Douglas, lists, You wrote: "I learned at the Centennial Conference that Professor Stjernfelt associates the two forms of deduction with secondness, and the three forms of induction with thirdness.
In the 1903 Harvard lectures draft I pointed to, Peirce seems instead to have settled (albeit tentatively) on deduction as associated with 3ns (necessary reasoning) and induction with 2ns. I would encourage anyone interested in this categorial issue (how the categories are associated with the three inference patterns) to read that draft. It shows how Peirce assiduously applies the principle of fallibility to his own research, and just how self-critical he can be. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 8:08 PM, Douglas Hare <ddh...@mail.harvard.edu> wrote: > > Gary R., > > Thanks for the reply. I don't have any brilliant answers at this point, > but there seems to be an immense amount of confusion surrounding Peirce's > theory of the modes of inference and the order of inquiry. I learned at the > Centennial Conference that Professor Stjernfelt associates the two forms of > deduction with secondness, and the three forms of induction with thirdness. > For now, I will await his reply before offering any of my half-baked ideas > on the relationship between these irreducible types of reasoning/stages of > inquiry. > > List, > Please note that among other typos in my last posting, I misspelled the > name of Irving Anellis, and I meant to say that the model-theoretic > tradition's approach to language does **not** run up against prison-house > of language problems (ineffability claims) given the possibilities of > meta-languages. > > Yours, > DH > > On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 7:19 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: >> >> Douglas, lists, >> >> Thank you for this insightful post--you've clearly given considerable >> thought to these matters. Because of time constraints, for now I'd like >> only to respond to your question to Frederik at the conclusion of your post. >> >> DH: I would like to close by asking Professor Stjernfelt if he agrees >> with Francesco Bellucci that the late Peirce saw diagrammatic reasoning >> containing its own abductive and inductive phases. I look forward to any >> questions or comments before we begin Chapter 8. >> >> >> I too would be interested in Frederik's answer to this question. >> Meanwhile, your question did make me think of a comment Peirce made in one >> of the drafts of the 1903 Harvard *Lectures on Pragmatism* which may >> have some, even if small, bearing on the answer to your question. >> >> I have occasionally referred to this draft (see note 3 to Lecture 5, >> 276-7, in Patricia Turrisi's edition of the lectures) to show that Peirce >> had changed his mind (and then changed it back again) as to whether >> deduction should be associated with categorial 2ns or 3ns. Here I would >> note that at the conclusion of this section of the draft lecture that he >> comments that there were some opinions upon which he had *never* changed >> his mind: >> >> One of these is that although Abductive and Inductive reasoning are >> distinctly not reducible to Deductive reasoning, nor either to the other, >> yet the *rationale *of Abduction and of Induction must itself be >> Deductive. All my reflections and self-criticisms have only served to >> strengthen me in this opinion. But if this be so, to state wherein the >> validity of mathematical reasoning consists is to state the ultimate ground >> on which any reasoning must rest (Turrisi, 277). >> >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >> On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 4:48 PM, Douglas Hare <ddh...@mail.harvard.edu> >> wrote: >> >>> 7.5 Diagrams in Linguistics >>> >>> In the final section of Chapter 7, language emerges from the Dicisign >>> doctrine as diagrammatical tool combining "loosely coupled parts" in order >>> to serve as a representing and reasoning organ with potentially "universal" >>> application. Using the premiss that diagrams are responsible for all >>> deductive reasoning, we can then produce an account of how ordinary >>> language possesses 'diagrammaticity' at the very least in its ability to >>> encode logical inferences in the form of syllogisms. But if the difference >>> between language and pictorial representations is a diagrammatical matter >>> of degree (measure of iconicity), not a difference of kind, then the >>> Herculean tasks of reinterpreting the "levels" of natural language into >>> their diagrammatic forms and figuring out how to measure gradations within >>> natural language as well as with other iconic forms of signification appear >>> before us. Later chapters might clarify why Peirce's Existential Graphs >>> remain a valuable instrument for both ostensibly Sisyphean endeavors. But >>> ignoring the Alpha and Beta Graphs for now, many recent cognitive linguists >>> cited by the author seem to agree that the logical connectors of >>> propositional logic, the linguistic quantifiers of first order predicate >>> logic, and other more basic structures of grammar allow for possible >>> topological formalization(s). >>> >>> Recall that for Peirce, Dicisigns are formed with icon rhemes and their >>> saturation by means of index rhemes. The cognitive linguist would agree >>> that sentences are formed by predicates and their saturation by means of >>> subjects. To wit: "A basic tendency seems to be that the distinction >>> between grammar and morphology on the one hand, and lexical semantics on >>> the other roughly corresponds to diagrams pertaining to formal and material >>> ontologies, respectively" (NP, 196). If iconic structures can be found in >>> the form of conjunctions and sentence structures as well as the the >>> multiplicity of structures of rhemes/predicates themselves, grammatical >>> transformations contain logical content, and more broadly grammar and >>> morphology will generally contain discoverable implicit formal-material >>> ontologies while lexical semantics can fill in regional ontological >>> information with particulars: adjectives, common nouns, verbs and >>> combinations thereof. Based on underlying forms of diagrammatic reasoning, >>> ordinary language does not remain committed to any particular ontology >>> (because diagrammatic reasoning is not committed to any particular >>> topological framework), even if it acquires variable ontological >>> commitments to objects and relational properties of the universe of >>> discourse in which we engage, which Qualities and Existents we recognize, >>> and how we choose to construct our Arguments. >>> >>> Stjernfelt relates the blurring of the grammar/semantics distinction to >>> Husserl's use of the scholastic distinction between *syncategorematica* >>> (closed classes)and *categoramatica* (open classes), and makes the >>> observation that, in all three accounts, formal ontologies are produced >>> that contain subclasses of formal ontologies such as modal logic, temporal >>> logic, higher order logic on the one hand and high-level material >>> ontological concepts from epistemic logic, deontic logic, speech act logic >>> on the other. The linguist might say that high-level material ontologies >>> include modal verbs, tempus morphemes of verbs, in propositional stances >>> verbs, in speech act verbs," (NP, 199) but regardless of the terminological >>> variation, the "doubleness of isomorphism and independence recognized >>> between logic, language, and ontology" (NP, 202) is a common thread whereby >>> a gluing (interdependence) between the global/local provided by the >>> Dicisign structure overcomes the structuralist account the arbitrarity of >>> language (usually inferred from the relationship between sounds and words), >>> because "conceived from a diagrammatical point of view, language has two >>> levels, one general, formal, vague, formalized in grammar and closed-class >>> categorematica--and another in lexical semantics and open-class >>> syncategorematic," (NP, 199) which are open to further investigation. >>> Ordinary language remains 'secular'--not committed to any topological or >>> metaphysical viewpoint ahead of time because the genuine interaction >>> between (what I am calling) the relatively autonomous global/local levels >>> allows for language to remain an ecumenical, indefinitely-extended, >>> self-critical means of information processing. >>> >>> The author closes the chapter with a discussion of Hintikka's >>> identification of two strands of 20th century philosophy, one which >>> views language as universal representation and one which sees it as a >>> calculus. According to the Hintikkan geneaology, Frege, Russell, >>> Wittgenstein, Quine, and even Heidegger and Derrida seem to favor the >>> former approach (language as one reference domain to all reality with >>> privileged semiotic access to the world) while Boole, Peirce Schroder, >>> Hilbert, Husserl, and the late Carnap understand that multiple >>> representational systems with differing degrees of generality, granularity, >>> are quite possible if not necessary to productive inquiry as an open-system >>> which does run up against, in Hintikka's words, "prisonhouse of language >>> hypotheses." I do not disagree with Stjernfelt's claim that for the >>> model-theoretic tradition considers language as closer to a *calculus >>> ratiocinator* than a *mathesis univseralis* but I would contend that >>> Irving Annelis's *paper <http://arxiv.org/pdf/1201.0353.pdf>* ( c.f. >>> pp. 25-28) offers a more nuanced assessment how these Leibnizian themes are >>> re-appropriated by the late Peirce than that of Hintikka, in my humble >>> opinion. >>> >>> For Peirce, representational pluralism does not conflict with a robust >>> realism given his idea of inquiry as a distinctly communal activity, one in >>> which natural language is able to engage by means of presenting various >>> formalizations which "semiotically triangulate the object," (NP, 200) and >>> one in which individual inquiry itself engages in a sort of game-theoretic >>> semantics. Given one representational system's ability to assess another, >>> we are not left with the ineffability claims but a science of semantics. >>> Indeed, a careful reading of Chapter 7 offers the reader a deeper >>> understanding of how language remains capable of entertaining universes of >>> discourse which lack logical consistency or logical commitment so we have >>> at our disposal a tool capable of examining and experimenting with the >>> ontologically inconsistent, the vague, the general, and the imaginary. >>> Peirce's 'fallibilistic apriorism' (opposed to Kantian apriorism) is better >>> able to account for the various *a priori* structures of different >>> material ontologies. Language from the diagrammatic perspective thus >>> resembles a versatile collaboration between different topological >>> considerations found inside, outside, and between conjunctions, grammar, >>> semantics, and their various instantiations. Along with recent developments >>> in Existential Graphs, the trajectory cognitive semantics exposited by >>> Stjernfelt makes a strong case for CSP's continued relevance to >>> diagrammatological linguistics. >>> >>> I would like to close by asking Professor Stjernfelt if he agrees with >>> Francesco Bellucci that the late Peirce saw diagrammatic reasoning >>> containing its own abductive and inductive phases. I look forward to any >>> questions or comments before we begin Chapter 8. >>> >>> Thankfully, >>> >>> Doug >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >>
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