> On Nov 24, 2015, at 11:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > Yes, a 'habit' as general or common, transforms input data (the object/s) > into an Interpretant. The habit is thus operative within the representamen. > > Not all signs have feeling and action associated with them [see the ten > classes of signs]
Again it’s important to be clear on our distinctions here. A feeling or an action are not the same as a sign. Typically in analysis of any particular phenomena (material or mental) we can break down our analysis in terms of firstness, secondness, and thirdness and then each of those categories further. So an effect of a sign can be a feeling or a an action but that’s separate from the sign itself, although we can then talk about this feeling or action in terms of a new sign. So for instance I may love my wife (a sign). I have a feeling of love (the feeling, firstness). My loving my wife (sign) leads to this feeling but should be distinguished from it. I think if I take Peirce’s discussion of swerve right that a sign can’t be a sign without there being an associated phenomena of feeling and action. They are essential for the sign to function as a sign but in terms of analysis should be distinguished from the sign. This seems one of those places though where our language becomes muddled quickly and keeping distinctions distinct can be difficult. My sense is we’re largely agreeing. This all seems somewhat tangental to the question at hand. >> "Now getting back to reversibility I suspect what we’re really talking about >> is acquiring habits or a second order habit. What Peirce called the habit of >> taking habits. In a certain sense habits aren’t reversible since if they are >> reversed by definition they are not longer called a habit. Perhaps that’s >> all Peirce means although my sense is he means something deeper. " >> >> > I'm not sure that reversibility can be equated with acquiring habits. The > passage that we've been referring to 8.318, denies that habits include > reversibility, and assigns reversibility to the purely mechanical realm. I probably should draw the distinctions a bit more clearly. Habits aren’t always absolute. Which implies it’s operational but sometimes not. So if we discuss a habit of taking habits sometimes that will be true and sometimes not. How strong the habit is consists of how often it is operational. When not operational this “taking habits” doesn’t occur. That means that the development of the habit in question (say going to be on time) isn’t strengthened. It may be weakened. So I’m suggesting one way to read the quote is in terms of these first and second order habits. I think if I have Peirce right here (no guarantee) that habits to be habits are always about acting in that particular way. It’s not that they are reversible but merely they are in play or not. What we might call the reversal of a habit isn’t really a reversal but is the non-functioning of this higher order habit in terms of developing the habit in question. I’m not saying this is necessarily what Peirce means. Just that now that I’ve thought about it for a while that’s the only interpretation that makes much sense to me.
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