not take account of in either of his books, and this is understandable in view of the fact that he is not a linguist. At the risk of losing most of the participants, perhaps the discussion can be enhanced by taking the following methodological considerations into account. What needs underscoring first is the role of asymmetry in the manifestation of linguistic signs, specifically in its conceptual bond with complementarity and markedness. The unequal evaluation of the terms of oppositions in language has been an important notion of linguistic theorizing since at least the heyday of the Prague School’s chief Russian representatives––Trubetzkoy, Jakobson, and Karcevskij. The clearest early expression of its role is in Jakobson, when he characterized the asymmetry of correlative grammatical forms in morphology as two antinomies: (1) between the signalization and non-signalization of A; and (2) between the non-signalization of A and the signalization of non-A. In the first case, two signs referring to the same objective reality differ in semiotic value, in that the signatum of one of the signs specifies a certain ‘mark’ A of this reality, while the meaning of the other makes no such specification. In the second case, the antinomy is between general and special meaning of the unmarked term, where the meaning of the latter can fluctuate between leaving the content of the ‘mark’ A unspecified (neither positing nor negating it) and specifying the meaning of the unmarked term as an absence. In focusing on the paradigmatic asymmetry of linguistic signs expressed by the polar semiotic values of marked and unmarked (superimposed on oppositions in phonology, grammar, and lexis), the early structuralists appear to have glossed over a cardinal syntagmatic consequence of markedness: complementarity. If the conceptual system which underlies and informs grammar (and language broadly conceived) consists of opposite-valued signs and sign complexes, then whatever syntagmatic coherence linguistic phenomena have in their actual manifestation must likewise be informed by principles of organization diagrammatic of this underlying asymmetry. The only aspect of the asymmetric nature of linguistic opposition that allows access to structural coherence is the complementarity of the terms of the asymmetry, the markedness values. The systematic relatability of the complementary entities and of their semiotic values is assured by the binary nature of all opposition, which balances the asymmetry of the axiological superstructure by furnishing the system of relations with the symmetry needed for the identification and perpetuation of linguistic units by learners and users. Moreover, in explaining the cohesions between form and meaning complementation of markedness values is seen to be the dominant mode of semiosis––so much so that replication is confined to the structure of desinences and the expression of further undifferentiated members of the hierarchy of categories. Given the common understanding of undifferentiated contexts, statuses, and categories as marked in value (Brøndal’s principle of compensation), it is clear that replication is itself the marked (more narrowly defined) principle of semiosis, vis-à-vis its unmarked (less narrowly defined) counterpart, complementation. Complementation actually has two aspects or modes of manifestation, which are semiotically distinct and need to be understood as such. The more usual effect of complementation, well-known in linguistic analysis, is the distribution of phonetic properties in complementary but mutually exclusive contexts. This widespread fact of language structure serves as a diagnostic in the determination of the non-distinctiveness of a particular feature, so that, e.g., the complementary distribution of short and long vowel realizations in English before obstruents indicates the non-phonemic status of quantity The general effect of variation rules is augmented by their correlation of complementary phonetic properties with specific contexts. More significantly, it has been discovered that the assignment of particular properties to particular contexts is governed by a universal semiotic principle of markedness assimilation, which assigns the unmarked value of an opposition to the unmarked context and the marked value of an opposition to the marked context. Complementary distribution can thus be understood as the semiotic instantiation of markedness assimilation. It is not difficult to perceive that this first, familiar sense of complementation is a manifestation of symmetry, since ‘variation rules ... transform relations of similarity––equivalence in markedness––into relations of contiguity in phonetic realization’ . What has not been perceived, however, is that this form of complementation is peculiarly characteristic of the expression system of language (phonology, phonetics). By contrast, the morphophonemic system of a language largely eschews the symmetrical, replicative patterns of semiosis which are favored by phonology. Indeed, morphophonemics systematically exploits a second, less-studied form of complementation; this is antisymmetrical in its effects, as an inversion, and can accordingly be called chiastic. The predominant use of chiastic complementation is perfectly consistent with the semiotic nature of morphophonemics, which is the part of grammar that is constituted by the ‘relations between the contextual variants of the same linguistic sign(s)’ and is contrasted with morphology, constituted by the ‘relations between [basic] linguistic signs’ . The fact that morphophonemics permits chiasmus is, in other words, in complete alignment with its function: the manifestation of morphological alternation. Conversely, the prevalence of symmetrical modes of semiosis in the specification of the basic signs of morphology accords with the semiotic status of morphological units. Thus, when the constitution of hierarchically independent (invariant) entities in grammar is at issue, correspondences which reflect relations of the content level (grammatical meaning) in the relations of the expression level (sounds) function as iconic signs. More precisely, they are a variety oficon (or hypoicon in Peirce’s trichotomous classification, which Peirce called metaphors and defined as ‘those which represent the representative character of a representamen [= sign] by representing a parallelism in something else’ (emphasis mine). This idiosyncratic understanding of metaphor, reflected in Peirce’s typically crabbed diction, seems to imply that the more familiar kind of hypoicon––the diagram (image being the third)––is a more general species of sign which subsumes parallelistic semiosis (replication of relational values) and chiastic semiosis (alternation of relational values) as variants. If this is so, then the metaphoric relations of parallelism entail the characterization of the relations contracted by chiasmus as metonymic, because of the status of antisymmetry as a species of metonymy via its negational quotient . The invocation of a framework based on markedness, to explain the coherence of linguistic entities syntagmatically, also implies the ineluctable and necessary consideration of these entities as signs, as parts of a semiotic. Heretofore, things like verb stems and desinences, including their positional shapes and alternants, have been looked upon simply as artifacts of description which facilitate an economical, mutually consistent statement of distributional facts; but the semiotic analysis presented here rests on the fundamental assumption that all these linguistic units have values––markedness values––which vary coherently and uniformly in alignment with contexts and the values (hierarchy) of contexts. The fusion of stems and desinences owes its coherence, its semiotic raison d’être, to the form of the meaning on both sides of the expression/content ‘solidarity’, to what Hjelmslev so astutely called ‘content-form’ and distinguished from ‘expression- form’. The coherence of linguistic units among each other is by no means a static one, for we have incontrovertible empirical evidence that languages change over time. But the fact of change must be correctly understood as a dynamic based on teleology, where the telos is greater goodness of fit (iconicity, coherence) between underlying structure and its overt manifestation in speech. The picture of contemporary Russian conjugation, for example, and of its system differs strikingly little from that of Old Russian , i. e. from the state of the language with respect to verb inflection dating as long ago as 900-1000 years! Given such a long span for testing, encompassing vast upheavals in the morphophonemics of Russian, we have every reason to suppose that present-day conjugation has a teleological coherence which has given shape to it diachronically, and which enables it to subsist in its present form synchronically. Finally, note should be taken of the prominence given by linguistic analysis done in a Peircean mode to the hermeneutic aspect of linguistic theory, and its application as explanans of concrete data. In this respect, appeals to cognitive linguistics produce no advance over neo-structuralist thinking done with a semeiotic understanding of language. Indeed, explanation cannot be achieved by the prevailing self-confinement to goals that are fundamentally (if unwittingly) non-explanatory. The rule-formalism approach of transformational-generative grammarians and of all their latter-day progeny may or may not demonstrate anything about ‘a speaker’s knowledge of his language’, but it is fundamentally irrelevant for linguistic theory whether it does or does not because a theory of grammar is not a theory of knowledge but a theory of habit (in the sense of Peirce). Explanation must focus on why the data cohere as signs, and not on the mechanisms by which grammatical forms can be derived by the judicious choice and application of rules. This requirement removes predictability-via-rules from the agenda of theory. The entire recent history of linguistics shows with great clarity the feasibility of kneading data into a wide number of mutually-compatible formalized configurations (‘notational variants’). What is needed, however, is an attitude toward the object of study which matches the structure of that object. Language is a system, both in its diachronic and synchronic aspects, that is informed by a pattern of inferences, deductive and abductive. The role allotted to interpretation in language as a structure––to its very nature and function as a hermeneutic object––demands that the methods of inquiry into and the theory of language be homologous with the principles of its organization. It is this very nature of language itself, the inherent organization of grammar as a patterned relationship between form and meaning, that necessitates transposing the theoretical enterprise of linguistics to another dimension, one defined by the subsumption of all linguistic analysis under the rubric of meaning or hermeneutic. As Jakobson himself put it: ‘Any linguistic item, from speech sounds and their constituents to discourse, partakes—each in its own way––in the cardinal, viz. semantic, tasks of language and must be interpreted with respect to its significative value.’ Michael -----Original Message----- From: Douglas Hare Sent: Dec 16, 2014 4:48 PM To: Cc: "biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>" , Peirce-L Subject: Re: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Stjernfelt Seminar: Chapter 7, Dicisigns Beyond Language ~ 7.1 7.5 Diagrams in Linguistics In the final section of Chapter 7, language emerges from the Dicisign doctrine as diagrammatical tool combining “loosely coupled parts” in order to serve as a representing and reasoning organ with potentially “universal” application. Using the premiss that diagrams are responsible for all deductive reasoning, we can then produce an account of how ordinary language possesses 'diagrammaticity' at the very least in its ability to encode logical inferences in the form of syllogisms. But if the difference between language and pictorial representations is a diagrammatical matter of degree (measure of iconicity), not a difference of kind, then the Herculean tasks of reinterpreting the “levels” of natural language into their diagrammatic forms and figuring out how to measure gradations within natural language as well as with other iconic forms of signification appear before us. Later chapters might clarify why Peirce's Existential Graphs remain a valuable instrument for both ostensibly Sisyphean endeavors. But ignoring the Alpha and Beta Graphs for now, many recent cognitive linguists cited by the author seem to agree that the logical connectors of propositional logic, the linguistic quantifiers of first order predicate logic, and other more basic structures of grammar allow for possible topological formalization(s). Recall that for Peirce, Dicisigns are formed with icon rhemes and their saturation by means of index rhemes. The cognitive linguist would agree that sentences are formed by predicates and their saturation by means of subjects. To wit: “A basic tendency seems to be that the distinction between grammar and morphology on the one hand, and lexical semantics on the other roughly corresponds to diagrams pertaining to formal and material ontologies, respectively” (NP, 196). If iconic structures can be found in the form of conjunctions and sentence structures as well as the the multiplicity of structures of rhemes/predicates themselves, grammatical transformations contain logical content, and more broadly grammar and morphology will generally contain discoverable implicit formal-material ontologies while lexical semantics can fill in regional ontological information with particulars: adjectives, common nouns, verbs and combinations thereof. Based on underlying forms of diagrammatic reasoning, ordinary language does not remain committed to any particular ontology (because diagrammatic reasoning is not committed to any particular topological framework), even if it acquires variable ontological commitments to objects and relational properties of the universe of discourse in which we engage, which Qualities and Existents we recognize, and how we choose to construct our Arguments. Stjernfelt relates the blurring of the grammar/semantics distinction to Husserl's use of the scholastic distinction between syncategorematica (closed classes)andcategoramatica (open classes), and makes the observation that, in all three accounts, formal ontologies are produced that contain subclasses of formal ontologies such as modal logic, temporal logic, higher order logic on the one hand and high-level material ontological concepts from epistemic logic, deontic logic, speech act logic on the other. The linguist might say that high-level material ontologies include modal verbs, tempus morphemes of verbs, in propositional stances verbs, in speech act verbs,” (NP, 199) but regardless of the terminological variation, the “doubleness of isomorphism and independence recognized between logic, language, and ontology” (NP, 202) is a common thread whereby a gluing (interdependence) between the global/local provided by the Dicisign structure overcomes the structuralist account the arbitrarity of language (usually inferred from the relationship between sounds and words), because “conceived from a diagrammatical point of view, language has two levels, one general, formal, vague, formalized in grammar and closed-class categorematica—and another in lexical semantics and open-class syncategorematic,” (NP, 199) which are open to further investigation. Ordinary language remains 'secular'—not committed to any topological or metaphysical viewpoint ahead of time because the genuine interaction between (what I am calling) the relatively autonomous global/local levels allows for language to remain an ecumenical, indefinitely-extended, self-critical means of information processing. The author closes the chapter with a discussion of Hintikka's identification of two strands of 20th century philosophy, one which views language as universal representation and one which sees it as a calculus. According to the Hintikkan geneaology, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, and even Heidegger and Derrida seem to favor the former approach (language as one reference domain to all reality with privileged semiotic access to the world) while Boole, Peirce Schroder, Hilbert, Husserl, and the late Carnap understand that multiple representational systems with differing degrees of generality, granularity, are quite possible if not necessary to productive inquiry as an open-system which does run up against, in Hintikka's words, “prisonhouse of language hypotheses.” I do not disagree with Stjernfelt's claim that for the model-theoretic tradition considers language as closer to a calculus ratiocinator than a mathesis univseralis but I would contend that Irving Annelis's paper<http://arxiv.org/pdf/1201.0353.pdf> ( c.f. pp. 25-28) offers a more nuanced assessment how these Leibnizian themes are re-appropriated by the late Peirce than that of Hintikka, in my humble opinion. For Peirce, representational pluralism does not conflict with a robust realism given his idea of inquiry as a distinctly communal activity, one in which natural language is able to engage by means of presenting various formalizations which “semiotically triangulate the object,” (NP, 200) and one in which individual inquiry itself engages in a sort of game-theoretic semantics. Given one representational system's ability to assess another, we are not left with the ineffability claims but a science of semantics. Indeed, a careful reading of Chapter 7 offers the reader a deeper understanding of how language remains capable of entertaining universes of discourse which lack logical consistency or logical commitment so we have at our disposal a tool capable of examining and experimenting with the ontologically inconsistent, the vague, the general, and the imaginary. Peirce's 'fallibilistic apriorism' (opposed to Kantian apriorism) is better able to account for the various a priori structures of different material ontologies. Language from the diagrammatic perspective thus resembles a versatile collaboration between different topological considerations found inside, outside, and between conjunctions, grammar, semantics, and their various instantiations. Along with recent developments in Existential Graphs, the trajectory cognitive semantics exposited by Stjernfelt makes a strong case for CSP's continued relevance to diagrammatological linguistics. I would like to close by asking Professor Stjernfelt if he agrees with Francesco Bellucci that the late Peirce saw diagrammatic reasoning containing its own abductive and inductive phases. I look forward to any questions or comments before we begin Chapter 8. Thankfully, Doug ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. 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