"Stephen C. Rose" <stever...@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear John, list -You are right.To Peirce, propositions are not only linguistic, but may also use diagrams, pictures, gestures etc.(hence his generalization of propositions to "dicisigns").For that reason, the unity of propositions can not be a matter of linguistic syntax only. Rather, linguistic syntax is but one example of how that unity is brought about.Thus, it is co-localization in a certain and non-trivial use of the word which fuses subject and predicate into propositions.Apart from ch. 3 of my 2014 book, Francesco Bellucci has also addressed this issue in recent papers.BestFFra: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Dato: torsdag den 21. januar 2016 10.46
Til: Frederik Stjernfelt <stj...@hum.ku.dk>, Robert Eckert <recke...@mail.naz.edu>, "peirce-l@list.iupui.edu" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Emne: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging
John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk]
Sent: Wednesday, 20 January 2016 1:25 PM
To: John Collier; Robert Eckert; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging
Dear Peircers -
Indeed a deep question.
In Peirce, it is connected to his complicated theory of what constitutes the unity of propositions ("Dicisigns" - . I addressed this in "Natural propositions" (2014)).
To Peirce, this question is independent of the issue of the components of propositions (subjects and predicate) taken individually and seems to have two aspects, one being the basic, relational structure underlying predicates, the other being a (most often disguised) self-reference of propositions connected to 1) their truth-claims and 2) the issue of the "immediate object" as the sign's claimed connection to its object.
Best,
Frederik
Fra: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Svar til: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Dato: onsdag den 20. januar 2016 06.40
Til: Robert Eckert <recke...@mail.naz.edu>, "peirce-l@list.iupui.edu" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Emne: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging
Interesting questions, Robert. They certainly deserve further investigation.
One difference I see is that Chomsky’s merge is a syntactic operation, whereas, If I understand him correctly, Peircean coupling has a semantic aspect as well. Chomsky consistently separates syntax and semantics, but he perhaps has a more narrow view of semantics than Peirce did. This latter issue is especially worth exploring, I think.
I believe that Chomsky’s merge (and many if not all of his earlier syntactic operations) is nonreducible to component parts (especially linguistic behaviours), and in this respect seems to be a Peircean third. Likewise for Peircean coupling. So in this respect they are species of a common genus. But I don’t think this directly implies they are of the same species of this genus for the reasons I gave before.
I have considerably more I could say, but I will leave it at that for now. I was exposed to Chomsky (as a professor of mine) and to Peirce (by independent study) more or less at the same time as an undergraduate, and I am probably more inclined than many to see connections between the two. This has only been reinforced by my subsequent studies, though the differences have also become more apparent.
John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
From: Robert Eckert [mailto:recke...@mail.naz.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, 20 January 2016 1:49 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging
Dear list,
Is it possible that Peirce's thirdness, Percy's coupling and Chomsky's merging are the same?
Could this bringing together, symbolization, merging, of two other things, explain our language ability?
If so, this basic exemplification in diagrammatic form defines humans.
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