Lists, It may not be extreme, but I think that most current realist metaphysicians (ones who accept universals as real, like myself and David Armstrong, for example) take a line closer to the Duns Scotus one. The more extreme view seems to most to be difficult to distinguish from Platonism (e.g., my otherwise hero Bertrand Russell, who came to reject particulars entirely). This isn't to say that universals are not open-ended at any time, and that something can come to fall under a universal.
However, Frederik, there are two slippery terms in your answer that I would like more elucidation on, "contracted in" and "comprise". My understanding of Armstrong, for example, does not have universals comprised of instances, but their reality does depend on their instantiation. Myself, I take a view slightly weaker than Armstrong in one sense, but stronger in another, and think that universals are made necessary only by logic (including 2nd order logic) or instantiation, in which case they are identical to natural kinds. I would not use the word "comprise" to describe this. This is one area that I have been sceptical of Peirce's metaphysics since I first found it as an undergraduate over 40 years ago, and my scepticism has yet to be put to rest. I do believe, unlike many contemporary metaphysicians, in the existence of (some) properties (often called tropes). In fact I believe they are more fundamental than "things", whose fundamental existence (here like Russell) I reject. Best, John -----Original Message----- From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk] Sent: March 11, 2015 6:19 PM To: Jon Awbrey; Peirce Discussion Forum (PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu); <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatism About Theoretical Entities Dear Jon, lists - You're right about the economy principle. But it is interesting when it was first articulated as an explicit doctrine. Calling Peirce's realism "extreme", I was only quoting the man, calling himself a "scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe" (5.470) The extremity lies in that P considered himself more realist than Dus Scotus because he rejected his idea that univerals are contracted in particulars (P claimed that universals comprise more than any possible number of particular instantiations). Best F Den 11/03/2015 kl. 21.25 skrev Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> : > Inquiry Blog > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/20/pragmatism-about-theoretical- > entities-1/ > > Peirce List > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15467 > FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15800 > > Frederik, List, > > Welcome one more time to the fray, where you'll find a rich array of > loose threads to tangle with and loose thoughts to wrangle with, > against the day, ever looming, of weaving whole cloth a Persian rug. > > I think we can safely stipulate that Principles Of Intellectual > Economy (POIE) have been with us from the time when poets and > philosophers first drew breath, or swords, as the case my be. I was > becoming concerned from the tenor of our discussions about nominalism > and realism that we were drifting to extremes -- I don't think of > Peirce as promoting any kind of "extreme realism" as I don't think > pragmatism is about extremes. So I gave it my best try at writing up > a balanced account of the opposing pans, nominalism and realism, placing the > pragmatic maxim at the examen or fulcrum. > > Regards, > > Jon
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