Janos, list I can see a large bowl of soup with many ingredients determining a continuous range of qualities and flavors, some of which overlap and "legislate" the subsequent flavors for an interpretant which moves to stir the bowl a bit or inhale through the nostrils, recognizing that the dominant "idea" is in need of adjustment. ( a sort of "Platonic Idea" bringing about an energetic interpretant. both related to a causal object. Jim W > Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2015 13:08:58 +0100 > From: ja...@cs.ru.nl > To: PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign > > Dear list, > > Thank you for your reactions so far. Unless I missed something, as yet > the nature of a relation between triadic sign and qualitative change has > not been fully explained. On 01/29/15 John wrote: "irreducible triads as > not fully computable, and hence inherently open-ended", which points in > the direction of a possible compatibility of the two concepts. For an > illustration of my view, that the relation between the two concepts can > be a relation of equivalence, I found a cognitive perspective helpful. > > Following cognitive theory, human processing is triggered by an > appearing quality. This quality or stimulus, which is a potential sign > (cf. representamen), must be a 1st. The stimulus or input qualia (which > are an internal representation of qualities) is triggering memory. The > arising memory response, which is in relation with the stimulus, must be > a 2nd. The generated thought or motor reaction, which is in a triadic > relation with simulus and memory response (cf. sign), must be a 3rd. > Note that in this model of human processing the appearing > quality/stimulus/potential sign/representamen is assumed to function as > an effect, not as a state. > > The arising thought must be a quality (it may trigger a next > interpretation cycle) that must be different from stimulus and memory > response. Hence it must be (or involve) a qualitative change. > > Best regards, > Janos > > > On 01/28/2015 08:18 AM, John Collier wrote: > > > > Dear list, > > > > If you want to look at the representamen as dynamical (which I am > > pretty sure that Perice sanctions (I don't have relevant quotes > > handy), then it is, I would think, a state, not a process. To be a > > process it has to change its state, but it does not. I am pretty sure > > that Edwina has said nothing that implies anything different, so > > contrary to Sung, and perhaps Gary, there is agreement on this. > > > > I see no need for introducing extraneous factors to Peirce's theory of > > signs to make sense of this. However interesting they might be, they > > are not essential. IN particular I find complementarity here to have > > no explanatory power. At best it merely restates something that can be > > understood more directly (such as that each abstraction such as a > > representamen, has a dynamical correlate. > > > > > > John > > > > *From:*sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *On > > Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji > > *Sent:* January 28, 2015 5:02 AM > > *To:* PEIRCE-L > > *Cc:* biosemiotics > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign > > > > Gary R wrote: > > > > ""The Representamen functions. . . as a process"? /Semiosis/ may > > perhaps be seen as a process, but the Representamen? Maybe this is > > required by your input-mediation-output wff version of semiosis, but I > > know of no one else who sees it like this, the representamen as "an > > active. . .process that abstracts and generalizes and uses these > > generalizations to 'interpret' the incoming sensate data from the > > object." > > > > Now, it seems significant, from a semiotic point of view, that two > > eminent experts on Peircean semiotics should disagree on the meaning > > of as basic a term as "representamen" and its relation to Firstness. > > Would this perhaps support the suggested PIRPUS (Principle of the > > Insufficiency of Reading Peirce for Understanding Signs) ? Can this > > problem in the Peircean scholarship be remedied by extending the > > mostly 19th-century Peircean theory of signs to include the > > 21st-century principle of complementarity originating from the > > 20th-century physics ? The seed of complementarity may be already > > sown by Peirce in his primitive definition of the sign, in the form of > > what he called the "ground" of the reprsentemen, which may be > > interpreted as the "context" of discourses. This idea may be > > represented as a diagram/algebraic equation: > > > > New (or Extended) Semiotics = Peircean > > Semiotics + Bohr's Complementarity (or Moebius strip) > > (012715-10) > > > > With all the best. > > > > Sung > > > > On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 9:29 PM, Gary Richmond > > <gary.richm...@gmail.com <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > Edwina, list, > > > > Just a few comments interleaved. I was only commenting on one of the > > questions brought about by Janos' post, so I'll only address that below: > > > > ET: 2) I also reject that the Platonic 'idea' is akin to 'qualia' - > > which is how Janos was describing the representamen-in-Firstness. The > > Platonic idea is akin to generalization and that is not the same as > > 'qualia'. Generalizations do indeed have the capacity to 'be possible' > > in actualization. Again, that's not the same as the sensual nature of > > 'qualia'. Therefore, I reject also your view that such Platonism is > > akin to Firstness. I think that two descriptions you provide, of the > > Platonic idea and the 'first universe' are not comparable to each other. > > > > The Platonic 'idea' as Peirce employs it need /not/ be "akin to > > 'qualia'--you make it seem as if 'qualia' exhausted Peirce's > > associations with firstness. Indeed, more primitiveeven than qualities > > is the idea of possibility as 1ns. But, in fact, Peirce offers myriad > > associations and connotations for firstness. Here are some from "A > > Guess at the Riddle" (I've added emphasis to them for quick reference): > > > > The first is that whose being is *simply in itself*/,/ not > > referring to anything nor lying behind anything. . . .(CP 1.356). > > > > The idea of the absolutely first must be entirely separated from > > all conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves > > a second is itself a second to that second. The first must > > therefore be *presen*t and *immediate*, so as not to be second to > > a representation. It must be*fresh* and *new*, for if old it is > > second to its former state. It must be*initiative, original, > > spontaneous*, and *free*; otherwise it is second to a determining > > cause. It is also something *vivid* and *conscious*; so only it > > avoids being the object of some sensation. It *precedes all > > synthesis and all differentiation*; it has *no unity* and *no > > parts*. It *cannot be articulately thought*: assert it, and it has > > already lost its *characteristic innocence*; for assertion always > > implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it > > has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his > > eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become > > conscious of his own existence -- that is *first, present, > > immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, > > vivid, conscious, and evanescent.* /Only, remember that every > > description of it must be false to it /(CP 1.357). > > > > And it is Peirce who says that the sign stands for something to a sort > > of idea "which I have sometimes called the ground of the sign." So if > > you say that you reject that notion of the ground of the representamen > > being understood as a kind of Platonic idea (as you just did) then you > > are rejecting Peirce's understanding of what the representamen is. You > > can do that, of course, but then you perhaps shouldn't be making the > > strong claims that you sometimes that your semiotics is Peircean. So, > > again a snippet from the 1897 passage I earlier quoted: > > > > /CSP: The sign stands for something/, its object. It stands for that > > object, /not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, > > which I have sometimes called the ground /of the representamen. > > */"Idea" is here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense/* > > > > ET: A 'quality or general attribute' is not the same thing as the > > sensate feeling of Firstness. > > > > So, again, I would refer you to the many associations of firstness > > other than "sensate feeling" that I just offered above. > > > > ET: And I disagree that the Representamen functions "as reflecting > > that first Universe of Experience, that is categorial firstness." > > Since the Representamen functions as the mediative process (between > > Object and Interpretant) then it doesn't reflect anything; it is an > > active rather than passive process that abstracts and generalizes and > > uses these generalizations to 'interpret' the incoming sensate data > > from the object. > > > > "The Representamen functions. . .as a process"? /Semiosis/ may perhaps > > be seen as a process, but the Representamen? Maybe this is required by > > your input-mediation-output wff version of semiosis, but I know of no > > one else who sees it like this, the representamen as "an active. . > > .process that abstracts and generalizes and uses these generalizations > > to 'interpret' the incoming sensate data from the object." > > > > That makes no sense to me at all. > > > > Best, > > > > Gary > > > > > > Gary Richmond > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > > > *Communication Studies* > > > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > > *C 745* > > > > *718 482-5690 <tel:718%20482-5690>* > > > > On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 6:25 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca > > <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote: > > > > Just a few comments, Gary R: > > > > 1) I am not saying that the Representamen cannot be in a mode of > > Firstness, but, reject the statement of Janos that "From this I > > conclude that, in sign > > generation, a representamen in the mode of firstness must be involved > > always." I think that this rejects the reality of the 9 classes of > > signs in which the representamen is not in a mode of Firstness. > > > > And I also reject his "In my view any representamen can be interpreted > > as a sign, and can be > > interpreted as a sign of any one of the 10 sign types." I think this > > is a confusion of the meaning of the term of 'sign'. > > > > 2) I also reject that the Platonic 'idea' is akin to 'qualia' - which > > is how Janos was describing the representamen-in-Firstness. The > > Platonic idea is akin to generalization and that is not the same as > > 'qualia'. Generalizations do indeed have the capacity to 'be possible' > > in actualization. Again, that's not the same as the sensual nature of > > 'qualia'. Therefore, I reject also your view that such Platonism is > > akin to Firstness. I think that two descriptions you provide, of the > > Platonic idea and the 'first universe' are not comparable to each other. > > > > A 'quality or general attribute' is not the same thing as the sensate > > feeling of Firstness. > > > > 3) And of course, I don't say " that all three categories may /not > > /occur associated with the ground of the representamen of the sign." > > > > That was my point to Janos - when I said that the ground/representamen > > is NOT always and necessarily only in a mode of Firstness. And I > > disagree that the Representamen functions "as reflecting that first > > Universe of Experience, that is categorial firstness." Since the > > Representamen functions as the mediative process (between Object and > > Interpretant) then it doesn't reflect anything; it is an active rather > > than passive process that abstracts and generalizes and uses these > > generalizations to 'interpret' the incoming sensate data from the object. > > > > Edwina > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > > > *From:*Gary Richmond <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> > > > > *To:*Peirce-L <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > > > > *Cc:*Gary Richmond <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> > > > > *Sent:*Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:27 PM > > > > *Subject:*Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign > > > > Janos, Edwina, list, > > > > There are those of us who do indeed see the representamen as > > Peirce refers to it as "a First," that is as categorial firstness. > > This interpretation is, in good part, based on Peirce's analysis > > of what it is that the representamen can represent, and at > > times--notably in the /New List/, but also elsewhere, such as a > > fragment the CP editors date at ca.1897--that 'something' that can > > be represented in the representamen is analyzed as a kind of > > 'idea' which he terms the *ground*. > > > > For example, in the oft quoted 1897 fragment just mentioned Peirce > > writes: > > > > A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to > > somebody for something /in some respect or capacity./ It > > addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that > > person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. > > That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the > > first sign. /The sign stands for something/, its object. It > > stands for that object, /not in all respects, but in reference > > to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground > > /of the representamen. /"Idea" is here to be understood in a > > sort of Platonic sense/, very familiar in everyday talk; I > > mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches > > another man's idea . . . (emphasis added, CP 2.228). > > > > Here "idea" (in this "sort of Platonic sense") is clearly > > associated with firstness. This will be the case throughout > > Peirce's career as I see it. For example, in the late /Neglected > > Argument/ Peirce gives the character of his three categories in > > these comments on three universes of experience. Interestingly his > > example of "the third Universe" is that of a Sign "which has its > > Being in its power of serving as intermediary between its Object > > and a Mind": > > > > Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, /the > > first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which > > the mind of poet, pure mathematician, or another might give > > local habitation and a name within that mind. Their very > > airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being consists in mere > > capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually > > thinking them/, saves their Reality. The second Universe is > > that of the Brute Actuality of things and facts. I am > > confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute > > forces, notwithstanding objections redoubtable until they are > > closely and fairly examined. The third Universe comprises > > everything whose being consists in active power to establish > > connections between different objects, especially between > > objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is > > essentially a Sign -- not the mere body of the Sign, which is > > not essentially such, but, so to speak, /the Sign's Soul, > > which has its Being in its power of serving as intermediary > > between its Object and a Mind/. Such, too, is a living > > consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a > > plant. Such is a living constitution -- a daily newspaper, a > > great fortune, a social "movement" (emphasis added,CP 6.455). > > > > But what I most want to emphasize here is that this conception of > > a kind of Platonic idea as firstness parallels that in the 1897 > > snippet when Peirce comments that "The sign stands for something, > > its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but > > /in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the > > ground of the representamen/. "Idea" is here to be understood in a > > sort of Platonic sense." > > > > In the /New List/ Peirce refers to this Platonic like idea as "a > > pure abstraction": > > > > Moreover, the conception of a pure abstraction is > > indispensable, because we cannot comprehend an agreement of > > two things, except as an agreement in some respect, and this > > respect is such a pure abstraction as blackness. Such a pure > > abstraction, reference to which constitutes a quality or > > general attribute, may be termed a ground (CP 1.550) > > > > And adds, rather tellingly as I see it: > > > > Reference to a ground cannot be prescinded from being, but being > > can be prescinded from it (CP 1.551). > > > > And, similarly, in speaking of the object he writes: > > > > Reference to a correlate cannot be prescinded from reference > > to a ground; but reference to a ground may be prescinded from > > reference to a correlate (CP 1.552). > > > > And, finally, in speaking of the interpretant in relation to the > > object, completing the tricategorial analysis, he writes: > > > > Reference to an interpretant cannot be prescinded from reference > > to a correlate; but the latter can be prescinded from the former > > (CP 1.553). > > > > Peirce will later greatly modify his terminology, but the basic > > categorial idea will continue into his late semiotics: namely, > > that what a sign represents is not the object itself, but this > > ground-idea, which 'idea' may be the sign of a quality > > (qualisign), an 'idea' of an existential relation to an object > > (sinsign), or the 'idea' of a law (legisign). But in > > all three cases, this "Platonic idea" occurs in the Universe of > > Experience which we term categorial Firstness. > > > > Or as Peirce puts it: > > > > Let us now see what the appeal of a sign to the mind amounts > > to. It produces a certain idea in the mind which is the idea > > that it is a sign of the thing it signifies and an idea is > > itself a sign, for an idea is an object and it represents an > > object. The idea itself has its material quality which is the > > feeling which there is in thinking (W3:67-68). > > > > I don't expect to convince Edwina on this (or I would have long > > ago), but I will say that those Peirce scholars who see > > categoriality in the basic sign-object-interpretant structure of > > semiosis and not only in the nine sign parameters (3 x 3), and > > their combinations into the 10 sign classes, would /not/ say that > > all three categories may /not /occur associated with the ground of > > the representamen of the sign. In a word, this approach sees the > > representamen as reflecting that first Universe of Experience, > > that is categorial firstness. > > > > There may be a tendency for some to reify the sign and its > > 'parts', but surely that is an error. It seems far better to see > > the sign in this way: > > > > It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a > > quasi-mind; for if we regard it as an outward object, and as > > addressing itself to a human mind, that mind must first > > apprehend it as an object in itself, and only after that > > consider it in its significance; and the like must happen if > > the sign addresses itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by > > forming a determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing will > > be lost by regarding that determination as the sign (MS 283 as > > quoted in /Peirce on Signs/, 255, edited by James Hoopes). > > > > Best, > > > > Gary > > > > > > Gary Richmond > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > > > *Communication Studies* > > > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > > *C 745* > > > > *718 482-5690 <tel:718%20482-5690>* > > > > On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 11:46 AM, Edwina Taborsky > > <tabor...@primus.ca <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote: > > > > Janos - I think that it might help if you defined your use of the > > terms: representamen and sign. Without this definition, I am > > puzzled by your comment. > > > > A representamen is, in the Peircean framework, the mediative > > aspect of the semiosic triad. Therefore, it doesn't 'exist per se' > > on its own as a sign. It isn't, in itself, a triadic sign. And no, > > I don't agree that 'in sign generation, a representamen in the > > mode of firstness must be involved always'. Again, I suggest that > > you read the Peircean outline CP 2.254 etc, to understand that the > > representamen is in a mode of Firstness in only one of the ten > > sign classes - and, to understand that the representamen is never > > 'interpreted as a sign'; it is one part of the semiosic triad that > > makes up the Sign. > > > > Edwina > > > > ----- Original Message ----- From: "Janos Sarbo" <ja...@cs.ru.nl > > <mailto:ja...@cs.ru.nl>> > > To: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca > > <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>>; <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > > <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> > > Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 10:40 AM > > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign > > > > > > > > Edwina: > > In my view any representamen can be interpreted as a sign, and can > > be interpreted as a sign of any one of the 10 sign types. Which > > one of those types the arising sign will have depends on the > > interpreting system's state, knowledge, etc. From this I conclude > > that, in sign generation, a representamen in the mode of firstness > > must be involved always. I think this view is compatible with the > > analytical one, by virtue of the involvement and subservience > > relation between the categories and so the hierarchy of sign aspects. > > > > Best, > > janos > > > > On 01/26/2015 02:49 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > > > Janos: I don't agree that the triad requires the representamen to > > be always 'interpreted as a quality', i.e., in the mode of > > Firstness. If you take a look at the ten classes of signs (2.256 > > as outlined in 1903), you will see that in only one of these ten > > classes is the Representamen in a mode of Firstness. It is in a > > mode of Secondness in three, and in a mode of Thirdness in six > > classes. > > > > Edwina > > > > ----- Original Message ----- From: "Janos Sarbo" <ja...@cs.ru.nl > > <mailto:ja...@cs.ru.nl>> > > To: <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> > > Sent: Monday, January 26, 2015 4:12 AM > > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign > > > > Lists, > > > > I have a question about triadic relation of Sign. If I correctly > > understand this concept, the generation of an irreducible triadic > > relation of representamen, object and interpretant, requires the > > representamen to be interpreted as a quality. The arising triadic > > relation must be a (novel) quality as well. This brings me to my > > question: How is the concept of a Sign (and so thirdness) > > different from > > the concept of a qualitative change? > > > > Best regards, > > Janos Sarbo > > > > > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to > > REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To > > UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to > > l...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line > > "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to > > REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To > > UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to > > l...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line > > "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > > ----------------------------- > > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to > > REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To > > UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to > > l...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line > > "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To > > UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > > <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in > > the BODY of the message. More at > > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > > Rutgers University > > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > > 732-445-4701 > > > > www.conformon.net <http://www.conformon.net> > > >
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