Jeff, Jon, lists, Jeff, I think your response to Jon's concerns about Ketner's comments in *A Thief of Peirce* makes good sense, while I'm uncertain exactly what you meant by your concluding comment.
Regarding Jon's 1st concern that "icons are not the most general types of signs and so the leap to signs in general falls a bit short." You wrote: JD: if we agree that every kind of dicisign or argument involves iconic qualisigns, sinsigns and legisigns as component parts, then the leap to the generalization may not be problematic. Even in cases where we abstract from many of the iconic features of the component signs, iconic features remain nonetheless, or self-controlled reasoning about such signs would not be possible. In a word, abstraction from certain iconic features yet leaves some "iconic features" such that reasoning about dicisigns and arguments remains possible; so, generalizing does not necessarily do away with certain iconic features. Makes sense to me. As to Jon's 2nd concern having to do with " the many senses of the word "model" and not having read Ketner's "Thief" I don't know which of the multitude he has in mind." You wrote: JD: if we replace Ketner's use of the word "model" with "diagram," [. . .] much of the weight of what Peirce is claiming falls on the conception of a skeleton diagram. I think that's correct and, indeed, in the Ketner passage from *Thief* with which I conclude this post, Ketner explicitly equates 'model' and 'diagram' in remarking that mathematics is "the science that models (diagrams) relations in areas under study." This brings us back to Peirce's notion of "abstractive observation," which he says is familiar to and offers no problem for ordinary folk, but seems to become problematic for some theorists. CSP: [The ordinary person] makes in his imagination a sort of skeleton diagram, or outline sketch, of himself, considers what modifications the hypothetical state of things would require to be made in that picture, and then examines it, that is, observes what he has imagined [. . . ,] such a process, [being] at bottom very much like mathematical reasoning [allows us to] reach conclusions as to what would be true of signs in all cases, so long as the intelligence using them was scientific. And, again, by a "scientific intelligence" Peirce means one "capable of learning by experience." So, I'm a bit uncertain as to what your intended meaning is in writing: JD: My assumption is the phenomenological categories of monad, dyad and triad (or first, second and third) are the formal features that we observe when we make any kind of skeleton diagram. That is, the formal relations of monad, dyad and triad are the "a priori" formal elements that are necessary for constructing and then reasoning about such skeleton diagrams. I'm not sure if the (abstract) categories *as such* (as opposed to particular relations) are the *actual *features we observe. Perhaps I'm just missing something here, but if you'd further explicate your remarks it would be helpful. I think your remark may relate to what Ketner says as he continues his analysis of the passage we've been discussing . In the following passage he considers, especially, "visual diagrams" (although he's just made some brief remarks on auditory and other diagram types). KK: . . . Pierce thought sight was probably best adapted for detecting new features of relational patterns in diagrams that model triadic relations presently under study. People sometimes say, when they want an explanation, "Draw me a picture." To "Draw a picture," then, would be to proceed in the way that Peirce would have recommended in response to the question "How can we study phenomena rich in triadic relations if dyadic considerations alone cannot exclusively do the explanatory job?" If we add that Peirce recognized algebras and other arrays of symbols as visual diagrams, then we can state that mathematics, not in the narrow sense in which it is usually understood today, but as the science that models (diagrams) relations in areas under study, would be among the finer tools for "drawing pictures" that humankind has yet developed (Ketner, 278). Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 8:09 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Jon, Gary, Lists, > > Jon has raised two concerns about Ketner's statement in the "Thief". Here > are some quick responses to the concerns: > > (1) A major problem is that icons are not the most general types of signs > and so the leap to signs in general falls a bit short. > > Response: if we agree that every kind of dicisign or argument involves > iconic qualisigns, sinsigns and legisigns as component parts, then the leap > to the generalization may not be problematic. Even in cases where we > abstract from many of the iconic features of the component signs, iconic > features remain nonetheless, or self-controlled reasoning about such signs > would not be possible. > > (2) A minor problem has to do with the many senses of the word "model" and > not having read Ketner's "Thief" I don't know which of the multitude he has > in mind. > > Response, if we replace Ketner's use of the word "model" with "diagram," I > don't think anything is lost. We would then remain truer to what Peirce > says in the passage. As far as I can see, much of the weight of what > Peirce is claiming falls on the conception of a skeleton diagram. > > Peirce says: The faculty which I call abstractive observation is one which > ordinary people perfectly recognize, but for which the theories of > philosophers sometimes hardly leave room. It is a familiar experience to > every human being to wish for something quite beyond his present means, and > to follow that wish by the question, "Should I wish for that thing just the > same, if I had ample means to gratify it?" To answer that question, he > searches his heart, and in doing so makes what I term an abstractive > observation. He makes in his imagination a sort of skeleton diagram, or > outline sketch, of himself, considers what modifications the hypothetical > state of things would require to be made in that picture, and then examines > it, that is, observes what he has imagined, to see whether the same ardent > desire is there to be discerned. By such a process, which is at bottom very > much like mathematical reasoning, we can reach conclusions as to what would > be true of signs in all cases, > so long as the intelligence using them was scientific. > > My assumption is the phenomenological categories of monad, dyad and triad > (or first, second and third) are the formal features that we observe when > we make any kind of skeleton diagram. That is, the formal relations of > monad, dyad and triad are the "a priori" formal elements that are necessary > for constructing and then reasoning about such skeleton diagrams. > Elsewhere, he calls the diagrams skeleton sets, or network figures, but I > think he is talking about the same kind of thing. > > --Jeff > > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net] > Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2015 2:12 PM > To: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and > Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams > > Re: Gary Richmond > At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16249 > > Gary, List, > > There are many problems here that I see right off. > > (1) A major problem is that icons are not the most > general types of signs and so the leap to signs in > general falls a bit short. > > (2) A minor problem has to do with the many senses of > the word "model" and not having read Ketner's "Thief" > I don't know which of the multitude he has in mind. > > But that's all I have time for now, so sufficient unto the day ... > > Jon > > On 4/22/2015 4:48 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Cathy, Jon, Frederik, Lists, > > > > I agree that CP 2.227 is a most extraordinary passage, one which Ken > Ketner > > has referred to as "one of the most remarkable theoretical passages ever > > written" (Ketner, *A Thief of Peirce,* 276). > > > > Just before quoting it he remarks that in it "Peirce brought together the > > concepts we need to make sense of diagrammatic thought as a nonreductive > > technique for modeling, and for thereby gaining an understanding of > triadic > > phenomena." > > > > Ketner spends much of the rest of his essay discussing the importance of > > the passage, perhaps getting a bit carried away with the 'power' of it.. > > > > *I ask you to note carefully several things about this remarkable > > paragraph. First of all the sheer power of it will grow on you, so please > > give it a chance to serenade you. One instance of its power is the > > connection it makes between mathematics and novels! Second, by reading > sign > > as "triad," we get the result that semeiotic is the study of triadic > > action, a study accomplished by constructing and observing models! *(op. > > cit., 277) > > > > > > What especially interests me is that Ketner describes 'abstractive > > observation', a phrase used three times in the passage (and implied > several > > times moreh) in this way: > > > > *Abstractive observation is of course observation of relations in models. > > Also, a sign or representation, this paragraph encourages one to infer, > is > > itself some kind of model of that which it represents (its object) to > that > > which interprets it (its interpretant). *(277) > > > > > > Several thoughts came to mind in reading this, but the first one is this: > > does Peirce use this expression, 'abstractive observation', elsewhere and > > consistently? If so, can we agree with Ketner that 'abstractive > > observation' is "*of course*" necessarily "observation of relations in > > models"? If we can, than the expression could be an especially useful > > shortcut for saying just that and, perhaps, be given greater currency. > > > > Best, > > > > Gary > > > > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > >
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