Gary R - I view all your bold analogies as indicative descriptions of
'qualia'....i.e., as 'simply in itself', present, immediate, fresh, new..can't
be thought...etc and etc. These are all attributes of the experience of
'qualia'.
But the Platonic idea, which is a universal Form, is none of these. The term
'idea' is not equivalent' to 'qualia'.
And I didn't say: " So if you say that you reject that notion of the ground of
the representamen being understood as a kind of Platonic idea (as you just did)
then you are rejecting Peirce's understanding of what the representamen is. "
What I said was: "I also reject that the Platonic 'idea' is akin to 'qualia' ".
I certainly do accept that the Platonic idea (Form) is akin to the
Representamen/ground BUT, in the Aristotelian sense that it cannot be separate
from being a basic component of the whole morphological Sign. Platonism
separates it..
Nor did I say: "The Representamen functions. . .as a process"? Semiosis may
perhaps be seen as a process, but the Representamen?
What I wrote was: Since the Representamen functions as the mediative process
(between Object and Interpretant) then it doesn't reflect anything; it is an
active rather than passive process that abstracts and generalizes and uses
these generalizations to 'interpret' the incoming sensate data from the object.
[my emphasis].
As for your being unable to make any sense of the above - well, there is
nothing that I can do about that!
Peirce himself writes extensively of the nature of the Representamen as
mediation. I'm aware that when I first wrote of this, some people questioned my
use of the term 'mediation'..and I had to provide several references from
Peirce where he specifically uses the term. Of course the Representamen acts as
a process! Of mediation! Semiosis isn't a mechanical conveyor belt action; it's
dynamic, transformative. Triadic action is, as Peirce points out, 'intelligent
action' and that means that something is going on within the semiosic
triad...something of the Mind. And "a Representamen mediates between its
Interpretant and its Object" 2.311
And if you declare that no-one else sees the triad as input-mediation-output
(Object-Representamen-Interpretant)..despite my using terms used by Peirce
..eg..input data of a 'feeling' ..mediated by knowledge...to interpretation
that 'this is fire'.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 9:29 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign
Edwina, list,
Just a few comments interleaved. I was only commenting on one of the
questions brought about by Janos' post, so I'll only address that below:
ET: 2) I also reject that the Platonic 'idea' is akin to 'qualia' - which is
how Janos was describing the representamen-in-Firstness. The Platonic idea is
akin to generalization and that is not the same as 'qualia'. Generalizations do
indeed have the capacity to 'be possible' in actualization. Again, that's not
the same as the sensual nature of 'qualia'. Therefore, I reject also your view
that such Platonism is akin to Firstness. I think that two descriptions you
provide, of the Platonic idea and the 'first universe' are not comparable to
each other.
The Platonic 'idea' as Peirce employs it need not be "akin to 'qualia'--you
make it seem as if 'qualia' exhausted Peirce's associations with firstness.
Indeed, more primitiveeven than qualities is the idea of possibility as 1ns.
But, in fact, Peirce offers myriad associations and connotations for firstness.
Here are some from "A Guess at the Riddle" (I've added emphasis to them for
quick reference):
The first is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to
anything nor lying behind anything. . . .(CP 1.356).
The idea of the absolutely first must be entirely separated from all
conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is
itself a second to that second. The first must therefore be present and
immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and
new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be initiative,
original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause.
It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of
some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no
unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has
already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a
denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world
was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any
distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence -- that is first,
present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid,
conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be
false to it (CP 1.357).
And it is Peirce who says that the sign stands for something to a sort of
idea "which I have sometimes called the ground of the sign." So if you say that
you reject that notion of the ground of the representamen being understood as a
kind of Platonic idea (as you just did) then you are rejecting Peirce's
understanding of what the representamen is. You can do that, of course, but
then you perhaps shouldn't be making the strong claims that you sometimes that
your semiotics is Peircean. So, again a snippet from the 1897 passage I earlier
quoted:
CSP: The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object,
not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes
called the ground of the representamen. "Idea" is here to be understood in a
sort of Platonic sense
ET: A 'quality or general attribute' is not the same thing as the sensate
feeling of Firstness.
So, again, I would refer you to the many associations of firstness other than
"sensate feeling" that I just offered above.
ET: And I disagree that the Representamen functions "as reflecting that
first Universe of Experience, that is categorial firstness." Since the
Representamen functions as the mediative process (between Object and
Interpretant) then it doesn't reflect anything; it is an active rather than
passive process that abstracts and generalizes and uses these generalizations
to 'interpret' the incoming sensate data from the object.
"The Representamen functions. . .as a process"? Semiosis may perhaps be seen
as a process, but the Representamen? Maybe this is required by your
input-mediation-output wff version of semiosis, but I know of no one else who
sees it like this, the representamen as "an active. . .process that abstracts
and generalizes and uses these generalizations to 'interpret' the incoming
sensate data from the object."
That makes no sense to me at all.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 6:25 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Just a few comments, Gary R:
1) I am not saying that the Representamen cannot be in a mode of Firstness,
but, reject the statement of Janos that "From this I conclude that, in sign
generation, a representamen in the mode of firstness must be involved
always." I think that this rejects the reality of the 9 classes of signs
in which the representamen is not in a mode of Firstness.
And I also reject his "In my view any representamen can be interpreted as a
sign, and can be
interpreted as a sign of any one of the 10 sign types." I think this is a
confusion of the meaning of the term of 'sign'.
2) I also reject that the Platonic 'idea' is akin to 'qualia' - which is
how Janos was describing the representamen-in-Firstness. The Platonic idea is
akin to generalization and that is not the same as 'qualia'. Generalizations do
indeed have the capacity to 'be possible' in actualization. Again, that's not
the same as the sensual nature of 'qualia'. Therefore, I reject also your view
that such Platonism is akin to Firstness. I think that two descriptions you
provide, of the Platonic idea and the 'first universe' are not comparable to
each other.
A 'quality or general attribute' is not the same thing as the sensate
feeling of Firstness.
3) And of course, I don't say " that all three categories may not occur
associated with the ground of the representamen of the sign."
That was my point to Janos - when I said that the ground/representamen is
NOT always and necessarily only in a mode of Firstness. And I disagree that
the Representamen functions "as reflecting that first Universe of Experience,
that is categorial firstness." Since the Representamen functions as the
mediative process (between Object and Interpretant) then it doesn't reflect
anything; it is an active rather than passive process that abstracts and
generalizes and uses these generalizations to 'interpret' the incoming sensate
data from the object.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Cc: Gary Richmond
Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 5:27 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign
Janos, Edwina, list,
There are those of us who do indeed see the representamen as Peirce
refers to it as "a First," that is as categorial firstness. This interpretation
is, in good part, based on Peirce's analysis of what it is that the
representamen can represent, and at times--notably in the New List, but also
elsewhere, such as a fragment the CP editors date at ca.1897--that 'something'
that can be represented in the representamen is analyzed as a kind of 'idea'
which he terms the ground.
For example, in the oft quoted 1897 fragment just mentioned Peirce writes:
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates
in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed
sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The
sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all
respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the
ground of the representamen. "Idea" is here to be understood in a sort of
Platonic sense, very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which
we say that one man catches another man's idea . . . (emphasis added, CP 2.228).
Here "idea" (in this "sort of Platonic sense") is clearly associated with
firstness. This will be the case throughout Peirce's career as I see it. For
example, in the late Neglected Argument Peirce gives the character of his three
categories in these comments on three universes of experience. Interestingly
his example of "the third Universe" is that of a Sign "which has its Being in
its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind":
Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first
comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, pure
mathematician, or another might give local habitation and a name within that
mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being consists in mere
capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them, saves
their Reality. The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and
facts. I am confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute
forces, notwithstanding objections redoubtable until they are closely and
fairly examined. The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists
in active power to establish connections between different objects, especially
between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is essentially
a Sign -- not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially such, but, so
to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power of serving as
intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such, too, is a living
consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant. Such is a
living constitution -- a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social "movement"
(emphasis added,CP 6.455).
But what I most want to emphasize here is that this conception of a kind
of Platonic idea as firstness parallels that in the 1897 snippet when Peirce
comments that "The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that
object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have
sometimes called the ground of the representamen. "Idea" is here to be
understood in a sort of Platonic sense."
In the New List Peirce refers to this Platonic like idea as "a pure
abstraction":
Moreover, the conception of a pure abstraction is indispensable,
because we cannot comprehend an agreement of two things, except as an agreement
in some respect, and this respect is such a pure abstraction as blackness. Such
a pure abstraction, reference to which constitutes a quality or general
attribute, may be termed a ground (CP 1.550)
And adds, rather tellingly as I see it:
Reference to a ground cannot be prescinded from being, but being can be
prescinded from it (CP 1.551).
And, similarly, in speaking of the object he writes:
Reference to a correlate cannot be prescinded from reference to a
ground; but reference to a ground may be prescinded from reference to a
correlate (CP 1.552).
And, finally, in speaking of the interpretant in relation to the object,
completing the tricategorial analysis, he writes:
Reference to an interpretant cannot be prescinded from reference to a
correlate; but the latter can be prescinded from the former (CP 1.553).
Peirce will later greatly modify his terminology, but the basic
categorial idea will continue into his late semiotics: namely, that what a sign
represents is not the object itself, but this ground-idea, which 'idea' may be
the sign of a quality (qualisign), an 'idea' of an existential relation to an
object (sinsign), or the 'idea' of a law (legisign). But in all three cases,
this "Platonic idea" occurs in the Universe of Experience which we term
categorial Firstness.
Or as Peirce puts it:
Let us now see what the appeal of a sign to the mind amounts to. It
produces a certain idea in the mind which is the idea that it is a sign of the
thing it signifies and an idea is itself a sign, for an idea is an object and
it represents an object. The idea itself has its material quality which is the
feeling which there is in thinking (W3:67-68).
I don't expect to convince Edwina on this (or I would have long ago), but
I will say that those Peirce scholars who see categoriality in the basic
sign-object-interpretant structure of semiosis and not only in the nine sign
parameters (3 x 3), and their combinations into the 10 sign classes, would not
say that all three categories may not occur associated with the ground of the
representamen of the sign. In a word, this approach sees the representamen as
reflecting that first Universe of Experience, that is categorial firstness.
There may be a tendency for some to reify the sign and its 'parts', but
surely that is an error. It seems far better to see the sign in this way:
It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for
if we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human mind,
that mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only after that
consider it in its significance; and the like must happen if the sign addresses
itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a determination of that
quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding that determination as the
sign (MS 283 as quoted in Peirce on Signs, 255, edited by James Hoopes).
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 11:46 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
Janos - I think that it might help if you defined your use of the
terms: representamen and sign. Without this definition, I am puzzled by your
comment.
A representamen is, in the Peircean framework, the mediative aspect of
the semiosic triad. Therefore, it doesn't 'exist per se' on its own as a sign.
It isn't, in itself, a triadic sign. And no, I don't agree that 'in sign
generation, a representamen in the mode of firstness must be involved always'.
Again, I suggest that you read the Peircean outline CP 2.254 etc, to understand
that the representamen is in a mode of Firstness in only one of the ten sign
classes - and, to understand that the representamen is never 'interpreted as a
sign'; it is one part of the semiosic triad that makes up the Sign.
Edwina
----- Original Message ----- From: "Janos Sarbo" <ja...@cs.ru.nl>
To: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>; <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2015 10:40 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign
Edwina:
In my view any representamen can be interpreted as a sign, and can be
interpreted as a sign of any one of the 10 sign types. Which one of those types
the arising sign will have depends on the interpreting system's state,
knowledge, etc. From this I conclude that, in sign generation, a representamen
in the mode of firstness must be involved always. I think this view is
compatible with the analytical one, by virtue of the involvement and
subservience relation between the categories and so the hierarchy of sign
aspects.
Best,
janos
On 01/26/2015 02:49 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Janos: I don't agree that the triad requires the representamen to
be always 'interpreted as a quality', i.e., in the mode of Firstness. If you
take a look at the ten classes of signs (2.256 as outlined in 1903), you will
see that in only one of these ten classes is the Representamen in a mode of
Firstness. It is in a mode of Secondness in three, and in a mode of Thirdness
in six classes.
Edwina
----- Original Message ----- From: "Janos Sarbo" <ja...@cs.ru.nl>
To: <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Monday, January 26, 2015 4:12 AM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign
Lists,
I have a question about triadic relation of Sign. If I correctly
understand this concept, the generation of an irreducible triadic
relation of representamen, object and interpretant, requires the
representamen to be interpreted as a quality. The arising triadic
relation must be a (novel) quality as well. This brings me to my
question: How is the concept of a Sign (and so thirdness)
different from
the concept of a qualitative change?
Best regards,
Janos Sarbo
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