> On Dec 1, 2015, at 8:38 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de > <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>> wrote: > > Gary, Clark, Sung, list, > to make the subject more complicated: We are dealing with the two kinds of > Salthean Hierarchy (Paper "Salthe´12Axiomathes"). The division of object into > immediate and dynamical object, and of the interpretant into its three modes > is a compositional hierarchy: The object is composed of its two modes, I > think, just like consciousness is composed of primi- alter- and medisense, > altersense of its two, and medisene of its three submodes. On the other hand, > the ten sign classes is a subsumption hierarchy: Here the subclasses are not > parts of, but kinds of those in the previous level. I wonder, whether in > either case of hierarchy, it stops at the third level (eg. (3.2.2)), or the > tree goes on having branches (eg. (3.2.2) splits up to (3.2.2.1) and > (3.2.2.2)).
I need to read that paper before saying anything. Do you have a link to it? My google-fu failed me and I couldn’t find it in my mail archive. I’d note that while we divide the object into the immediate and dynamical object we could easily add more intermediary objects depending upon the type of analysis. The distinction is the object as it really is (or as it is known to be as the final interpretant in other views) from the object as taken to be. That immediate object’s nature of course depends greatly upon the type of analysis we are doing. Further a problem is to assume it remains stable when often it doesn’t. That is the move from dynamical object to immediate object is a process and we can analyze the object at any point through that process. As to the subclasses, I think that goes on in a kind of infinite fractal descent. Further (and I think this is what you’re ultimately getting at) the fact that the object, sign-token, and interpretant are themselves open to a lot of analysis themselves. To give an obvious example a paragraph can be treated as a sign-token but that sign-token can itself be broken down into sentences with the sentences having connections between them in order to signify the interpretant. Likewise the sentences can be broken down into words, syntax, grammar, and the words broken down into letters or phonems and so on. Likewise the interpretant depending upon its nature can be broken down in terms of neural processes each of which is a sign system. The object can be broken down into the original dynamical object but also a series of immediate objects. Further it can be analyzed in terms of prior sign-tokens, the codes that enable the sign-tokens to be interpreted and so forth not to mention the causal link to the original object(s). It seems we can split in two ways. First the way the 10 categories gives us but also in any logical analysis we can see how various signs not to mention examples of firstness and secondness of various sorts all interact and relate to make something function the way it does. A great example of doing just this sort of thing is Frederik Stjemfelt’s book Natural Proposition which we discussed last year. His analysis of a lot of common features and propositions of a sort we encounter daily. Often he’s following Peirce’s examples but I found a lot of his analysis a great example of dealing with all this. As a someone related point someone asked earlier about the two 10 lists. I wonder if we shouldn’t make the distinction between logical analysis versus phenomenological analysis. Peirce has an excellent quote along these lines which for the life of me I can’t seem to locate at the moment. But I think a lot depends upon whether we’re doing logic, phenomenology, or a more physical or causal analysis. In a certain sense the categories are the same but I think sometimes the terminology shifts a bit not to mention what we tend to focus on.
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