List, Jim:
Thank you for clarifying your intent in your writings and diagrams. It shapes
a context.
WRT the VSEPR, I studied it intently without finding any meaningful conte
Ii appears to me that by augmenting the physical-chemical concept with an
undefined "base" (plane?), coherence is lost.
Have fun!
Cheers
jerry
On Mar 4, 2015, at 9:30 AM, Jim Willgoose wrote:
> Hi Jerry.
>
> There is no great entelechy driving my interests other than curiosity and
> "playfulness;" the art of mousetrap.
> Here is a theater of entia rationis, algebraic fictions, though with
> intriguing constraints. On my table is a laptop with 1880 Peirce. To the
> right is a copy of Wittgenstein's lectures on mathematics from '34. ("Here I
> put my spade") Next to it is Feferman's biography on Tarski.
>
> In my garage is a square. I had thought of it in terms of "m x n," but never
> quite in terms of "ij." (I need to study matrices and memorize counting
> rules)Although I am adept at writing in linear Alpha notation (a la Baldwin
> Dictionary 1901), I had never quite seen the ratio of negative powers to
> idempotent positives in the light that I do now. So, I will literally build
> a ring that uses involution and reverse association. I will hang it from my
> ceiling and name it "Tautology."
>
> I didn't have anything like missiles and bombs in mind. I just thought it
> was interesting to imagine "bent" VSEPR models, possibly controlled by
> integration and bias that would shorten their "legs" and lower their azimuth
> ("heads") as they approach one another; a sort of crude simulation of
> increasing volume of molecules. 7th graders could drive them around and get
> yelled at.
> My attitude is a variation on Peirce's idea of "musement." (though as far as
> I am aware, the plays he staged in Milford were largely tragedies.)
>
> Jim W
>
> From: jerry_lr_chand...@me.com
> Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 15:32:36 -0600
> CC: colli...@ukzn.ac.za; jimwillgo...@msn.com
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc
> To: PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu
>
>
> John, Jim W. List:
>
> As I prepared to write this, I focused on the distant western bank of the
> Mississippi, just a thin line of shadows separating the intense whiteness of
> the new fallen snow and light leaden-gray sky. Metaphorically, a thin line
> of differences on the meaning of mathematics motivates this response.
>
> Your entelechy and the putative entelechy of physics are not mine. The
> pragmatic successes of physics / mechanics are well known. Those are a
> success of mathematics and logic. In this path to the mechanization of the
> world, the pragmatic approach of physicists and engineering has been to find
> suitable approximations that work in the world. Logic works as a local guide
> to "local approximations" for physical equations of motion that are
> sufficient for economic and defense purposes.
>
> At present, my purpose is to isolate the logic of chemistry as it is used in
> medicine, biomedical sciences and biochemistry. This demanding need for a
> clear and distinct logic for chemistry slowly emerged after several decades
> of pragmatic work on dose-response relationships and there mathematical
> foundations. It is apparent that the communications channels between
> mathematicians and chemists are effectively closed. The reason for this
> absence of essential scientific communication between chemists and
> mathematicians (and philosophers) is that the notation for numbers differ.
>
> A critical distinction is between the real number system and the atomic
> number system. The former is used to build nuclear weapons, war machines and
> space craft. The latter are used to describe life, the cycles of life and all
> that these terms imply.
>
> Physical relations ground themselves on the real number system and a very
> small set of qualia, the SI units of measure.
>
> Chemical relations ground themselves on the atomic numbers and use these
> numbers as a reference system for chemical calculations (molecular weight,
> molecular formula, molecular structure and a term that I added to the
> chemist's lexicon, molecular number.) But one must always recall that the
> atomic numbers themselves were deduced from physical measurements of force.
>
> The real number calculations which relate the physical units of physical
> qualia to atomic numbers and related molecular terms NECESSARILY REQUIRE
> chemical qualia to express the initial conditions for the equations (of
> motion.) Thus, the logic of chemistry and the logic of physics are
> inseparable.
>
> Now, more directly to your interventions.
>
> On Mar 2, 2015, at 8:22 PM, John Collier wrote:
>
> Hi Jerry,
>
> I am not so sure that chemistry avoids the problems of noncomputable dynamics
> in the interactions of large molecules as found in biology.
>
> The dynamic of any large system is non-computable. This is a general
> mathematical truth, grounded by Poincare. Of course, I fully agree with your
> phrase.
> However, the logic of chemistry describes both large systems and exact
> computations on them. The logic of physics does NOT.
>
> I am no expert in this field by any means, but it seems to me that
> interactions of tertiary structure may well not always follow simple additive
> rules.
> The logic of chemistry creates the concept of tertiary structures. The
> concept of tertiary structures are inferences from the atomic numbers.
>
> I’ve been told of some examples in transport through cellular membranes, but
> I have never thought them through carefully.
>
> (As an aside, biochemical transport of a substrate across a membrane seldom
> requires any chemical change (pragmatic exception exist. I do not understand
> the relevance in this context).
>
> Mostly, though, macromolecules act like machines in Tom Schneider’s sense of
> “molecular machines”, but for the time being I am keeping an open mind on
> this issue.
>
> The approximations that Tom uses are very useful. Excellent work. As you are
> aware, he is a long time friend.
> But Tom's molecular machines are not Newtonian machines and do not exhibit
> mechanical mathematics.
> Thus, Tom focuses on information theory and probabilities, not first
> principles.
> Do his machines resolve the fundamental issue of which is right, quantum
> mechanics or thermodynamics?
> (Not to mention the fundamental contradiction of the squares of oppositions
> between these two concept of force and matter.)
>
>
> Donald Kalish used to speak in our set theory class about how he once thought
> that set theory could unify everything, but that he had to give up the idea.
> He was a much better logician than I will ever be. Nonetheless, I think it
> works well for denotation, once we have fixed meaning with pragmatics.
>
> Yes, set theory works well for many purposes, especially for computations of
> any organizing chains of judgments. And, of course, the logical mess of set
> theory conundrums must be kept in mind.
>
> Set theory does not work for the atomic numbers because atomic numbers
> exhibit qualia. Set theory members and classes do not admit rhetorical qualia
> with semantic meaning.
>
> I remain persuaded that a good place to start is with Hilbert's notion of
> consistency, completeness and decidability.
> Because of the contradictions noted above (QM/TD), physical argumentation is
> contradictory and can not meet Hilbert's demanding standard of consistency.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
>
>
> But the last is where the complexity lies (and also the opportunity for
> open-endedness and creativity, if I am right -- Informal Pragmatics and
> Linguistic Creativity, South African Journal of Philosophy, 2014). I am just
> finishing another version for the Foundations of Science series. Peircean
> influenced, but not much mention of Peirce. The openness and continuity and
> creativity are all very much Peircean, though.
>
>
> John
>
> From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
> Sent: February 28, 2015 8:43 PM
> To: Peirce List
> Cc: John Collier; Jim Willgoose
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc
>
> John, List:
>
> Curious response! We concur on the need to capture the essential meanings
> of linguistic sentences in set-theoretic representations of the sentence.
> Simply imposing formal rules on a sentence may not be sufficient to capture
> the intended meaning of the logic of the sentence. Despite this challenge,
> set theoretic expressions, within the context of its formal symbolic rules,
> can be extendable indefinitely and preserve valid conclusions - computer's
> work very well.
>
> In the context of electronic computers, Hilbert's criteria for mathematics
> are satisfied:
>
> Consistency. Completeness. Decidability.
>
> Despite the flaw found by Godel for infinite numbers, Hilbert's criteria
> function very nicely for finite calculations. And, BTW, Hilbert's criteria
> work very nicely for chemistry, even though the symbolic logic for chemistry
> is very remote from the symbolic logic of set theory and Venn diagrams.
> Mathematics is something beyond set theory!
>
> What Ben's conclusions bring to fore, and of course, CSP's numerous logic
> texts, is deeper than mere "pragmatics" ( I think the use of the term of
> pragmatics in this context merely obscures the reality of the Trojan horse at
> the gate. A wooden horse outside the gate remains a wooden horse inside the
> gate.)
>
> Allow a simplistic example.
> We have formal symbolic logical systems for:
> set theory
> mathematics (at least finite arithmetic)
> music
> dance (yes! dance!)
> chemistry
>
> Can you suggest a philosophical and scientifically valid (validity here means
> empirically reproducible) approach (beyond the slightly flawed first pair -
> set theory and mathematics) to transliterate among these modes of
> representations of human perceptions?
>
> An overwhelming number of scientific and philosophical issues ride on finding
> a valid transliteration between these formal logics and related informal
> logics (such as the logic of inheritance.)
>
> Viewed from a different angle, the question can be simplified to the
> undergraduate level by asking:
>
> Is set theory extendable to the unity of the natural sciences?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
>
> On Feb 28, 2015, at 5:04 AM, John Collier wrote:
>
>
> Jerry, List,
>
> Just a brief point to clarify what I meant. I agree that informal rhetoric
> requires interpretation, but I believe that to be true of formal language as
> well. In fact I have argued in several places now, including my PhD thesis,
> that interpretation always requires consideration of pragmatics first, and
> semantics can only follow that. In what I said I had assumed that the first
> part had been done.
>
> This has consequences for the issue at hand. If there are problems, then the
> problems lie in pragmatics. I believe that in artificial examples it is quite
> possible for the relevant pragmatics to be underdetermined, since the context
> is (at least in part) missing. Some of the discussion has involved unusual
> contexts to produce counterexamples, which I think supports my point.
>
> In any case, I don’t think we really disagree here. We were just working to
> somewhat different ends (different pragmatics).
>
> Best,
> John
>
> From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
> Sent: February 28, 2015 12:49 AM
> To: Peirce Discussion Forum (PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu)
> Cc: Jon Awbrey; John Collier; Benjamin Udell
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc
>
> John, List:
>
> Thanks for your response.
>
> I phrased my concerns as questions in order to stimulate a through evaluation
> of conclusions that Ben had drawn.
>
> Your response is at least partially true in that the interpretation of any
> rhetoric statement as a set theoretic symbolization requires that at some
> parts of the meaning of the rhetoric statement ought to represented in the
> symbolizations of the translations from one form to another form.
>
> However, the simple fact of the matter is that most rhetorical statements do
> not translate well from the rhetorical form to the strict formal logical form
> of set theory. The reason for this broad assertion is simple. Most human
> rhetoric is informal and is not intended, expected nor interpreted as formal
> statements. Judgments are necessary.
>
>
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