>> On Oct 6, 2015, at 3:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: >> >>>> 1)Third, you (MATT) wrote: " Moral rationality is based on values. There >>>> is no conceptual necessity to subscribe to the idea that there is one >>>> standard of moral values that applies to all people for all time, or, for >>>> that matter, for all people at any given time. (I could have taken the >>>> word 'moral' out and, I could argue, it would still be true.)" >>>> >>>> EDWINA: The above sounds to me to be totally relativist and arbitrary. >>> >>> MATT: It is certainly relativist. But it is not any more arbitrary than >>> believing there are unchanging values. Invariance vs. Flux. Isn't the >>> choice arbitrary? As far as I can see it is, which is why I pursue an >>> understanding of the world from each side. >>> >> EDWINA: No- my point is not to even suggest that there are 'unchanging >> values'; I'm not setting up a false binary dilemma between 'invariance vs >> flux'. My point is that the societal values are NOT arbitrary but are >> functional within the economic-political-population size organization of >> that society. That is, a hunting and gathering band, usually made up of >> about 30 people, will have non-arbitrary, functional values about, eg, >> sharing the hunt, sharing whatever is gathered. This value is not universal, >> for, it wouldn't work in a larger population where some of the harvest must >> not be consumed by the immediate population but must be (a) stored to plant >> next year's crop; and (b) marketed to obtain non-local food and services. >> And so on. So, the value is embedded within the economic infrastructure of >> the society.
Not to be pedantic but do you mean there is nothing arbitrary in them? That is nothing about them that is chance? Or do you mean that what is possible by chance is constrained by functional limits? It seems to me important to answer that question. Evolutionary adaptations are often arbitrary in some senses and clearly constrained in others. I think this is often a problem in how we talk about such things. Moreso than biological evolution it seems like human conventions often have that element of chance in them even though they are like biology, constrained in certain ways. I do think though that when we ask about values we should probably distinguish between what a community has as norms and what some ideal community would arrive at as the best values for that community. Those seem two very different questions. The former seems much more open and arbitrary (although still constrained) whereas the latter seems much less relativist. If we talk of possibilities we can ask whether a potential value is better than the values actualized in the given community. My sense (perhaps incorrect) is that for Peirce ethics is this ideal possibility rather than the more relativist one. Clearly there is however a relationship between the values at any given time and the ideal values. Effectively the universe is working out the ideal values for any given circumstance. >>> 2) EDWINA: But the source of values has to rest within their pragmatic >>> functionality AND within human rationality* not within whim or even habit. >> >> MATT: I agree. One's moral values are relative to one's history/culture. If >> history and culture changes over time and space, then so will moral values. >> I think you're saying that moral values are dependent on biology and >> physics. I agree that physics and biology limit the range of possible >> values, but that's a wide perimeter and leaves a lot of leeway. Physics and >> biology also limit what is possible for history and culture. Differences >> that we see in moral values, e.g., attitude toward suicide, Gypsie children >> stealing wallets, government assassinations, are judged relative to one's >> history and culture. And the validity of those judgments* are subject to >> change with a change in history/culture. Yes, if physics and biology >> changed, then of course history and culture would change with it. Biology >> does change. Conceptions of physics do too; and it can be argued, using >> Thomas Kuhn for example, that sometimes our changing conceptions of physics >> are, to some extent, due to changing attitudes regulated by history/culture. >> As far as I can see physics and historical/culture affect each other, like >> when I push against a tree it pushes against me. >> > EDWINA: I see 'history/culture' as ideological PRODUCTS of the deeper > societal infrastructure which is embedded in the pragmatic realities of the > local ecology. [This really isn't biology and physics. Ecology can't be > reduced to biology and physics]. > I don't see that gypsy children stealing wallets is reflective of a whole > societal infrastructure - the same could be said for looting. The fact that > the gypsy family considers such theft a viable means of economic > participation - and that people who loot feel the same - certainly, you can > define them as VALUES - but I don't see how this fits into the discussion. When we make a judgment and then judge the judgment it seems to me we have to make clear what we are actually measuring. Certainly we can judge whether a behavior is according to the norms of a society. But that seems a different judgement than if we are asking what the ideal action would be. It fine to talk about each. I think we just have to be careful to be clear what it is we are measuring.
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