Hi Jerry, Did you mean that First, Second and Third are adjectives and Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are nouns ?
All the best. Sung On Mon, Sep 28, 2015 at 3:06 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com > wrote: > > > Begin forwarded message: > > *From: *Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com> > *Subject: **Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Practopoiesis: now I understand it > better* > *Date: *September 28, 2015 11:19:21 AM CDT > *To: *Danko Nikolic <danko.niko...@googlemail.com> > > Dear Danko: > > Would you like to consider a question? > > After struggling with the numerous statements of Firstness, Secondness, > and Thirdness for several years, I settled on one of his latest renditions > because of its mathematical implications as well as biochemical > interpretations, that is the version given in his private letter to Lady > Welby. > > In recent weeks, as a consequence of explorations of the meaning of > identity in utterances, statements and propositions, it occurred to me that > CSP proposes these terms in such a grammatical way that is extremely > innovative. (Recall that CSP depended heavily on English grammar to > formulate his logical propositions, such as in the medad and the trichotomy > of nine nouns as a universal logical/relational argument for whatever.) > > Presuppositions: > The terms First, Second and Third are nouns. > The suffix term, "-ness" functions grammatically by changing nouns into > adjectives. > > Example: > The ball is red. > The red ball is (predicate) > The redness of the ball is (predicate) > > My conjecture is that CSP is intentionally invented these terms to infer a > special class of objects that intrinsically communicate, grammatically, > terms that implicitly contain the qualities of both being a noun and an > adjective. > Thus each of the three terms (Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness) > contains in its sub-parts, roots of both. > > Note that this usage of "x-ness" is consistent with his chemical training > and modern chemical logic. > The formal logic of two atoms combining to form a molecule is of this type > of usage. > > Is this consistent or non-consistent with your meanings? > > I presume that you will find this to be a strange question. I pose it to > provide you an opportunity to explore the foundation of CSP logic in the > hard sciences, which is direct and wide-ranging and not at all amazing as > you suggest. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > > On Sep 28, 2015, at 3:57 AM, Danko Nikolic wrote: > > Dear all, > > > When I presented the list with the theory of practopoiesis and suggested > that the three traverses can account for abductive reasoning, I also > received a number of questions regarding Peirce's work to which I had no > answers. The reason I had no answers was that I did not know much about > work of Peirce other than abductive reasoning. > > > Now, I would like to share with you that I have made a bit of a step > forward. One of the questions (or suggestions) that I received was that > perhaps the three levels of organization that I proposed (three traverses) > correspond to the three Peirce's categories: Firstness, Secondness, and > Thirdness. > > > Meanwhile, I have learned more about Peirce and I think that the answer > is: No. The three levels of organization do not correspond to these three > aspects of our consciousness. Actually, it seems that all three categories > should be assigned to the same level of organization, and this would be the > middle level, which I named anapoiesis. > > > I always thought that this middle level is the most interesting part of > the theory, as it can produce a fascinatingly rich dynamics to explain > consciousness. Now, it seems to me that 1ness, 2ness, and 3ness correspond > very nicely to different aspects of its dynamics. So, it appears that this > aspect of Pierce's work will be extremely helpful in the future in > describing different aspects of adaptive processes in tri-traversal systems. > > > Peirce's philosophy (at least a part of it) may even get some sort of a > foundation in hard sciences, which would be amazing. > > > I hope that someone finds this useful. > > > Best, > > > Danko > > > -- > > > Prof. Dr. Danko Nikolic > > > > Web: http://www.danko-nikolic.com > > > Mail address 1: > > Department of Neurophysiology > > Max Planck Institute for Brain Research > > Deutschordenstr. 46 > > 60528 Frankfurt am Main > > GERMANY > > > Mail address 2: > > Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies > > Wolfgang Goethe University > > Ruth-Moufang-Str. 1 > > 60433 Frankfurt am Main > > GERMANY > > > ---------------------------- > > Office: (..49-69) 96769-736 > > Lab: (..49-69) 96769-209 > > Fax: (..49-69) 96769-327 > > danko.niko...@gmail.com > > ---------------------------- > > > > > ----------------------------- > > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net
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