> On Oct 23, 2015, at 12:54 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > Agreed - that immediate/dynamic interpretant as cut off from the final > interpretant is nominalism. But, i still see Derrida as the ultimate > kabbalistic mystic, with The Word as the 'primal cause'; that is, it isn't > speech and its 'presentness' that is primary but the non-present 'writing' > ...existing outside even of the 'differance' between words..
Right, but a Kabbalistic mystic really is a variant of neoPlatonism and the One as both origin and end (alpha and omega) entails a strong type of realism. I’d also say that the Kabbalist sees the Word as a sign and thus one can’t separate the Word from its object and interpretant. The question then becomes, as it often is in Platonism, is how to view the relationship of time to origin. There are two ways to do it. One is when Platonism is used as a foil or straw man to attack the idea of permanent complete objects always before us. The other way looks at time is a different way that is closer to what I see Derrida and Peirce doing. Again Kelly Parker’s "The Ascent of Soul to Noûs: Charles S. Peirce as Neoplatonist” is a must read here. http://agora.phi.gvsu.edu/kap/Neoplatonism/csp-plot.html > As we know, Derrida rejected logic (i.e., reason) as the basis of language > and instead opted for 'utterances' in actual discourse. He obviously wasn't > that interested in the objective world. I'm not an expert on Derrida, having > been turned off by his rejection of logic and reason and the objective > world....so - the above are only my vague memories of my readings on him. Again one has to be careful here. Derrida rejected a particular view of reason as the basis of language. Effectively what he rejects is logic/language as being non-vague. He sees language not as determinate but as signs in the Peircean sense. (In On Grammatology he even explicitly makes this connection) So Derrida isn’t rejecting logic but saying logic is really signs. Further what grounds logic is ethics (which should be very familiar to Peirceans). Now how Derrida sees ethics is wrapped up in the Levinasian demand of the other, but its still an ethics. So effectively what Derrida is doing is taking this ethical ground quite seriously. (You can see this in particular in his famous paper “Force of Law” which distinguishes the relationship of law and justice — this applies to practical law but he intends it much more broadly)
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