> On Nov 24, 2015, at 9:33 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com> > wrote: > > List, Clark: > > On Nov 24, 2015, at 10:19 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > >> Even a particular belief is always still a general. > > Is this a logical assertion? > > If so, what are premises? > > Is it a deductive argument? > > Is it an inductive argument? > > Is it an abductive argument? > > Or, could is be a conditional statement? > > I bring these question to the discussion because this (philosophical?) > assertion appears to negate the possibility of an individual belief and the > belief of the chemists in the concept of an organic identity. The concept of > an organic identity appears to one of the cornerstones of CSP beliefs.
A belief is an habitual connection of ideas. For example, to say that I believe prussic acid is a poison is to say that when the idea of drinking it occurs to me, the idea of it as a poison with all the other ideas which follow in the train of this will arise in my mind. Among these ideas, or objects present to me, is the sense of refusing to drink it. This, if I am in a normal condition, will be followed by an action of the nerves when needed which will remove the cup from my lips. It seems probable that every habitual connection of ideas may produce such an effect upon the will. If this is actually so, a belief and an habitual connection of ideas are one and the same. In a mind which is capable of logical criticism of its beliefs, there must be a sensation of believing, which shall serve to show what ideas are connected. [—] The intellectual significance of beliefs lies wholly in the conclusions which may be drawn from them, and ultimately in their effects upon our conduct. For there does not seem to be any important distinction between two propositions which never can yield different practical results. (W 3:107-8) So I think there are elements of firstness and secondness but that these are somewhat different from the belief qua belief which is always habitual connection of ideas. Also And what, then, is belief? It is the demi-cadence which closes a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life. We have seen that it has just three properties: First, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a habit. As it appeases the irritation of doubt, which is the motive for thinking, thought relaxes, and comes to rest for a moment when belief is reached. But, since belief is a rule for action, the application of which involves further doubt and further thought, at the same time that it is a stopping-place, it is also a new starting-place for thought. That is why I have permitted myself to call it thought at rest, although thought is essentially an action. The final upshot of thinking is the exercise of volition, and of this thought no longer forms a part; but belief is only a stadium of mental action, an effect upon our nature due to thought, which will influence future thinking. The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is playing different tunes. (“How to Make Our Ideas Clear”)
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