Claudio, list, Just a quick response to one suggestion in your post. You wrote:
I think [. . . ] that instinct is some how related to secondness, to a more (so to say) 'biological' aspect, I would agree that instinct must involve the 'biological'. But I'm not so sure that even there I'd limit it to 2ns because of its tendency towards regularity, habit (3ns), while instincts have there own characters (1ns). But I also haven't given this enough thought yet. I'm pleased, however, that John introduced the topic as I'm hoping we'll be able to think it through together. I'm not clear what you meant in writing "we read and study Peirce, but then we write and understand was is written in a strict 'positivist' way." I don't see this "strict" positivist approach as occurring here, at least not with the frequency you seem to be suggesting. Certainly pragmaticism, three faceted Peircean inquiry (abduction, or hypothesis formation-> deduction of the implications for testing -> induction as a testing of the hypothesis), triadic semiotic, etc. would seem to preclude such 'strict positivism' in all our inquiries. So, would you expand on your comment a bit further? Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 3:22 PM, Claudio Guerri <claudiogue...@gmail.com> wrote: > Gary, List, > you are right Gary, but there is still a strange behavior in most of us > Peirce-listers... we read and study Peirce, but then we write and > understand was is written in a strict 'positivist' way. Since everything is > a sign and every sign has to be considered triadic... then of course in > "human instinct" there has to be more than ONLY knowledge... because > knowledge can not 'exist alone'... > I think, without having never studied this subject thoroughly, that > instinct is some how related to secondness, to a more (so to say) > 'biological' aspect, and though to the "impossible", to "the real" in > Lacan, and so on... > And by the way, I am also aware that we are not completely aware, or > conscious, of all what we 'really' know... > and more, besides what we know and what we don't know that we know, there > is the unconscious (that also exists), and works, not always, in favor of > what we are able to think rationally. > All the best > Claudio > > > Gary Richmond escribió el 15/07/2015 a las 02:34 p.m.: > > Claudio, list, > > Claudio wrote: "I would say that instinct is not related to knowledge, > but abduction and habit are. > There is no 'good' abduction without knowledge... > " > > I'm not certain that I agree with the first part of this statement, > viz., "that instinct is not related to knowledge," but that is a complex > issue which would take some considerable work to address adequately > (Manuel's snippet and my previous long Peircean quote, as well as the > passage below may suggest a path which such an inquiry might take). > > But I fully agree with the second part of your comment, viz. that "there > is no 'good' abduction without knowledge," what Peirce calls "the > well-prepared mind" making good guesses leading to, in the following > example, correct hypotheses in science (something not dissimilar must > surely be the case in art, architecture, etc., I'm sure you'd agree). > > . . . Yes; it must be confessed that if we knew that the impulse to > prefer one hypothesis to another really were analogous to the instincts of > birds and wasps, it would be foolish not to give it play, within the bounds > of reason; especially since we must entertain some hypothesis, or else > forego all further knowledge than that which we have already gained by that > very means. But is it a fact that man possesses this magical faculty? Not, > I reply, to the extent of guessing right the first time, nor perhaps the > second; but *that the well-prepared mind has wonderfully soon guessed > each secret of nature is historical truth. All the theories of science have > been so obtained *[emphasis added]. > > But may they not have come fortuitously, or by some such modification of > chance as the Darwinian supposes? I answer that three or four independent > methods of computation show that it would be ridiculous to suppose our > science to have so come to pass. [. . .] There is a reason, an > interpretation, a logic, in the course of scientific advance, and this > indisputably proves to him who has perceptions of rational or significant > relations, that man's mind must have been attuned to the truth of things in > order to discover what he has discovered. It is the very bedrock of logical > truth. CP 6.476 > > > Best, > > Gary > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 1:01 PM, Claudio Guerri <claudiogue...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to <l...@list.iupui.edu>l...@list.iupui.edu with the line >> "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- > > Prof. Dr. Arq. Claudio F. Guerri > Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo > Universidad de Buenos Aires > Domicilio particular: Gral. Lemos 270 > 1427 BUENOS AIRES > Telefax: (011) 4553-7976/4895 > Celular: (011) 15-6289-8123 > E-mail: <claudiogue...@fibertel.com.ar>claudiogue...@gmail.com >
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